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Abstract
The present dissertation analyses the relationship between the concept of scientific
representation and the concept of structure. According to the recent literature on
scientific representation, such relationship is rather problematic.
The problematic character of the relationship is partially due to the notions it calls
for. Indeed, neither the concept of scientific representation – generally intended as
the construction and the application of models to the phenomena investigated –
nor the concept of structure – generally intended as a set of objects and relations
among these objects – are employed unambiguously.
Moreover, it is widely acknowledged that the use of the concept of structure in
the analysis of scientific representation is controversial since it can lead to two un-
desirable consequences. First, focusing solely on structures might lead to neglect
the pragmatic aspects of scientific representation in favor of the relationship be-
tween the vehicle and the target of representation. Second, focusing on structures
alone may require to define the relationship between the model and its target in
structural terms (e.g., by resorting to the use of morphisms) in order to justify the
representational relationship.
The dissertation is articulated in three chapters. In each chapter the problem is
analysed by examining the relationship between scientific representation and a par-
ticular concept of structure, that is, respectively, structure as pattern-ascription,
structure as presented within the semantic view of scientific theories, structure as
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presented within (a particular instance of) the so-called structural approaches to
scientific representation. The analysis aims to identify if and to what extent the
concept of structure can be integrated into the philosophical analysis of scientific
representation without leading to the two undesirable consequences above.
Chapter 1 provides a critical review of some of the most recent approaches to
scientific representation. In particular, the so-called deflationist approaches are
considered, which I group into two categories. The first category comprises ap-
proaches that deflate the problem of scientific representation. According to these
approaches, scientific representation is not crucially different from other forms of
representation, so it does not pose any special problem to be solved. The second
category comprises approaches that deflate the concept of scientific representation.
According to these approaches, it is not possible to give necessary and sufficient
conditions for all occurrences of representation in science. My stance on these two
forms of deflationism is twofold. I reject the deflationism about the problem of
representation by appealing to a concept of structure conceived as pattern ascrip-
tion – which I label epistemic structure ascription. As for the deflationism about
the concept of representation, I subscribe its claim, and I argue that it can be
fruitfully combined with the concept of epistemic structure ascription.
Chapter 2 examines the relationship between the semantic view of scientific theo-
ries and scientific representation. The analysis of this relationship is relevant for
two reasons. First, the semantic view, conceived as an analysis of scientific theo-
ries focusing on models (rather than on language), is widely acknowledged among
the analyses contributing to the development of the issue of scientific representa-
tion. Second, being presented as a formal analysis of models as structures, the
semantic view is often charged of leading to the undesirable consequences men-
tioned above, i.e., to neglect the pragmatic aspects of scientific representation and
to define the relationship between models and target systems solely in structural
terms. The aim of this chapter is to show that the semantic view, at least in its
early formulation, is not the legitimate target for these criticisms.
Chapter 3∗, identifies one legitimate target of the criticisms usually directed against
∗Chapter 3 is based on a joint work with Mauricio Sua´rez.
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the semantic view: the structural accounts of scientific representation and, in par-
ticular, the structural account propounded by Bartels (2006). Applying the ar-
gument from the misrepresentation objection – the fact that structural accounts
are not capable to explain the possibility of inaccurate representation – we show
that if the concept of structure is isolated from all the pragmatic aspects of rep-
resentation, then it is not sufficient to account for misrepresentation and, hence,
to account for representation tout court.
The overall conclusion of this dissertation is the following: the concept of struc-
ture can still be useful within the philosophical analysis of scientific representation,
provided that the limitations on its use are plainly specified. More precisely, as
stressed in Chapter 1 by appealing to the notion of epistemic structural ascrip-
tion, the concept of structure sheds light on what makes models accomplish their
representational task; as pointed out in Chapter 2, where a fair assessment of the
semantic view as an account of representation is attempted, the concept of struc-
ture can be employed to provide a rational reconstruction of the use of models in
the scientific practice. However, as argued in Chapter 3, the concept of structure
exceeds its scope when it is employed either to reconstruct the scientific theo-
rizing independently of pragmatic aspects, or to set the necessary and sufficient
conditions for all the occurrences of scientific representation.
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Abstract
(in italiano)
In questa tesi viene analizza la relazione tra il concetto di rappresentazione scien-
tifica e quello di struttura. Questa relazione risulta essere particolarmente proble-
matica secondo la letteratura piu` recente sulla rappresentazione scientifica.
Parte del problema dipende dalla difficolta` di definire in modo esauriente sia il
concetto di rappresentazione scientifica, generalmente inteso come costruzione e
applicazione dei modelli ai sistemi indagati, sia il concetto di struttura, general-
mente inteso come un insieme di elementi e un insieme di relazioni definite sugli
elementi.
Inoltre, si ritiene che il ricorso al concetto di struttura nell’analisi della rappresen-
tazione scientifica sia controverso dal momento che puo` portare a due conseguenze
indesiderate. In primo luogo, focalizzarsi esclusivamente sul concetto di struttura
puo` indurre ad ignorare gli aspetti pragmatici della rappresentazione scientifica in
favore della sola relazione tra rappresentante e rappresentato. Secondariamente,
a meno che non si definisca strutturalmente anche la relazione tra il modello e il
sistema indagato (ad esempio, ricorrendo alla nozione di morfismo), tale relazione
rimane priva di giustificazione.
La tesi e` articolata in tre capitoli. In ciascun capitolo il problema e` analizzato
esaminando la relazione tra il concetto di rappresentazione e una particolare for-
mulazione del concetto di struttura. Nel primo capitolo il concetto di struttura
considerato e` quello di ascrizione o riconoscimento di un ordine (pattern). Nel
secondo capitolo il concetto e` quello presentato dalla concezione semantica del-
le teorie scientifiche. Nel terzo capitolo il concetto e` quello presentato da una
particolare istanza di approccio strutturale alla rappresentazione scientifica. Lo
scopo dell’analisi e` quello di stabilire se e fino a che punto il concetto di struttura
possa essere integrato nell’analisi filosofica della rappresentazione scientifica senza
implicare le conseguenze indesiderate menzionate.
Nel capitolo 1 viene fornita un’ analisi critica di alcuni degli approcci piu` recenti
alla rappresentazione scientifica. In particolare, sono presi in esame gli approcci
vdeflazionisti alla rappresentazione, che distinguo in due categorie. La prima cate-
goria si applica al problema della rappresentazione: la rappresentazione scientifica
non e` diversa da altre forme di rappresentazione, pertanto essa non pone alcun
problema speciale da risolvere. La seconda categoria di deflazionismo si applica al
concetto della rappresentazione scientifica: non e` possibile fornire una definizione
di rappresentazione che ne individui le condizioni necessarie e sufficienti. Nel ca-
pitolo sostengo che gli approcci che rientrano nella prima categoria devono essere
rifiutati e che il concetto di struttura inteso come ascrizione di un ordine – concet-
to che chiamo ‘ascrizione epistemica di struttura’ (epistemic structure ascription)
– ha un ruolo decisivo in questo rifiuto. Per quanto riguarda gli approcci che
rientrano nella seconda categoria, sostengo che questi debbano essere accettati e
suggerisco una loro integrazione con l’ascrizione epistemica di struttura.
Nel capitolo 2 viene esaminato il rapporto tra concezione semantica delle teorie
scientifiche e la rappresentazione scientifica. L’analisi del rapporto e` rilevante per
due ragioni. In primo luogo perche´ la concezione semantica, essendo un’analisi
delle teorie scientifiche che si focalizza sui modelli (piu` che sul linguaggio) e` con-
siderata tra i fattori che hanno concorso a stimolare il dibattito filosofico sulla
rappresentazione scientifica. In secondo luogo, venendo considerata un’analisi for-
male centrata sui modelli come strutture, la concezione semantica e` generalmente
tacciata di portare alle conseguenze indesiderate citate inizialmente, vale a dire, l’i-
gnoranza degli aspetti pragmatici della rappresentazione scientifica e la definizione
in termini puramente strutturali della relazione tra il modello e il sistema inda-
gato. L’obiettivo del capitolo e` argomentare che la concezione semantica, almeno
nella sua formulazione iniziale, non e` il corretto destinatario di queste critiche.
Nel capitolo 3† si identifica il corretto destinatario delle critiche mosse alla con-
cezione semantica, cioe` gli approcci strutturali alla rappresentazione scientifica e,
in particolare, l’approccio strutturale formulato da Bartels (2006). Viene dunque
considerato uno degli argomenti usati in letteratura per indebolire gli approc-
ci strutturali, detto ‘della rappresentazione fallace’ (misrepresentation). Secondo
questo argomento, gli approcci strutturali non possono giustificare la possibilita` di
una rappresentazione fallace. Ricorrendo a queso argomento, dimostriamo che, se
il concetto di struttura viene completamente isolato dagli aspetti pragmatici della
†Il capitolo 3 e` basato su un lavoro in collaborazione con Mauricio Sua´rez.
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rappresentazione, allora esso non e` sufficiente per giustificare la rappresentazione
fallace e, dunque, per giustificare la rappresentazione tout court.
La conclusione della tesi e` in sostanza la seguente: il concetto di struttura puo`
essere ancora utile per l’analisi filosofica della rappresentazione scientifica, purche´
i suoi limiti vengano chiaramente individuati. Piu` precisamente, come sottolinea-
to nel Capitolo 1 riferendomi alla nozione di ascrizione epistemica di struttura,
il concetto di struttura e` utile a chiarire cosa consente ai modelli di assolvere la
loro funzione rappresentazionale; come ho messo in rilievo nel Capitolo 2, dove ho
tentato di fornire una ricostruzione il piu` fedele possibile alle prime formulazioni
della concezione semantica delle teorie scientifiche, il concetto di struttura puo` es-
sere usato al fine di fornire una ricostruzione razionale dei modelli utilizzati nella
pratica scientifica. Tuttavia, come abbiamo argomentato con l’analisi offerta nel
Capitolo 3, il concetto di struttura non puo` essere usato per fornire una ricostru-
zione della rappresentazione scientifica nella quale vengono ignorati gli elementi
pragmatici, o per individuare le condizioni necessarie e sufficienti valide per tutte
le istanze di rappresentazione scientifica.
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Introduction
Scientific representation is a term which is still lacking a univocal interpretation
notwithstanding many scientists and philosophers agree that science amounts to
a representational activity. The issue of scientific representation has arisen as a
philosophical attempt to systematize the epistemic process of acquiring knowledge
on a specific target, and to analyse thoroughly the devices available to carry out
such a process. However, as Hughes – one of the main contributor to the philo-
sophical debate on the issue – points out, to call the byproduct of the theorizing
activity “model”, and the relation between a model and target system “represen-
tation”, does not take us very far (Hughes, 1997, p.325). Scientific models come in
too many varieties, and equally varied are the possible representational relation-
ships holding between specific kinds of models and their target systems, not to
mention the fact that models may not be the only means through which scientific
representation can be carried out.
Philosophical attempts to bring some order to the complexity of the representa-
tional issue should be dated back to the 1960s, when the semantic view arose as an
alternative to the syntactic view of scientific theories, drawing the philosophers’
attention to models – presented as proper explanatory tools, rather than as mere
heuristic devices. The semantic view has focused its analysis of theories on the
notion of models as structures, either model-theoretically or set-theoretically un-
derstood. Since then, the possibility to understand the explanatory roles of models
in terms of either logical or mathematical properties has offered a quick route for
the philosopher of science to a clearer overview of scientific representation. Already
in the early 1980s, the approaches based on the notion of structure started to be
xi
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criticized. In particular, the notion of model put forward by the ‘semanticists’
has been criticized as too theory-oriented: conceiving models as semantic realiza-
tions of a theory, the semantic view does not account for models which do not
directly depend on theories for their construction, as well as for models which do
not find in one single theory the formal background for their construction. More
importantly, focusing on formal aspects of theory construction and application,
the semantic view has been charged of not taking into account the pragmatic as-
pects proper to scientific theorizing. In the 1990s, structural approaches have been
put forward and presented as formulations of the semantic view. As the seman-
tic view, structural approaches conceive models in structural terms, and justify
the applicability of models to their target system in terms of structural relation-
ships of some sort (mainly, morphisms). Notwithstanding structural approaches
present themselves as formulations of the semantic view, they go one step further
with respect to the latter. This step consists in positing structural relationship
as necessary and sufficient conditions for representation. The skepticism already
fostered towards representational accounts based on the notion of structures then
has grown further. Indeed, within structural approaches, the role of model-users
and the pragmatic aspects of model construction are blurred up to the point to
question their relevance for the philosophical analysis.
Consequently, when it comes to the issue of representation, it seems that the
philosopher of science has to choose between two clashing schools of thought. On
the one hand, the philosopher could opt for privileging accounts of representation
mainly focused on structural features, and leaving to, e.g., the sociologist of science
the analysis of the pragmatic aspects of model construction and application. On
the other hand, she could opt for focusing on the pragmatics of modelling. In
the latter case, formal concepts are not strictly necessary for the analysis and the
philosopher might be content with examining particular occurrences of scientific
representation, and with drawing conclusions on the grounds of these occurrences.
However, I think that a halfway house between the two schools of thought can be
found. The philosophical analysis of scientific representation should not confine
itself within the safe boundaries of case studies. Nor it should confine itself within
the safe boundaries of any sort of formalism. It should rather attempt to provide a
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rational reconstruction of scientific representation where both the pragmatic and
the formal aspects of representation have their own place.
The goal of this dissertation is to see if we can clear up the concept of structure
from the limitations ascribed to it, and to see if the concept can be fruitfully used
for a rational reconstruction of scientific representation. A rational reconstruction
of scientific representation depends on the selection of relevant aspects of theorizing
which characterize particular sciences (e.g. physics, biology, chemistry, etc). In the
selection process, several details which actually characterize scientific theorizing,
and which are distinctive of the different disciplines, are left out. Nonetheless, the
rational reconstruction, in virtue of its approximate and general character, might
help to shed light on the whole activity itself.
The dissertation is articulated in three chapters. Each chapter analyses if and
to what extent the concept of structure can be integrated into the philosophical
analysis of scientific representation. In each chapter a particular concept of struc-
ture is considered, that is, respectively, structure as pattern-ascription, structure
as presented within the semantic view of scientific theories, structure as presented
within (a particular instance of) the so-called structural approaches to scientific
representation.
Chapter 1 introduces the issue of scientific representation (Section 1.1) and high-
lights a recent tendency in philosophy of science to dismiss the possibility of a
rational reconstruction of the issue aiming at singling out the general features of
representation in science (Section 1.2). The aim of the chapter is to see if this gen-
eral tendency can be resisted and, in particular, to see if the concept of structure
can play a role in reversing the trend. To this purpose, I consider different forms of
deflationism concerning scientific representation which have influenced the debate
in recent years.
In Section 1.3, I consider the form of deflationism put forward by Callender and
Cohen (2006). This form of deflationism turns out to be quite detrimental for the
debate on scientific representation since it aims at deflating the very problem of
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scientific representation. Indeed, Callender and Cohen argue that scientific repre-
sentation has no special status with respect to other kinds of representation and,
as any of these kinds, it can be reduced to just one fundamental form of repre-
sentation. They frame their deflationism within the so-called General Griceanism,
according to which representation obtains by stipulation, that is, representational
vehicles represent their targets by virtue of their users’ mental states, on the
grounds of which users agree that the vehicle can be employed to represent.
In Section 1.4, I discuss two criticisms against General Griceanism, one made
by Toon (2012) and the other by Liu (2015). These two criticisms, although
not identical, are very similar. Indeed, both Toon and Liu reject Callender and
Cohen’s deflationism on the grounds that it does not explain the epistemic role
that models have in scientific representation; hence, they argue, it fails to reduce
scientific representation to a more fundamental form of representation. I agree
with their conclusion about the impossibility for General Griceanism to account
for scientific representation. However, I suggest that their criticisms need to take
a further step in order to be fully effective. More precisely, I argue that we have to
specify what kind of epistemic task models are built for and how a model-user can
employ models to accomplish such a task. I conclude by suggesting that scientific
models are built and used for two very specific epistemic tasks, i.e., to explain and
to predict the behavior of target phenomena, and that it is possible to identify
a core feature that characterizes how such epistemic tasks can be accomplished,
namely, the capability of models to allow the model-user to ascribe a certain
structure to a target system – which I call epistemic structure ascription.
The other form of deflationism which I consider in this chapter concerns the con-
cept of scientific representation and it aims at showing that it is not possible to
give necessary and sufficient conditions which hold for all occurrences of scientific
representation. In Section 1.5, I consider this kind of deflationism in the form
put forward by Sua´rez (2004), which goes under the label of inferential concep-
tion. In this account, the deflation of the concept is obtained by positing that, at
most, only necessary conditions for representation can be given. These conditions
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roughly amount to the possibility for the model-user to draw inferences about the
target of the model, according to the current norms of scientific practice.
In Section 1.6, I discuss the virtues of the inferential conception, also with respect
to another deflationary account, i.e., the DDI account of representation advocated
by (Hughes, 1997). Moreover, I suggest that the idea of epistemic structure as-
cription – i.e, the idea that models accomplish their epistemic role by allowing a
user to ascribe a certain structure to their target – can be fruitfully integrated
into Sua´rez’s inferential conception, to form a sort of combined account. Such a
suggestion, I hope, might be a development – although marginal – of the infer-
ential conception. This is because the concept of epistemic structure ascription
is faithful to the deflationary spirit of the inferential conception. In particular,
it allows to strengthen one of the necessary conditions for representation set by
the inferential account. This condition, I argue, can be fruitfully combined with
a structural approach to the epistemic task of models and, hence, to scientific
representation. Finally, Section 1.7 provides some concluding remarks.
Chapter 2 examines the relationship between the semantic view of scientific the-
ories and scientific representation. The main focus is on two criticisms that are
raised against the semantic view because of its focus on structures. I argue that the
semantic view, at least in its early formulation, is immune to these criticisms. To
this purpose, I first review what the early advocates of the semantic view posited
about the relationship between theories and scientific representation, with partic-
ular emphasis on some aspects that are often overlooked – if not misunderstood.
Then, I apply these posits to show that the semantic view is not a legitimate target
for the criticisms considered in the chapter.
The semantic view has gained its orthodoxy status in contrast to the syntactic
view. Such a contrast is then useful to understand the fundamental tenets of the
semantic view. However, the contrast is often sketched in a way that, for sake
of arguments and clarity, blurs some aspects of the semantic view which, I argue,
turn out to be crucial to evaluate its contribution to the issue of representation.
In my reconstruction of the semantic view (Section 2.2) I aim at recovering these
aspects and, to this end, I proceed in three steps.
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First, I examine the approach of the semantic view to the formalization of theories
(subsection 2.2.1), showing that the view aims at providing a rational reconstruc-
tion which is fundamentally structural – i.e., based on models as structures and
on the structural relationship between models – and “modest”, in the sense that
it does not claim that such formalization is the only possible one. Second, I il-
lustrate the overall scope of the view, showing that the view acknowledges the
relevance of actual scientific practice (subsection 2.2.2) and that it even looks at
the actual practice to test the goodness-of-fit of the reconstruction thus provided.
Third, building on the previous steps, I argue that the semantic view – at least
in its early formulation – seems to be neutral with respect to both realism and
antirealism and that it does not necessarily imply any particular ontological stance
(subsection 2.2.3).
I then turn my attention to two criticisms against the semantic view which focus
on its implications for scientific representation. The first criticism rules out the
possibility for the semantic view to account for representation (Section 2.3). I
focus on two recent contributions which I consider as instances of this criticism,
i.e., Le Bihan (2012) (subsection 2.3.1) and Brading and Landry (2006) (subsection
2.3.2). In both these papers, representation is cashed out in terms of the hierarchy
of models put forward by Suppes (1962), i.e., representation is intended as the
relationship between the last layer of the hierarchy, at which we find data models,
and the target system. The two contributions share the assumption that the
semantic view is eminently a program of analysis of the structure of theories, and
they both reach the conclusion that, within such a program, representation can
not be accommodated. The second criticism is more subtle, as it concedes that
the semantic view could be an account of representation, but only at the price of
implying a form of structuralism about representation (Section 2.4). Such criticism
is seldom made explicit and it seems to imply the idea that the semantic view is
a hospitable framework for structural realism.
My arguments in defense of the semantic view follow from the analysis of the view
that I have provided in the first part of the chapter. With respect to the first
criticism I claim that, although I share with both Le Bihan (2012) and Brading
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and Landry (2006) the idea that the semantic view is eminently a rational recon-
struction of scientific theories, we reach opposite conclusions about the possibility
for the semantic view to account for representation. I argue that their conclusion,
i.e., that the semantic view can not offer an account of representation, relies on
assumptions which are unwarrantedly too strong.
Le Bihan (2012) assumes that a necessary condition for the semantic view to ac-
count for representation is that it must be able to tell us when the procedure
followed by a scientist to construct a data model is good or bad for a given phe-
nomenon (subsection 2.3.1). In the light of the discussion in subsection 2.2.2, I
argue that the semantic view is capable of this kind of evaluation, but only in two
weak senses. First, the semantic view can establish if the procedure is consistent
with the theory of experimental design. Second, it can evaluate whether the pro-
cedure yields a data model that is potentially – but not necessarily – morphic to
the theory’s model. The semantic view can assess the procedure that leads to the
construction of a data model in no more specific senses. However, this suffices to
account for scientific representation in the sense expressed in Le Bihan (2012) by
the concept of “functional adequacy”.
Brading and Landry (2006) assume that representation can not be accounted for
unless we somehow impose a structure on phenomena, either by identifying phe-
nomena with their associated data models, or by directly assuming that phenom-
ena come in structures. Since they (correctly) argue that the semantic view is
silent on the structure of target phenomena, they conclude that the view can not
account for scientific representation. My counter-argument is that an account of
scientific representation need not be framed exclusively in structural terms – as
Brading and Landry seem to believe – and that the semantic view does not appeal
solely to a series of structural relationships to account for representation. More
precisely, my point here is that a rational reconstruction is an account of repre-
sentation that tells us how data models latch to their target phenomena, but it
does so without dealing with any specific component of any particular target phe-
nomenon. A rational reconstruction can be an account of scientific representation
in Le Bihan’s sense of functional-adequacy without any structuralist commitment.
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Explaining why data models are built in the way they are actually built sheds
light on how models latch to their target phenomena, at least in the weak sense
of rationalizing the behavior of scientists and their actual practices.
With respect to the second criticism I argue that it is both historically misleading
and unwarranted. The early advocates of the view, as clarified in the discussion of
neutrality in subsection 2.2.3, did make it very explicit that the view should not
aim at being a framework for developing epistemic stances. In subsections 2.2.1
and 2.2.2, I argue that the second criticism is unwarranted. In fact, the semantic
view can account for representation – in the sense of a rational reconstruction
of it – without requiring any ontological commitment. Indeed, to assume that
reality is already in structural form (ready for the scientist to be translated into a
data model) would mean to commit to structural realism. However, the semantic
view does not make such an assumption. Instead, it assumes that the scientist is
forced by the way in which theories are formulated (and, more precisely, by the
hierarchy of models), to extract information from the phenomenon and to put it in
the structural form which is typical of the data model. Finally, Section 2.5 sums
up the main points of both the criticisms and my counterarguments.
Chapter 3 analyses an instance of the so-called structural approaches to scientific
representation, namely Bartels’ homomorphic theory of representation (Bartels,
2006). The hallmark of structural approaches is to present structural properties of
models, such as morphisms, as necessary and sufficient condition to have represen-
tation. In this chapter, which is based on a joint work with Mauricio Sua´rez, we
show that, contrary to Bartels’ claim, his account can not accommodate misrepre-
sentation and, hence, it can not account for representation tout court. This leads
us to conclude that if the concept of structure is isolated from all the pragmatic as-
pects of representation, as structural approaches require, then any account which
relies on such a concept can not accommodate representation.
In Section 3.2, we review the concept of misrepresentation in scientific modelling,
in both the mistargetting and inaccuracy varieties. We consider the influential
historical case of the billiard ball model of gases, which we use to identify the
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ways in which inaccuracy obtains. We then argue that Bartels’ account fails to
accommodate both the forms of misrepresentation.
In Section 3.3 we show that Bartels’ homomorphism theory can not account for
mistargetting, as it is presented in (Sua´rez, 2003). We consider Bartels’ homomor-
phism theory of representation, pointing out the essential role played in Bartels’
account by what he calls a “representational mechanism”, whose role is to pick
a target for a given model out of the set of its possible targets. Since a repre-
sentational mechanisms is crucial for misrepresentation to occur in the form of
mistargetting, but it is independent of any structural mapping, we argue that
(mis)representation is not accounted fully in structural terms.
In Section 3.4, we show that Bartels’ theory can not account for inaccuracy, that
we define by introducing three ways in which models can inaccurately represent:
abstracting, pretending, and simulating. We argue that all scientific models ab-
stract, many pretend, and some simulate and that, despite their inaccuracy, models
preserve their descriptive, predictive, and explanatory value. We show that even
the weakest notion of structural morphism is too strong for jointly accommodat-
ing abstracting, pretending, and simulating. Therefore, we conclude that Bartels’
account can not accommodate misrepresentation as inaccuracy.
Finally, in Section 3.5 we draw the moral that greater care should be taken with
structural accounts of representation based on the notion of morphism: although
morphisms may well be needed to assess the accuracy or faithfulness of a scientific
model, neither scientific representation, nor actual theorizing, can be successfully
reduced to any kind of morphism.
Chapter 1
Reinflating Scientific
Representation
1.1 Presenting representation
The issue of scientific representation has arisen as a philosophical attempt to sys-
tematize the epistemic process of acquiring knowledge on a specific target, and to
analyse thoroughly the devices available to carry out such a process. Among these
vehicles, apparently, a pivotal role is ascribed by both scientists and philosophers
to models. Many philosophers conceive science as a representational activity, that
is, as depending on “the possibility of ignoring accidents, of isolating certain key
features in a situation. These are captured by models, although in the very act
of idealisation or approximation we convince ourselves that the model is indeed
false.” (Redhead, 1980, p.162). The act of explaining notwithstanding, or in virtue
of, omission and isolation is what makes models crucial for science to be carried
out. This is what Cartwright seems to suggest when she claims that “to explain
a phenomenon is to construct a model which fits the phenomenon into a theory.
The fundamental laws of the theory are true of the objects in the model, and they
are used to derive a specific account of how these objects behave. But the objects
1
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of the model have only ‘the form or appearance of things’ and, in a very strong
sense, not their ‘substance or proper qualities’.” (1983, p.17).1
As for many issue in philosophy, we can not fix a moment in time when the issue
of scientific representation arose. We must be content to track down the context
which allowed the issue to be set forth. This moment coincides with the rise of the
“modeling attitude”, a label recently coined by Teller (2008a) and Sua´rez (2015)
to identify the tendency, both in physics and in philosophy, to consider models
among the main means to pursue scientific theorizing.2
The modelling attitude finds its prehistory in the so called Bildtheorie, a view
mainly developed throughout the work of Boltzmann ([1974] 1902,4), Hertz (1899)
and usually extended to the work of Maxwell ([1990] 1856).3 Bildtheorie mainly
amounts to a claim about the aim of science, which is defined as “the ubiquitous
1Besides the works by Redhead and Cartwright just mentioned, other contributions subscrib-
ing this picture of science as representational are Cartwright (1999a), Giere (1988, 1999, 2004),
Hughes (1997), Morgan and Morrison (1999), Redhead (2001), van Fraassen (1997, 2008). In
particular, to stress the representational role of models are Hughes (1997), Giere (1999), Teller
(2001), Sua´rez (2002), Bailer-Jones (2003). On the other hand, Hacking (1983) famously turns
down this picture.
2An alternative account of the rise of the “modelling attitude” is presented by Bailer-Jones
(1999). Bailer-Jones lets the modelling attitude begin with a phase that she labels “from dis-
regard [of models] to popularity” (ibid, p.24). This is the phase when Duhem (1954), “against
his own interest” (Bailer-Jones, 1999, p.25) brings to the fore the work of models in scientific
theorizing. Indeed, in The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory (1954) Duhem draws the fa-
mous distinction between the ‘Continental-schooled’ and the ‘English-schooled’ physicists’ view
on theory construction. The French or German physicist will avoid any imaginative effort and
she justifies her hypotheses by treading the path of the “algebraic development” via deduction
which starts exactly from the attachment of physical attributes (magnitudes) to the objects of
the theory (ibid., p.78). On the other hand, for the English physicist, understanding a phe-
nomenon is “the same thing as designing a model imitating the phenomenon; whence the nature
of the material things will be understood by imagining a mechanism whose performance will
represent and simulate the properties of bodies” (p.72). In so doing, Bailer-Jones claims, Duhem
implicitly and unintentionally frames the need for models to supplement theories for explanatory
purposes.
3Blackmore (1999) and de Regt (1999) provide accurate analyses of Boltzmann’s Bildtheorie,
with a stress on his approach on explanation and understanding. They also draw interesting
comparisons between Boltzmann’s, Hertz’s and Maxwell’s views. A thorough analysis on the
role of models, analogies and metaphors in Maxwell’s work is provided by Peruzzi (2010). A
reconstruction of the Bildtheorie’s development is provided by van Fraassen (2008, ch.8, pp.
191-204), with a stress on the Bildtheorie’s implications for the realism-antirealism debate. In
this section, I do not need to go into details concerning the differences among Bildtheorie’s
formulations and I only aim at providing an overview.
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task [...] to explain the more complex in terms of the simpler; or, if preferred, to
represent [anschaulich darstellen] the complex by means of clear pictures [Bilder ]
borrowed from the sphere of the simpler phenomena.” (Boltzmann, [1974] 1905,
p.149).
As is well known, Bildtheorie presents theories as mental constructions of models,
“the working of which we make plain to ourselves by the analogy of mechanisms we
hold in our hands and which have so much in common with natural phenomena as
to help our comprehension of the latter.” (Boltzmann, [1974] 1902, p.790). Thus,
as Hertz (1899) stresses, on the basis of the analogy between our “inner pictures”
and the “external objects”, we are allowed to draw inferences from the former
on the latter: “the necessary consequences of the pictures in thought [Bilder ] are
always the pictures [Bilder ] of the necessary consequences in nature of the things
pictured.” (1899, p.2).
What emerges as relevant from this early stage of the modelling attitude is the
fact that science is not conceived mainly as a description, capable of being true
or false, of the system under inquiry. Science rather proceeds by building pictures
of such systems. Secondly, the relationship between these pictures, models, and
their target systems is representational. Boltzmann couches this relation as an
ascription of (mental) pictures with a “definite content” to the thing we want
them to stand for, although such an ascription does not imply complete similarity
since “we can know but little of the resemblance of our thoughts to the things we
attach them.” (Boltzmann, [1974] 1902, p. 213).
What makes the Bildtheorie a candidate forerunner of the current philosophical
analysis of the issue of scientific representation is the fact that, although cashing
out the concept in terms of mental states, it puts models at the center of the
theorizing activity, raising the puzzle of how something which does not mirror
the real system under inquiry could be capable of providing knowledge about the
latter. It is around this puzzle that the question ‘in virtue of what do models
represent ? ’ becomes the core of the issue of scientific representation.
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To grasp the origin of the philosophical qualm about representation, consider as
an example the well-known model of a simple pendulum. The following equation
describes the motion of a “grandfather clock” (Giere, 1988) as the period of a
pendulum which is proportional to the square root of its length and independent
of its mass:
T = 2pi
√
l
g
(1.1)
where T is the time period for one oscillation, l is the pendulum length, and g is the
acceleration due to gravity. To get to equation (1.1), we need to start by imagining
the following idealization of a real pendulum. Our idealized pendulum consists of
a point mass, m, which is attached to an infinitely light rigid rod whose length
is l which, in turn, is attached to a frictionless pivot point. In accordance with
Newton’s Second Law, the equation of motion of the pendulum is the following:
ml
d2θ
dt2
= −mg sin θ (1.2)
where θ represents the angle of swing of the pendulum calculated from the ver-
tical position. Equation (1.2) is further simplified by assuming that the angle of
oscillation is very small, so that sin θ ≈ θ. The modified equation of motion has
the following form:
d2θ
dt2
+
g
l
θ = 0 (1.3)
The solution to (1.3) is:
θ = θ0 sin
(√
g
l
t+ φ0
)
(1.4)
where θ0 is the angle of swing, and φ0 is the initial phase angle. (The values of θ0
and φ0 depend on the initial conditions of the motion of the pendulum).
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All these equations have the “unhappy feature [that they] do not represent facts”
(Cartwright, 1983, p.58). Indeed, in the case of the motion of a pendulum, what
is represented by the equation is only an idealized and approximate version of
the motion of a grandfather clock. In fact, the latter has not just a point mass,
and is not attached to a rod that is infinitely light, and the pivot point does have
frictions. In other words, idealization imposes some “deliberate omissions” (Bailer-
Jones, 2002) of parameters which are not considered as relevant.4 Model-users are
aware of what is represented by this equation and how – i.e., according to which
parameters – it is represented. The selection of parameters is the feature which
shows the “imaginative and intuitive element in theoretical physics” (Redhead,
1980, p.162) and makes models “not descriptions of facts, but an invitation to [...]
imagine a particular situation” (Frigg, 2010, p.260).
The philosopher who aims at understanding the source of the explanatory power
of models has nowadays the possibility to choose among, mainly, two conflicting
stances, recently labelled by Chakravartty (2010) as the functional and the infor-
mational approaches to scientific representation. Informational approaches tend
to present representation as a dyadic relation between the model and its target
system, emphasizing the “objective relations” holding between the two, such as
similarity, isomorphism or other kinds of morphisms. The relations are defined
as objective in the sense of “mind-independency”: what makes a model repre-
sentational pertains to its ‘ontology’, i.e., to its features and properties.5 Func-
tional approaches rather emphasize the functional character of representation. As
stressed by van Fraassen (2008), representation is a function of models and, as
such, it is not operative unless it is ascribed or recognized by a model-user. The
role played by model-users in such an ascription and recognition is then crucial to
have representation.
4Idealization here is intended as “Aristotelian idealization” (Frigg and Hartmann, 2012), or
“abstraction” (Cartwright, 1989), that is, as the act of “stripping away” those properties of a
concrete object that are not considered as relevant for the problem at stake.
5The term “ontology” as applied to models is used here in the loose sense suggested by Frigg
(2002, 2006), who defined as an “ontological puzzle” the question concerning ‘what kinds of
objects are models’ (Frigg, 2006, p.50).
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Informational approaches are also known as “structural” since they rely on the
notion of morphism (such as isomorphism, homomorphism, partial isomorphism,
etc.) to justify representation: a model represents its target system if and only if
the former is isomorphic (or morphic to some degree) to the latter (Bartels, 2006,
Bueno and French, 2011, Bueno et al., 2002, da Costa and French, 1990, 2003,
French and Ladyman, 1999).6 According to these approaches, the representational
power of a model is a property of the system, and such a property determines the
necessary and sufficient condition for representation to occur. As the condition
(the morphism) has been identified, we do not need to appeal to model-users’
intentions, purposes or representational conventions, to account for representation.
Functional approaches, on the other hand, aim “to provide a space for [scientists’]
purposes” (Giere, 2004, p.743) in any account of representation. The function
of something is defined by its use: something is used in order to fulfill a certain
task and such fulfillment is its function. In the case of models, their task is to
represent target systems. It is distinctive of the source of representation in general,
and of scientific representation in particular, ‘not to own’ its functionality. In
other words, a model does not represent per se: the representational function is
always ascribed by and recognized by a model-user. Therefore the representational
function of a model does not occur unless the users, with their intentions, purposes
and representational practice, are part and parcel of the account. Bas van Fraassen
couches the core claim of functional approaches in what he defines the Hauptsatz
of a theory of representation: “There is no representation except in the sense that
some things are used, made or taken, to represent a thing as thus or so.” (van
Fraassen, 2008, p.23)7
6The label “structural” is employed by Frigg (2002, 2006), and it includes, if not reduces to,
the semantic view of scientific theories. Since the next chapter is devoted to give reasons to write
the semantic view off Frigg’s list, I limit myself here to mention those approaches which actually
deserve such a label – and which use the label themselves to dub their accounts.
7The original formulation of van Fraassen’s Hauptsatz is due to Giere (2004, p.743).
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1.2 Twilight of the philosophical analysis?
Given its manifest relevance, the issue of scientific representation is nowadays a
booming topic in philosophy of science. However, it is far from being settled.
This is due to the fact that there is no agreement among philosophers either on
the ontology of models, or on the possible relationship between models and their
target system.8
This lack of agreement might be quite of an impasse for attempting a philosophical
analysis of the issue. As stressed by McMullin (1968), the task for a philosophi-
cal analysis of models and, more in general, for the analysis of representation in
science, should be to provide a reconceptualization, or a rational reconstruction,
of the key terms of the issue (in this case: model, theory, representation). Mc-
Mullin also emphasizes that this task is rather complicated given that we can not
consider these key terms as they are employed by scientists, since scientists use
them in a “vague and often inconsistent manner that would play havoc” (1968,
p.386). On the other hand, McMullin argues, scientists’ vagueness does not allow
philosophers to opt for “purely stipulative definitions”. What we have to find is
rather a “half-way house between these lexical and stipulative extremes.” (ibid.).
So, McMullin points out that:
[W]hen two philosophers disagree as to “what a model is”, a rather frequent
disagreement recently, this is not like two scientists disagreeing as to “what
a meson is” or two lexicographers disagreeing as to how the word ‘model’ is
actually used in some language group. The criteria for setting this sort of
disagreement are not purely empirical – we cannot go out and find a model
and start observing its behavior – nor are they purely lexical, since linguistic
usage is not sufficiently definite nor sufficiently well correlated with actual
scientific practice, as a rule, to make sharp decision of this sort possible. The
criteria are [...] partially empirical, in that one must scrutinize the actual
8Weisberg (2007) and Godfrey-Smith (2006) even question whether a ‘representational rela-
tionship’ in fact holds between a model and a target system. In particular, Weisberg argues that
modeling is a form of indirect representation: the target for a model is not a ‘real’ system but
an idealized replica of the latter. A direct representational relation then holds only among the
outcomes of what he defines as “direct abstract modelling” and the target system.
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epistemological structures inherent in current scientific practice and try to
find out a conceptual system which will articulate as closely as possible with
this practice. [...] In the last analysis, when two philosophers disagree as to
“what a physical model is”, it may be assumed that each has isolated some
element in scientific practice that he considers important and has attached
to it the label ‘model’, a label which in ordinary usage may be only loosely
correlated with this element. (emphasis mine, 1968, pp.386-87)
So, according to McMullin the task of the philosophical analysis of “model” and
“representation” is partly conceptual and partly empirical. The conceptual side
has the aim of making the analysis as widely applicable as possible. The empirical
side is a test-bed for the validity of such conceptual analysis.
However, as convincingly stressed by Hughes (1997), both the concept of repre-
sentation and the concept of models – to which representation seems to be tightly
tied – are “slippery” (ibid., p.325) and tricky to define. In the wake of Hughes’
disillusion that the concepts of “model” and “representation” will ever be given
a satisfactory definition, the general trend in current philosophy is, as puzzling
as it may sound, to acknowledge the relevance of the issue of representation and,
concurrently, to question its tractability. In other words, the trend is to deflate
the issue of scientific representation.
Indeed, models can be either abstract or concrete entities and, consequently, the
“problem of style” – i.e., the problem due to the different ways in which models
represent according to their particular ontology – poses a conundrum for any
account for representation (see Frigg, 2006, sect. 2).9 An abstract model, such as
the Bohr model or the simple harmonic oscillator, does in practice represent its
9For a taxonomy of the types of models proliferating in the philosophical literature, see Frigg
and Hartmann (2012, sect.1). The following is a list with just a few of the models mentioned
by the authors: phenomenological models, computational models, developmental models, ex-
planatory models, impoverished models, testing models, idealized models, theoretical models,
scale models, heuristic models, caricature models, didactic models, fantasy models, toy models,
imaginary models, mathematical models, iconic models, analogue models. However, as Frigg
and Hartmann points out: “Each of these notions is still somewhat vague, suffers from internal
problems, and much work needs to be done to tighten them. [...] What we need is a systematic
account of the different ways in which models can relate to reality and of how these ways compare
to each other” (Sect. 1.1).
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target system (respectively, an atom or the motion of, e.g., an oscillating spring)
in a different way than a material model, such as Watson and Crick’s metal model
of DNA.
Moreover, models can be constructed either dependently on theories or indepen-
dently of them. As Morrison (1999) and Frigg and Hartmann (2012) point out,
the liquid drop model of the atomic nucleus ascribes to the nucleus properties
(surface tension and charge) determined by appealing to different theories (re-
spectively, hydrodynamics and electrodynamics). Analogously, Cartwright et al.
(1995) argue that the London model of superconductivity, although grounded on
classical electromagnetic theory, was not “contained” by the theory in a relevant
sense, since the equation in the model had no justification in the theory and was
motivated on the basis of purely phenomenological considerations. Many contri-
butions in the volume by Morgan and Morrison (1999) aim at stressing the (at
least partial) independence of models from theories and data, due to the weight
of “additional ‘outside’ elements” (ibid., p. 11).10
In light of these differences, the relationship between models as representans and
their targets as representanda can not be univocally presented. The possibility for
philosophy of science to provide a rational reconstruction, that is, a neat and tidy
account of what models are and in virtue of what they represent is increasingly
dropped in favor of ‘particularistic analyses’ based on specific disciplines, where
particular representational devices are used, and specific ways of gaining knowledge
through such devices are thus laid bare (e.g., Godfrey-Smith, 2006, Knuuttila and
Boon, 2011, Vorms, 2013).
The trends raised by ‘particularistic analyses’ certainly enriches the philosophical
analysis. However, I wonder whether dropping the attempt of a rational recon-
struction would not lead us to conceive philosophy of science as a mere description
of the scientific activity and, in particular, of modelling in science, rather than as
a proper elucidation of this very intricate practice. Just to avoid misunderstand-
ings, I am not claiming here that we should opt for a mere rational reconstruction
10In Morrison and Morgan’s volume, Boumans’ essay (1999) – where Boumans examines
business-cycle – provides an overview of these “outside ingredients” among which he counts
mathematical techniques, analogies, metaphors, relevant policy views.
Chapter 1. Reinflating Scientific Representation 10
devoid of any link with actual scientific practice. Scientific practice is rather the
constant referral to test our rational reconstruction. I am only skeptical that in-
jecting as many details as possible into our philosophical analysis by looking at
particular cases is the only way to better understand how modelling works and
that such understanding would not be possible otherwise.
The challenge for me in this chapter is then to see if and to what extent this general
tendency to deflate the issue of scientific representation can be accepted without
renouncing to the kind of general philosophical analysis advocated by McMullin
(1968). For this purpose, I consider two forms of deflationism concerning scientific
representation, which have shaped the literature about the topic in the recent
years. The first form of deflationism is quite detrimental for the issue insofar as it
concerns the very problem of scientific representation. The assumption grounding
deflationism about the problem of representation is that scientific representation
has no special status and, as any other form of representation, it works mainly
by stipulation. The second form of deflationism is more subtle and concerns the
concept of scientific representation.
1.3 Deflationism about the problem of scientific
representation
What philosophers find special about scientific representation is that the main
tools of scientific theories, i.e., models, are informative about a target system
notwithstanding the fact that they “commit sins of omission and commission by
lacking and having features the world does and does not have” (Callender and
Cohen, 2006, p.67). As in the example of the simple pendulum in Section 1.1, the
omission of features actually characterizing the grandfather clock do not prevent
from, rather they allow for, the former to represent the latter. So, if one wants
to sort out the appropriate formulation of the problem of scientific representation,
it would be the following: ‘how do models represent despite the fact that they
misrepresent?’.
Chapter 1. Reinflating Scientific Representation 11
The deflationism put forward by Callender and Cohen (2006) questions such a
special status that philosophers tend to ascribe to scientific representation with
respect to other forms of representation (e.g., artistic, literary, etc.). Callender
and Cohen state this quite clearly from the very title of their famous paper: There
is no special problem about scientific representation. In particular, they argue that
the philosophical qualm about anything the problem of scientific representation
could be reduced to is pretty much unjustified. So they claim that “while there
may be outstanding issues about representation, there is no special problem about
scientific representation” (ibid., p.77).
The deflation of the problem by Callender and Cohen is based on what they call
General Griceanism, i.e., the assumption that all forms of representation – in-
cluding scientific representation – can be reduced to just one fundamental form of
representation, that is, stipulation allowed by individuals’ mental states.11 Accord-
ing to General Griceanism, the fundamental representation obtains by virtue of
(i) the mental state of a given individual that is in a representational relation with
a given object, together with (ii) a stipulation that confers upon the representant
(whatever it is) the representational properties of that mental state.
By resorting to General Griceanism, Callender and Cohen assume that any form of
representation is derivative with respect to the fundamental representation given
by mental states. So, they can conclude that “once one has paid the admittedly
hefty one-time fee of supplying a metaphysics of representation for mental states,
further instances of representation become extremely cheap.” (ibid., p.74). In
other words, their proposal is to employ General Griceanism to “solve or dissolve”
(ibid., p.67) the problem of scientific representation and to leave the remaining
puzzles to philosophers of mind:
11The argument by Callender and Cohen actually proceeds in two steps. First, they argue that
philosophers tend to merge into the question of ‘how do models represent despite the fact that
they misrepresent?’ three different questions (constitution, demarcation and normative. See
fn. 12) which should rather be sharply distinguished. Second, once the questions involved are
singled out, they call upon General Griceanism and argue that all the three questions dissolve
– and become pragmatic issues – and, consequently, the problem of scientific representation
disappears.
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[S]cientific representation is just another species of derivative representation
to which the General Gricean account is straightforwardly applicable. This
means that, while there may be outstanding issues about representation,
there is no special problem about scientific representation. (ibid., p.77)
Turning to scientific representation, Callender and Cohen claim that models are
just the typical representational vehicles used in science, and that they represent
their targets “by virtue of the mental states of their makers/users” together with a
stipulation. More precisely, all that is required for a model to represent its target
is that a model-user has the appropriate mental state (condition (i) of General
Griceanism) and that the same user stipulates that the model does actually rep-
resent its target, trying to convey to the community (e.g., of fellow scientists) her
belief (condition (ii) of general Griceanism). Given such posits, any general puzzle
about (mis)representation is dissolved.12,13
It should be emphasized that the adoption of General Griceanism leads Callender
and Cohen to reframe any distinction across the different forms of representation
– which derive all from the fundamental form – exclusively in pragmatic terms.
The use of one object or another as the representant in a given representational
relationship is entirely based on utility, always intended in pragmatic terms. The
choice of the representant made by the user depends only on the practical easiness
of stipulation which, in turn, depends only on pragmatic (that is, cultural, social,
historical, physical, etc.) elements.
12 This framework also leads to the dissolution of the three questions that Callender and Cohen
claim to be generally at stake when philosophers deal with the problem of scientific representation
(and that often are conflated into the question ‘how do models represent despite the fact that they
misrepresent?’). The first question is on constitution: ‘what does constitute the representational
relation between the model and its target?’ The second question is normative: ‘what is for
representation to be correct?’, where the correctness is to be interpreted as ‘being explanatory’.
The third question is a demarcation question: ‘how to distinguish scientific representations from
non-scientific ones?’. See also footnote 13.
13As examples of answers to the constitution question, Callender and Cohen consider Giere’s
account of similarity (Giere, 1988), French’s notion of partial isomorphism (French, 2003), and
Sua´rez’s inferential account (Sua´rez, 2004). According to Callender and Cohen, these accounts
are attempts to identify necessary conditions for models to represent. However, while the iden-
tified conditions do serve the role of relating models to targets, as well as the role of “pragmatic
aids” to recognize a representational relation, they are just “independent pragmatic constraints
that may work together or separate to guide choices between scientific representations.” (Cal-
lender and Cohen, 2006, p.78).
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Hence, according to Callender and Cohen, virtually anything can serve as a vehicle
for scientific representation.14 The only distinction that can be made across poten-
tial representants is the degree of pragmatic utility that they entail for a particular
representational purpose, i.e., how easily they allow stipulation. So, models are the
typical vehicle of scientific representation only because they turn out to be more
suitable for the stipulation to obtain (condition (ii) of General Griceanism). This
idea is particularly evident in Callender and Cohen’s analysis of the role played
by similarity and morphisms within the representational practice:
[W]e suggest that, while resemblance, isomorphism, partial isomorphism,
and the like are unnecessary for scientific representation, they have impor-
tant pragmatic roles to play; namely, they can (but need not) serve as prag-
matic aids to communication about one’s choice of representational vehicle.
(ibid., p.76)
1.4 The pragmatics of structure ascription
The deflationism propounded by Callender and Cohen, if tenable, would be quite
detrimental for the issue of scientific representation, in the trivial sense that it
would make several contributions to the topic unwarranted. Nonetheless, few at-
tempts have been made by philosophers interested in the problem of representation
to resist this kind of deflationism. In this section I will briefly consider two explicit
14Teller could then be considered a deflationist a` la Callender and Cohen, since in his (2001)
paper he reaches exactly the same conclusion: “I take the stand that, in principle, anything can
be a model, and that what makes a thing a model is the fact that it is regarded or used as a
representation of something by the model users. Thus in saying what a model is the weight is
shifted to the problem of understanding the nature of representation.” (p. 397).
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attempts in this direction: Toon (2012) and Liu (2015).15 For reasons which will
be made clear shortly, I claim that both the attempts point in the right direc-
tion, but are not ultimately effective. I then put forward a way to improve those
attempts by resorting to a pragmatic use of the notion of structure.
Toon argues that assuming the General Gricean framework – according to which,
just to recall Callender and Cohen’s point, “scientific representation [...] is con-
stituted in terms of a stipulation, together with an underlying theory of represen-
tation for mental states” (Callender and Cohen, 2006, p.78) – does not assure a
univocal account of fundamental representation based on mental states, nor that
stipulation is a sufficient condition for representation whenever an individual has
the appropriate mental state.
Toon makes his point by focusing on depiction, namely a particular form of
representation (i.e., “pictorial representation”) which, on the basis of General
Griceanism, should be as derivative as scientific representation. In order to show
that it is not clear which mental states are to be considered responsible for condi-
tion (i) to hold, Toon considers two accounts of depiction, each of which justifies
pictorial representation in terms of mental states.16 On the first account, the men-
tal state fulfilling condition (i) is the artist’s intention to create a certain visual
15Sua´rez (2004) and Contessa (2007) provide, so to speak, ante litteram replies to Callender
and Cohen’s argument. Sua´rez, in particular, stresses that arbitrary stipulation by an agent is
not sufficient for scientific representation. However, since Callender and Cohen’s deflationism
is not their target, I can not count Sua´rez and Contessa among the few attempts to resist the
deflationism at stake. Thomson-Jones outlines a reply which he himself defines as the “beginnings
of a response to Callender and Cohen”, which amounts just to the remark that “ it is nonetheless
entirely possible that given the sorts of representational task we are attempting in the sciences,
and given the various practical constraints at work, there are some particular ways of representing
that de facto predominate in the sciences – some characteristic kinds of representational vehicle
which are employed, for example. So there can be a special question about how representation
works in the sciences. That question may well be worth asking, and answering, furthermore, for
it may be that articulating an account of the specific ways of representing which predominate
in the sciences will aid us in our attempts to understand scientific explanation, theory testing,
modelling, and the various other aspects of scientific practice which concern us in the philosophy
of science” (2011, p.138). The point I am making at the end of this section is sympathetic to
Thomson-Jone’s, and, I hope, a bit more detailed.
16The accounts considered by Toon are, respectively, Goldman’s (2003) and Walton’s (1990).
It is not necessary to go into the details regarding the formulations of these accounts in order to
illustrate Toon’s argument.
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experience of an object. On the second account, the mental state fulfilling condi-
tion (i) is given by the particular imaginative act in which the viewer of the picture
is engaged. So, we can reasonably think of two distinct classes of mental states
that could act as bases for the fundamental representation from which pictorial
representation allegedly derives: the mental state of the painter and the mental
state of the viewer of the painting. This shows that General Griceanism requires,
at least, a more precise specification of who is the referent for the relevant mental
state.17
The point about the untenability of condition (ii), i.e., of the insufficiency of stipu-
lation, is made by Toon using the following example which, again, is about pictorial
representation. Suppose we take a blank canvas, and suppose that condition (i)
is satisfied by our current mental state. Then, suppose that we stipulate that the
blank canvas represents Napoleon and that we manage to convince our audience
that the canvas represents Napoleon. This situation perfectly fits Callender and
Cohen’s idea that an act of stipulation, as long as it is agreed upon, is sufficient
to establish a particular form of representation.18 However, even accepting that
stipulation can be agreed upon for whatever object used as representant, if we
want to use a blank canvas to represent Napoleon, then it seems fair to say that
we can hardly talk of pictorial representation. So, there must be some charac-
teristic which is proper of pictorial representation that goes beyond conditions (i)
and (ii) of General Griceanism. Such additional characteristic can not be just the
pragmatic utility of using a painting when we want to represent by means of vi-
sual images, as otherwise we lose any justification to call a form of representation
‘pictorial’ instead of, e.g., sculptural – not to mention the impossibility to justify
the pictorial representation of Napoleon by means of a white canvas.
The reasoning applied to pictorial representation can be applied to scientific rep-
resentation as well. This allows me to introduce the first steps of my argument.
17I do not push the consequences of this argument by Toon against condition (i) any further,
since I mean to focus on Toon’s argument about the untenability of condition (ii).
18The example that Callender and Cohen make is of a salt-shaker used to represent Mada-
gascar: we pick up a salt shaker and stipulate (and inform our audience) that it represents
Madagascar. As long as the audience agree with our stipulation, we have an occurrence of
representation (Callender and Cohen, 2006, pp.7-10).
Chapter 1. Reinflating Scientific Representation 16
Consider the attempt to use the sign ‘D.N.A’, rather than the Crick and Wat-
son’s model of DNA itself, to represent the DNA molecules. Suppose again that
condition (i) is satisfied and that we succeed in stipulating that ‘D.N.A.’ is a
representation of DNA molecules. Is this scientific representation? I agree with
Toon that it is not, even if an entire audience of biochemists could be persuaded
that it is. Roughly speaking, an account of scientific representation should give us
information on what is the special characteristic of models that makes them the
vehicle mostly preferred by scientists to represent. Appealing to pragmatic utility
without explaining why models are more useful than other vehicles for scientific
representation is not a satisfactory manoeuvre:
The particular derivative account assumed by Callender and Cohen, which
claims that models represent simply in virtue of an act of stipulation, is
clearly inadequate. In fact, their argument simply trades on the ambiguity
of the term ‘represent’. An act of stipulation may perhaps be sufficient
to make it such that a model refers to or denotes some system, and so
‘represents’ it in some sense of the term. But just as theories of depiction aim
to account for the particular forms of representation that pictures provide,
so our theory of scientific representation should account for the particular
form (or forms) of representation offered by scientific models. Stipulation is
not sufficient to establish an instance of this relation. (Toon, 2012, p.33)
According to Toon, models are able to represent their target by “prescribing” us to
imagine things in a certain way depending “upon the features of the models”, which
must be such that the community can imagine what a model prescribes about its
target. In fact, the properties of an object chosen as a vehicle of representation by
mere stipulation can be of no help to imagine the target’s features. This argument,
although sensible, is nonetheless wanting in the sense that it does not clarify how
models should accomplish their prescriptive role in scientific representation.
Liu (2015) presents an argument which is very much in line with the one used by
Toon, but which seems to go one step forward in developing a full criticism against
Callender and Cohen’s deflationism. Liu divides representational vehicles in two
categories: symbolic vehicles and epistemic vehicles (Liu, 2015, p.10). According
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to Liu, the failure to recognize that scientific models are epistemic vehicles –
rather than symbolic vehicles – has led to the misleading view that whatever
distinguishes scientific models from other representational vehicles is merely a
matter of pragmatics.
Liu explicitly recognizes that in order to argue that a model is an epistemic vehicle
we should specify what a model does besides just referring to, or denoting, its
target – that is, besides being a symbolic vehicles. Of course, in order to represent
its target, a model has to be necessarily secured to it. In fact, this is a task
that a model accomplishes by denoting or referring. As in maps the cities and
towns are identified by names and labels, so in models the task of securing the
representant to its target is usually done by those “symbolic elements” that are
attached to the components of the model. Indeed, models typically contain both
symbolic elements and structural elements, and there is a sort of division of labour
between these two elements. The symbolic elements work to secure the what in
the representation, while the “modelistic elements” work to show the like-what,
i.e., what the target structure should be thought like.
So, the epistemic task of a model is to make us think what its targets is like. To
accomplish this task, Liu argues, a model must be such that:
1. the connection to its targets is not essentially established by convention;
2. it does not work exclusively as a tag or name to pick out what it represents;
3. it is primarily used to have access to aspects of the target
4. if used to convey information, then its function is to induce the right belief
among interlocutors without necessarily appealing to explicit conventions.
Condition (ii) of General Griceanism can not meet requirements 1-4 above. Hence,
stipulation can only account for the securing task fulfilled by the symbolic elements
of a scientific model, it does not account for the epistemic role of models. This
argument is not as wanting as Toon’s since it clarifies that the role ascribed to
models in scientific representation is crucially epistemic, and that such role is
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carried out by the structural elements of the model – while the denotational task
is accomplished by its symbolic elements. However, Liu’s argument is not fully
developed as well. Indeed, it does not explain how the structural elements actually
carry out their epistemic role.
I will now try to take the final step missing in both Toon’ and Liu’s arguments,
that is, to provide an answer to the question how models pursue their epistemic
role. Preliminarily, the kind of epistemic role that models are meant to have should
be specified. I claim that scientific models are built and used for two very specific
epistemic tasks: to explain and to predict the behavior of target phenomena.
Despite the wide variety of models used in scientific practice to accomplish these
epistemic tasks, I think that it is nonetheless possible to identify a core feature
that characterizes how such epistemic tasks can be accomplished – and which
therefore characterizes the special status of scientific models. I call this core feature
epistemic structure ascription, by which I refer to the capability of models to allow
a model-user to ascribe a certain structure to a target phenomenon.
My proposal draws on Morrison’s suggestion that “[t]he reason models are explana-
tory is that in representing these systems, they exhibit certain kinds of structural
dependencies” (1999, p.63). Morrison does not flesh out her suggestion, but I
think that much work in the direction she points to had already been done in the
recent past. An important contribution in this regard is the work of McMullin
(1978) about the “hypothetical-structural explanation” or, in short, “structural
explanation”. According to McMullin this kind of explanation is what we typi-
cally aim for when we use scientific models, and it obtains when the behavior of a
complex entity is explained by alluding to its structure, which is understood as a
set of constituent entities, processes and relationships between the entities.
According to McMullin, the structural explanation has a special role in the scien-
tific enquiry since “it goes from effect to cause” (McMullin, 1978, p.145). To go
from effect to cause means to ascribe a structure to a certain phenomenon that
could explain its observed behavior. Indeed, in a structural explanation:
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[T]he structure is postulated to account for the observed properties or be-
havior of the entity under investigation. Here, the warrant for believing that
the entity actually does have this structure is the success of the explanation
it enables one to give. The explanation is an hypothetical one, since a dif-
ferent structure might also account for the features to be explained. (ibid,
p.139)
The last sentence, in particular, clarifies that no ontological commitment is ac-
tually required for a structural explanation. What is required is to ascribe the
structural elements of the model to the target phenomenon, but only instrumen-
tally, in order to manage its complexity. Epistemic structure ascription hence
seems to describe quite satisfactorily how the structural elements of a model carry
out their epistemic role.
1.5 Deflationism about the concept of scientific
representation
There is a form of deflationism that does not concern the problem of scientific
representation. It is rather about the concept of scientific representation. More
precisely, I consider here the deflationism propounded by Sua´rez (2004), which
can be regarded to be about the concept of representation in the sense that it
questions the possibility to give necessary and sufficient conditions valid for all
instances of scientific representation. The concept of representation, it is argued,
should be taken as primitive:
I propose that we adopt from the start a deflationary attitude and strategy
towards scientific representation, in analogy to a deflationary or minimalist
conception of truth, or contextualist analyses of knowledge. [...] Represen-
tation is not the kind of notion that requires a theory to elucidate it: there
are no necessary and sufficient conditions for it. We can at best aim to
describe its more general features. (Sua´rez, 2004, pp.770-771)
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Such a deflationary account has been named inferential conception, as it affirms
that the possibility for the model-user to draw inferences about the target of the
model is a necessary condition for scientific representation to obtain.
Besides the fact that the inferential conception does not attempt to give sufficient
conditions for representation, there is another crucial aspect in which Sua´rez’s
deflationary account is different from the account of representation put forward by
Callender and Cohen (2006), that is, the inferential conception does acknowledge
a special status for scientific representation.
In order to place the inferential conception in the literature on scientific represen-
tation and to clarify why it is particularly relevant to my analysis, I need in the
first place to consider the distinction drawn by Sua´rez between substantive and de-
flationary accounts, as well as the distinction between reductive and non-reductive
accounts.19
A substantive account of scientific representation is an account that gives both
necessary and sufficient conditions for representation, with such conditions be-
ing assumed to hold for all possible instances of representation. In other words,
the well-specified set of conditions for representation to obtain are invariant with
respect to the users of the model at stake. Sua´rez summarizes the tenets of a
substantive account as follows:
[A] source A is a representation of a target B if and only if A, or some of
its parts or properties, constitute a mirror image of B, or some of its parts
or properties. A and B are entities occurring in the world as described
by science, so a thorough scientific investigation of all the facts about A
and B and their relation should thus suffice to settle the matter. This is
perhaps best summarized by means of a slogan: “scientific representation
is a factual relation between entities in the world that can be studied by
science”. Since the relation of representation is factual it cannot involve
essential or irreducible judgements on the part of agents.20 (emphasis mine,
2003, p.226)
19Sua´rez (2015) uses the label substantial in place of substantive. I keep using the latter,
following Sua´rez (2002, 2003, 2004, 2010).
20“Source” is the term chosen by Sua´rez to denote any vehicle of representation.
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The substantive account is said to naturalize the concept of representation, in
the sense that it disregards model-users’ judgements and purposes, thus reducing
the concept of representation to a dyadic relation holding between the source and
the target of representation. Hence, the representational relation turns out to be
justifiable only by appealing to intrinsic properties of both the source and the
target (Sua´rez, 2004, p.768). In other words, for an account of representation to
be substantive, the envisaged representational relationship must obtain universally
between the source and the target, and “it does not in any way answer to the
personal purposes, views or interests of the inquirer” (Sua´rez, 2002, p.4).
On the other hand, a deflationary account does not aim at establishing necessary
and sufficient conditions that can be taken to hold for all occurrences of scientific
representation. A deflationary account rather justifies the adequacy of the prop-
erties of the source to represent the target by appealing to the very fact that the
source is used by someone to represent the target. So, the account does provide
a criterion of functional adequacy to evaluate the source-target relation within
scientific practice.
Sua´rez (2004, 2015) sharpens the contrast between substantive and deflationary
account by appealing to its analogue for the theories of truth. Sua´rez claims
that a substantive approach to truth aims at identifying a kind of relation (e.g.,
correspondence) between propositions and facts such that a proposition standing
in that relation to facts is true. Substantive approaches thus allow to explain why
a proposition is true. Such an explanation can not be attained if the account of
truth at stake is deflationary. Indeed, the deflationary account determines the
truth of a proposition by appealing to its functional role in the linguistic practice.
Now, it is worth noticing that deflationary accounts may differ in the degree of
deflation (of the concept of scientific representation). Indeed, although all defla-
tionary accounts renounce to provide conditions for representation that are both
necessary and sufficient, a deflationary account can nonetheless provide necessary
conditions. So, a deflationary account can give precise conditions for scientific
representation not to obtain. The extent to which such conditions require the
source, the target, or the relationship between them to satisfy some properties,
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fixes the degree of deflation which is implied by the account: the more demanding
and restrictive the conditions are, the less deflationary – and more substantive –
the account is.
Sua´rez also distinguishes reductive from non-reductive accounts. An account is
reductive if it aims at reducing scientific representation to something else. This
can be, for instance, a property of the source-target relationship – e.g., similarity
– or some more general theory from which representation is derived – e.g., the
theory of mind. As a result, a reductive account moves all crucial issues regarding
scientific representation to whatever the latter has been reduced to.
A non-reductive account assumes that representation is irreducible in the sense
that it is a primitive concept, hence it can not be understood by appealing to
something that implies it, or from which it can derive.21 With these two distinc-
tions in place, I can now go back to Sua´rez’s deflationary approach and examine
the discrepancy between his account and Callender and Cohen’s account.
Callender and Cohen’s account of representation could be classified as reductive
and mildly substantive. It is reductive as it resorts to General Griceanism to
figure out a primitive concept to which representation can be reduced, and it is
mildly substantive because it gives necessary and sufficient conditions for repre-
sentation (conditions (i) and (ii) of General Griceanism, see Section 1.3). I dub
this account as “mildly substantive” because, although the conditions given by
Callender and Cohen are invariant with respect to model-users, they do take the
users’ judgements and purposes into account, therefore representation is not fully
naturalized.
On the other hand, Sua´rez’s inferential conception is both deflationary and non-
reductive. The fundamental tenet of this account is presented in Sua´rez (2002,
2004) where it is assumed that a source S represents a target T only if :
(Inf1) the representational force of S points to T ;
21It should be noted that many deflationary accounts are non-reductive and many substantial
accounts are reductive. However, this is not the only possible combination. In fact, we can have
a substantial account that is non-reductive and a deflationary account that is reductive. For a
more detailed classification of existing accounts of scientific representation see Sua´rez (2015).
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(Inf2) S allows an informed and competent agent to draw specific inferences on T
Condition (Inf1) secures the model to its target by appealing to the representa-
tional force of the source, i.e., to “the capacity of a source to lead a competent
and informed user to a consideration of the target” (Sua´rez, 2004, p.768). Thus
(Inf1) comprises denotation, although it is not limited to it. The “representational
force” is not univocally interpretable, and aims at covering all the possible mean-
ings of “S represents T”. It is in this sense that the inferential conception is a
non-reductive account.
Condition (Inf2) introduces the requirements that are specific to scientific repre-
sentation. In so doing, (Inf2) confers to scientific representation the special status
that is denied by Callender and Cohen (2006). Indeed, Sua´rez makes clear that:
The inferential conception adds a second condition [(Inf2)], which is specif-
ically required for scientific representation. The source must have the ca-
pacity to be employed by an informed and competent user to draw valid
inferences regarding the target – what is known as “surrogative” reasoning
or inference. (Sua´rez, 2010, p.98)
Inferences in (Inf2) are “specific” in the sense that they must not be the mere
result of representation itself, rather they should be built upon the representational
relation. So, to use a model of DNA to infer that a given nucleo-base’s name is
either guanine, adenine, thymine, or cytosine does not qualify the inference as
specific, since the fact that the nucleo-base has been assigned one of the four
names follows directly from the model denoting the nucleo-base by one of the
names among guanine, adenine, thymine, or cytosine. On the other hand, to infer
from the same model that the actual composition of two distinct pieces of DNA
is the same is a specific inference, insofar as it goes beyond the mere information
that we get by denotation.
Moreover, the inferences in (Inf2) are not required to lead to correct conclusions
about the target. They only need to comply with some representational practice
which allows to distinguish between a correct and an incorrect inference. In other
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words, the legitimacy of the inference does not rely on its being correct. An
inference is legitimate if it is in line with the scientific representational practice.
This allows Sua´rez’s account to accommodate all kinds of representations.
I close this section by pointing out some relevant differences between the inferen-
tial conception advocated by Sua´rez and another deflationary and non-reductive
account: Hughes’ (1997) famous DDI account (the acronym is for denotation,
demonstration and interpretation). According to Hughes, scientific representation
is typically – yet not always – the result of three distinct activity. The first is an
act of denotation of a target by a model. The second is an act of demonstration
of some results by appealing to the internal dynamic of a model. The third is
an act of interpretation of some features of the target as features of the model.
Interpretation also involves the trasposition of the conclusions drawn via demon-
stration from the model to its target. The DDI account is a strongly deflationary
account since it requires neither that any of the three actions is necessary for
representation, nor that they are jointly sufficient for it.
A difference which is worth emphasizing between Hughes’ DDI account and Sua´rez’s
inferential conception is that the latter is more user-based, in a sense that Sua´rez
makes clear by resorting, again, to the analogy with the theory of truth:
All deflationary theories of some concept X deny that there is a definition
of the concept that explains its use. Redundancy theories [and analogously
Hughes’ DDI account] deny that X may be defined altogether; use-based
theories [and analogously Sua´rez’s inferential conception] admit that X may
be defined, and may have possession conditions, but they deny that the use
of X is thereby explained. (Sua´rez, 2015, p.17)
What I think to be a relevant difference between the two accounts is that the
inferential conception sets out necessary conditions for representation, while the
DDI account does not. Therefore, one could even be tempted to say that Sua´rez’s
account is slightly less deflationary than Hughes’ account, as the latter gives nei-
ther sufficient nor necessary conditions for representation. For reasons that I will
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give in the next section, this difference makes the inferential account preferable to
the DDI account for the sake of my argument.
1.6 A proposal for a combined account
In this section, I discuss the possibility to integrate the concept of epistemic struc-
ture ascription (that is, the idea that models accomplish their epistemic role by
allowing a user to ascribe their structure to a target) into Sua´rez’s inferential
account.
As I have argued in Section 1.4, this concept is incompatible with the deflationism
about the problem of representation propounded by Callender and Cohen (2006).
On the other hand, the concept might fit well into the framework of the inferential
conception. In particular, necessary condition (Inf2) is a good starting point for
introducing epistemic structure ascription.
First of all, the inferential conception already acknowledges that (Inf2) requires
models to have a structural component – although not necessarily expressed in a
mathematical form:
[(Inf2)] certainly requires unravelling, since it brings together several fea-
tures of the practice of scientific representation. First of all, for the source
to have this capacity [to be employed in order to draw valid inferences re-
garding the target] it needs to be endowed with some internal structure: it
must be the case that the source can be divided into parts and the relations
between the different parts can be outlined. (emphasis mine, Sua´rez, 2010,
p.98)
Furthermore, the necessary “internal structure” of the model turns out to be a
crucial ingredient for the surrogative reasoning at the core of the specific inferences
indicated in (Inf2):
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[T]he source’s parts and relations are in some way interpreted in terms of
the target’s own parts and relations. This is an implicit condition without
which surrogative inference would be impossible. (emphasis mine, ibid,
p.98)
The interplay between the internal structure of the model and the surrogative
reasoning it allows for is nicely captured in the following overview of the inferential
conception provided by Sua´rez:
[A]ccording to the inferential conception, scientific representation is, unlike
linguistic reference, not a matter of arbitrary stipulation by an agent, but
requires the correct application of functional cognitive powers (valid reason-
ing) by means that are objectively appropriate for the tasks at hand (i.e., by
models that are inferentially suited to their targets). (Sua´rez, 2004, p.778)
It is now helpful to introduce the distinction that Sua´rez makes between means
and constituents of representation (Sua´rez, 2003, 2010). We say that R is the
constituent of representation if, for any source–target pair (S, T ), the occurrence
of R is a necessary and sufficient condition for S to represent T . On the other hand,
we say that R′ is a means of the representation of T by S, for some source–target
pair (S, T ) at time t and in the context C, if some user of S employs R′ at time t
and in context C to draw inferences about T from S.
This distinction allows me to lay bare the reason why I find appealing the possibil-
ity to combine what I called the epistemic structure ascription with the inferential
conception. Sua´rez (2003) presents several arguments to show that structural
relationships as similarity and isomorphism are not the constituents of scientific
representation.22 I do agree on this point, and it is definitely not my purpose to
22These arguments will be illustrated in more details in Chapter 3. The following is just
an overview of the arguments, and only the isomorphism case is considered here. The logi-
cal argument shows that isomorphism and representation do not share the logical properties:
while isomorphism is reflexive, symmetric and transitive, representation is non-reflexive, non-
symmetric and non-transitive. The non- sufficiency and non-necessity arguments show that
representation may fail to obtain when isomorphism holds (non-sufficiency), and may obtain
when isomorphism does not (non-necessity). Finally the misrepresentation argument appeals to
fact that inaccuracy is intrinsic to scientific representation, while isomorphism seems to leave no
room for either incomplete or incorrect representation.
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argue that epistemic structure ascription is a constituent of scientific representa-
tion.
Sua´rez (2004) argues that (iso)morphism, similarity, instantiation, truth, and stip-
ulation are among the most common means of scientific representation. However,
Sua´rez stresses that none of them is universally employed and, therefore, none of
them constitutes a necessary condition for representation. I agree on this point as
well, for the vey same reasons put forward by Sua´rez and presented in the “argu-
ment from varieties” (Sua´rez, 2003). These reasons mainly concern the fact that,
although those constituents are widely employed in science, “neither one, on its
own, covers even nearly the whole range [of the possible means of representation].”
(ibid., p. 231).
Once made explicit that I am not privileging any constituent of representation,
nor am I holding that either (iso)morphism or similarity are universal means of
representation, I shall illustrate the role of the epistemic structure ascription. In
the inferential conception, condition (Inf2) is both specific to and necessary for
scientific representation. A closer look at (Inf2) reveals that this condition sets at
least two further requirements:
(Inf2.1) the model (source) has an internal structure, (i.e, “[it] can be divided into
parts and the relations between the different parts can be outlined” (Sua´rez,
2010, p.98));
(Inf2.2) the internal structure of the model (source) is interpreted in terms of the
target’s internal structure, (i.e, “the source’s parts and relations are in some
way interpreted in terms of the target’s own parts and relations” (Sua´rez,
2010, p.98))
Since (Inf2) is a necessary condition for scientific representation and both (Inf2.1)
and (Inf2.2) are necessary conditions for (Inf2), it follows that conditions (Inf2.1)
and (Inf2.2) are individually necessary conditions for scientific representation. Two
issues emerge from this conclusion. The first concerns what does it mean to
interpret “a structure in terms of another structure”. The second issue concerns
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the fact that condition (Inf2.2) seems to require the target to possess its own
internal structure, otherwise the internal structure of the model could not be
interpreted in terms of the target’s ‘parts and relations’.
I suggest that, by resorting to epistemic structure ascription, both issues are solved.
Such an accomplishment does not undermine the deflationary character of the
inferential conception – although a special role for the concept of structure and for
structural relationships is acknowledged. If we assume that the model-user takes
the internal structure of the model – posited by (Inf2.1) – and ascribes it to the
target, we do not need to assume that the target has its own internal structure
and, moreover, we end up with a specification of what it means to interpret a
structure in terms of another.
But what does it mean, in practice, to ascribe a structure to a target? Drawing on
what argued so far, it means that a model-user considers the internal structure of
a model that she (or a former competent agent) has identified as a good approx-
imation of the target. Here the “goodness” of the approximation depends on the
representational practice at stake – the very practice that determines whether an
inference drawn from a model is correct.
This suggestion, I think, constitutes a development – maybe just a marginal one
– of the inferential conception. As such, it is faithful to the deflationary spirit
of the inferential conception and it strengthens its condition (Inf2) by explicitly
combining it with a structural interpretation of the epistemic task that models
accomplish in scientific representation.
1.7 Representation reinflated?
In this chapter I have presented the issue of scientific representation, with a focus
on the recent tendency in the relevant literature to deflate the issue. The main aim
of the chapter was to examine if and to what extent this tendency could be sub-
scribed without renouncing the kind of general philosophical analysis advocated
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by McMullin (1968). In particular, I have examined whether the concept of struc-
ture could play any role in such an analysis. To this purpose, I have considered
two different forms of deflationism about scientific representation.
First, I have considered the form of deflationism propounded by Callender and
Cohen (2006), which questions the fact that scientific representation is a special
form of representation worth of philosophical analysis. On this account, the so
called General Griceanism is invoked to reduce all forms of representation to a
fundamental form which is determined by mental states and fixed by stipulation.
Second, I have considered the form of deflationism propounded by Sua´rez (2004),
which questions the possibility to give necessary and sufficient conditions valid for
all instances of scientific representation. On this account, known as inferential
conception, only necessary conditions for representation are given, which roughly
amount to the possibility for the model-user to draw inferences about the target
of the model – according to the actual norms of scientific practice.
Following Toon (2012) and Liu (2015), I have rejected the first form of deflationism
as it does not account for the epistemic role of models. Furthermore, I have
suggested that scientific models are built and used for two very specific epistemic
tasks (i.e., to explain and to predict the behavior of target phenomena), and that it
is possible to identify a core feature that characterizes how such epistemic tasks can
be accomplished by a model-user, i.e., the capability of models to allow their users
to ascribe a certain structure to a target phenomenon. I have dubbed this feature
epistemic structure ascription. This proposal is a completion of, and consistent
with, Toon’s (2012) and Liu’s (2015) contributions.
Finally, I have suggested that the idea of epistemic structure ascription could be
fruitfully integrated into Sua´rez’s inferential conception. By positing that the
epistemic task of models is accomplished when a model-user ascribes the internal
structure of the model to its target, we strengthen the necessary conditions for
representation that the inferential conception sets forth, while remaining faithful
to its deflationary spirit.
Chapter 2
Semantic View and Scientific
Representation
2.1 The relevance of the relationship
References to the semantic view are ubiquitous in the literature about scientific
representation after the Sixties. The connection between the semantic view and
representation is nicely outlined in this remark by Frigg: “if we wish to learn from a
model about the world [...] we are committed to the claim that the model involves
some sort of representation. This raises the question of how models manage to
represent and of what kind of things they are. The currently most influential
answer to this question has been given within the context of the so-called semantic
[...] view of theories” (2002, p.2).
There are important criticisms against the semantic view whose goal is to write
off the import of the view for the issue of scientific representation. In this chapter
I consider two of these criticisms. The first criticism questions the possibility for
the analysis provided by the semantic view to account for representation. The
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second criticism allows the semantic view to be an account of representation only
at the price of implying a form of structuralism about representation.1
The semantic view, as is well known, gained its orthodoxy status on theories and
models in contrast to the syntactic view. The contrast is usually drawn in the
literature in a way that could lead to a misleading picture of the two views and, in
particular, of those aspects of the semantic view which are essential to understand
its implications for the issue of representation. In the first part of this chapter, I
attempt to recover those aspects and to show that they are essential to an adequate
understanding of the contribution of the semantic view to both the issues of theory
structure and of representation. Such aspects also set the basis for my defense of
the semantic view from the two criticisms mentioned above, which are examined
in the second part of the chapter.
Before I proceed, some disclaimers are due. The literature about the semantic
view, as well as the literature about representation, is vast. In this chapter the
formulations of the semantic view that are considered are those which belong to
the early stages of the semantic view, and which offer a formal account of models
and of their representational task. These are the formulations provided by Suppe,
Suppes, and van Fraassen. The reason why I focus on the early stages of the
semantic view is that the objections considered in the second part of the chapter
mainly apply to these formulations. For this very reason, formulations of the view
such as Giere’s (1979, 1999), as well as the non-statement view formulated by the
German structuralism (e.g., Moulines, 1996, Sneed, 1994, Stegmu¨ller, 1979), are
not considered here.
Finally, a last and crucial remark concerning what is meant by the term “represen-
tation” throughout this chapter. The notion of representation, as intended both
by the semantic view and within the charges against it considered here, is inter-
preted as the relationship, allegedly of explanatory kind, holding between models
and their target system. I do agree with the deflationary claim about the concept
1The criticism of the second kind would be conceived as such only by those who, like myself,
consider ontological commitment detrimental for an analysis of scientific representation. Reasons
for this viewpoint are provided in Section 2.2.3.
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of representation in general, and with the remarks by Morrison (1999) and Knu-
uttila (2011) in particular, that representation amounts to the entire process of
model construction, of which model application is only the final stage. However,
as I hope to make clear in the following analysis, a rational reconstruction of sci-
entific theories, such as the semantic view, does not aim at a literal description of
model construction and application. Many aspects related to the epistemic pro-
cess of model construction and application are just conflated into the model-target
relationship.
2.2 The semantic view as a ‘program of analysis’
The semantic view arose in the Sixties as an analysis of the structure of scientific
theories and, since then, it has gradually gained the status of orthodoxy on the
issue. The view was recognized as such at the Illinois symposium on the structure
of scientific theories in 1969 where, after a state of “acute intellectual disarray”
(Suppe, 1977, p.4) due to the failure of the syntactic view of theories, alternatives
to the latter were considered.2
The semantic view is presented as a program of philosophical analysis of theo-
ries. As such, it is not a univocal view: it rather comprises different formulations
with a common core of assumptions.3 The first assumption concerns the aim of
this program, which is to provide a “format” for scientific theories (van Fraassen,
1987, p.109), i.e., a possible way to present the structure of a theory. The sec-
ond assumption concerns the “nature” of the theory structure: while the format
2Before that symposium, individual contributions were given by Suppes (1957, 1960, 1967),
Suppe (1967) and van Fraassen (1970).
3An accurate analysis of the reasons which led advocates of the semantic view to choose
one formulation of the view over another has been long overdue. However, it is not among the
goals of this chapter to provide such analysis. A conjecture has been put forward by Suppe:
“How significant these differences [within the semantic view formulations] are is a matter worth
investigating; my conjecture is that they reflect the mathematical preferences of the authors
or decisions as to which mathematical approach is most suitable for making progress on other
philosophical problems the author is interested in [...]. Despite their mathematical differences,
there is a general agreement among the above authors that the theory structures are equivalent
to state spaces or the homomorphic images of state spaces.” (1989, p.420).
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of theories may slightly vary according to the mathematics employed by the sup-
porters of the view, the theory structure is generally assumed to be extralinguistic.
The argument in favor of the extralinguistic nature of theories comes in two steps.
First, the concept of theory is claimed not to be reducible to its formulation in a
formal language. Second, it is argued that the formulation of a theory comprises
also the class of its models. Note that the same class of models could be described
by different linguistic formulations, therefore models are conceived as – at least
to some extent – independent of descriptions in a particular language (see van
Fraassen, 1980a, p.44, and Suppe, 1989, p.82). The following quote from Suppe
concisely presents the semantic view as a program of analysis:
The Semantic Conception gets its name from the fact that it construes the-
ories as what their formulations refer to when the formulations are given a
(formal) semantic interpretation. Thus ‘semantic’ is used here in the sense
of formal semantics or model theory in mathematical logic. On the semantic
conception, the heart of a theory is an extralinguistic theory structure. The-
ory structures variously are characterized as set-theoretic predicates (Sup-
pes and Sneed), state spaces (Beth and van Fraassen) and relational systems
(Suppe). Regardless which sort of mathematical entity the theory structures
are identified with, they do pretty much the same thing – they specify the
admissible behaviors of state transition systems. (1989, p.4)
Given that the semantic view arises as an alternative to the syntactic view, it is
ordinary practice in the literature to outline the former by contrast with the latter.
The present work is not an exception to such practice. However, two preliminary
remarks about the contrast I draw need to be made.
The first remark concerns the version of the syntactic view which I take into
account. As for the semantic view, also for the syntactic view we can not identify
a univocal school of thought. What I refer to as the “syntactic view” here is its
“final version”, as it is presented and critically analysed by the advocates of the
semantic view (see Suppe, 1977, Suppes, 1967, Thompson, 1989, van Fraassen,
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1980a).4 The final version of the syntactic view presents theories as axiomatized
systems comprising a set T of theoretical postulates, or fundamental laws of the
theory expressed in formal language, and a set of sentences C (correspondence
rules) which provide T with a semantic interpretation.
The second remark concerns the guidelines I appeal to for drawing the contrast. In
particular, I follow the advice by Hughes (2010), Suppe (2000) and van Fraassen
(2014) to avoid the oversimplified sketches of the semantic and syntactic views
often found in the literature. There exists indeed a tendency to reduce the analysis
of the theory structure provided by these views to “identity statements” of the
form “a theory is ...”, where the dots are to be filled in by, respectively, “a collection
of models” and “an axiomatic calculus”.5 As the semantic view does not opt for
a total rejection of the linguistic component of theories, so the final sketch of
the syntactic view heavely relies upon (Tarskian) semantics. On the one hand,
as Thompson (1988) and Suppe (2000) emphasize, correspondence rules can be
considered as semantic models for the syntactic view.6 On the other hand, by
defining theories as “extralinguistic entities”, the advocates of the semantic view
do not reject any role for language in the formulation of theories. They rather aim
4This version of the syntactic view is defined as “final” by Suppe (1977, p.50). By “final
version” Suppe explicitly refers to Carnap (1956, 1966) and Hempel (1958, 1963) (cf. Suppe,
1977, p.52, fn.107). It might seem at first sight odd to analyse a view employing the version
which is provided by its very critics. However, the most accurate overview of the syntactic view
to date has been provided by the very advocates of the semantic account and, in particular, in
the mentioned work by Suppe. Moreover, it is with respect to this sketch of the syntactic view
that the semantic view has been formulated by its advocates. So it will be useful to consider
the “final version” also in the light of its role of “opposite manifesto” for the semantic view. A
critical analysis of this sketch of the syntactic view has been provided by Lutz (2014).
5Examples of standard sketches are Craver (2002), French (2008), Godfrey-Smith (2006),
Halvorson (2012), Hendry and Psillos (2007).
6The influence of Tarski’s work on Carnap is actually earlier than his paper Meaning and
Necessity (1947). In Introduction to semantics (1942), Carnap reveals Tarski’s influence for the
development of his idea of a syntactical formal methods “supplemented by semantical concepts”
(ibid., p. vi). He nonetheless acknowledges that their conception of semantics differs on how
to draw the distinction between syntax and semantics. For Carnap, semantical systems are
interpreted languages, while syntactic systems are uninterpreted calculi. Moreover, Carnap puts
forward another distinction – upon which Tarski would not agree – between factual and logical
truth, the former being dependent on the actual state of things, and the latter relying solely on
the meaning of terms determined semantically.
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at deflating the role which is ascribed to it by the syntactic view.7 In fact, the view
supports the weaker claim that the language of a theory is not the appropriate
“individuation property” for the theory structure (Suppe, 1989). According to
Suppe, the features of the language in which a theory is formulated can not be
used in the philosophical analysis to construe the theory structure.8 On the other
hand, the fact that the semantic view invites to focus on models does not imply
that the view amounts to an identity statement about theory structure of the form:
“a theory is a collection of its models”. In other words, the focus on models still
leaves some room for language in the formalization of theories.9
In the following, to avoid the oversimplifications led by identity statements, I draw
the contrast between the semantic and syntactic views on the grounds of three
elements, each of which is a crucial aspect of an analysis of scientific theories:
the formalization employed, its relationship to actual scientific practice, and the
neutrality with respect to other issues that can be raised concerning scientific
theories. By fleshing out these aspects, I set the basis for the defense of the
semantic view that I present in the second part of the chapter.
2.2.1 Formalization
In this subsection I mean to identify the semantic view’s take on formalization.
First of all, I focus on the role that the semantic view ascribes to formalization.
Secondly, I focus on the concept of model as presented by the semantic view in its
formalization of theories.
Contrasting the semantic view with the syntactic view turns out to be useful for
at least two reasons. First, it helps to stress that the semantic view, just as the
7As stressed by van Frassen, the semantic view’s insistence on the extralinguistic character
is to be understood as an attempt to orient the philosophical analysis “towards models rather
than language” (van Fraassen, 1980a, p.217).
8I think that, among the advocates of the semantic view, only van Fraassen explicitly claims
the irrelevance of language (1989, p.222). However, he has recently amended the claim (see van
Fraassen, 2014, p.279).
9Indeed, the very advocates of the semantic view have made their aversion for identity claims
explicit in several works (see van Fraassen, 1989, p.222, Suppe, 1989, p.17 Suppe, 2000, p.S112,
Suppes, 2002, p.2).
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syntactic view, is eminently a theory of theories. As such, it preserves the pre-
scriptive character of the syntactic view. Thus, the semantic view is not a faithful
description of scientific theories as employed in actual practice. Second, the con-
trast allows to show that, while the prescription by the syntactic view to conceive
theories in a certain way was in fact an attempt to satisfy the wider philosophical
program of logical positivism, the prescriptive character of the semantic view is
not intertwined with any philosophical agenda other than the mere analysis of
theory structure.
It is fair to say that the semantic view, at least in its early formulation, shares
the positivists’ idea of philosophy as the Theory of Science (Carnap, [1991] 1955,
p.393). More precisely, the semantic view conceives philosophy as an analysis
which, as Carnap points out, has among its major tasks that of clarifying issues
concerning science. Formalization is among the main tools to accomplish such a
task. In this vein, Suppes claims that:
The role of philosophy in science is to clarify conceptual problems [...]. The
clarification of conceptual problems or the building of an explicit logical
foundation are tasks that are neither intensely empirical nor mathematical
in character. They may be regarded as proper philosophical tasks directly
relevant to science. In the context of such clarification and construction,
a primary method of philosophical analysis is that of formalizing and ax-
iomatizing the concepts and theories of fundamental importance in a given
domain of science. (Suppes, 1968, p.653)
The same view is held by Suppe, who claims that: “It is only a slight exaggeration
to claim that a philosophy of science is little more than an analysis of theories
and their role in scientific enterprise” (Suppe, 1977, p.3), and it is reiterated by
Suppes (1954) and van Fraassen (1980b).10
10The fact that the semantic view, as the syntactic view, conceives philosophy of science mainly
as an analysis of theories has led Cartwright, Shomar and Sua´rez to count the semantic view,
together with the syntactic view, among the “theory dominated views of science” (Cartwright
et al., 1995). It is interesting to note that Suppe has recently deflated the tone of the claim
quoted in the text, thus reaching conclusions which are quite sympathetic to the view held by
Cartwright, Shomar and Sua´rez in their paper. Indeed, Suppe acknowledges that nowadays:
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So, the semantic view does not reject the task of philosophy of science set by the
syntactic view, nor its claim that formalization is the chief device to accomplish
such a task. The semantic view rather rejects the syntactic view’s reliance on
axiomatization to characterize scientific theories (Suppe, 1977, 113). In particular,
the discontent is on the dyad to which the syntactic view reduces theories, i.e.,
axiomatic calculus plus correspondence rules.11
The semantic view, on the other hand, opts for a more liberal approach to formal-
ization. First, formalization is not necessarily restricted to the axiomatic method,
but it can also be extended to encompass semantic techniques, such as those of
model-theory. Second, the chosen formalization is modest in two senses: neither it
is the only possible one that a philosophical analysis can favor, nor it is applicable
to all the empirical sciences. Both the points have been clearly stressed by Suppes.
In his 1968 paper, Suppes claims that: “To argue that such formalization is one
important method of clarification is not in any sense to claim that it is the only
method of philosophical analysis” (emphasis mine, 1968, p.653). Recently, Suppes
has extensively argued against the idea that a philosophical analysis of theories
could ever be universally applicable, that is, that it could apply to all scientific
theories:12
My view of science has moved increasingly from that of a foundationalist
to the viewpoint that the conceptual content of science is best analysed in
terms of a diverse set of methods for solving a wide variety of problems. [...]
For those raised in traditional philosophy or even traditional philosophy
“much of science is atheoretical [...] . The business of most experimental and observational
science is modeling data. [...] Today, models are the main vehicle of scientific knowledge.”
(Suppe, 2000, p.S109).
11Standard criticisms of the kind of formalism employed by the syntactic view in its “final
version” are examined in Suppe (1977), Suppe (2000), Suppes (1967) and van Fraassen (1980a).
We can group these criticisms as follows: (i) the individuation properties of a theory identified
by the syntactic view do not correspond to those of theories as employed in actual scientific prac-
tice (Suppe, 1989, p.4); (ii) the Lo¨wenhein-Skolem theorem implies the existence of unintended
models for a theory in first-order language, that is, the language of theories as presented by the
syntactic view (see Suppe, 2000, p.S104); (iii) given its formulation of theories, the syntactic
view would allow for the case that a change in the syntax of a theory leads to change the theory
tout court.
12In the same vein, Suppe (1989, p.199) specifies that the goal of the semantic view is a
tentative account of what is to be a scientific theory, and not of what a scientific theory is.
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of science, with the search for generality and universality of conceptual
schemes so dominant, it is not easy to accept or even be sympathetic with
a view that is skeptical of the success of any of the general schemes aimed
at providing a traditional philosophy of science. [...]. It is only a myth
engendered by philosophers – even in the past to some extent by myself –
that the deductive organization of physics in nice set-theoretical form is an
achievable goal. [...] This does not mean that set-theoretical work cannot
be done, it is just that its severe limitations must be recognized. (Suppes’
reply to Sneed, in Sneed, 1994, pp.213-214)
In other words, the semantic view does not aim at laying bare the deep structure
of theories, nor at using such structure as a canonical formulation valid for all the
empirical sciences. What it aims at is to provide a formal framework to formulate
and solve problems of specific disciplines which can be formalized as the view
suggests.13
This point helps to correctly interpret the claims made in the seminal paper by
Suppes (1960) about the fundamental character of the Tarskian concept of mod-
els.14 According to Suppes, the Tarskian concept of models is fundamental in the
sense that it can be employed as a “technical meaning” shared by different sciences
(empirical and mathematical), as well as in the sense that it can be employed to
deal with different issues internal to a specific science. Despite claims to the con-
trary (see Landry, 2007), in this paper Suppes is not setting the basis for reducing
all the different concepts of models to the Tarskian one.15
13This is one of the main features distinguishing the semantic view from German Structuralism
(see Moulines, 1996, p.5) which claims that issues concerning methodology do have ontological
implications, that is, they play a role in revealing the deep structure of theories. Suppes makes
explicit his aversion for this view in his published reply to Sneed (1994).
14Tarski defines models as “A possible realization in which all valid sentences of a theory T
are satisfied” (1953, p.11).
15To be precise, Landry appeals to Suppes’ commitment to “the set-theoretical foundationalist
program” to ground her interpretation of the role that Suppes assigns to the Tarskian concept
of models (Landry, 2007, p.5). Indeed, the goal of the program is to reduce all the branches of
mathematics to set-theory (see Suppes, 1972, p.1). However, as the quote from Sneed (1994)
suggests, Suppes gave up the idea of applying the set-theoretical foundationalist program to the
philosophical analysis of theories at least twenty years ago. I will come back to this point in
subsection 2.2.3.
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Therefore, the concept of formalization employed within the semantic view is con-
tingent in the sense that there is no intention, nor an explicit claim, by its advo-
cates to reduce all scientific theories to the format provided by the formalization.
Indeed, the formalization of theories that the semantic view puts forward is pre-
sented just as one among the possible methods of analysis. The adequacy of the
formalization is assessed only with respect to those theories which can be formu-
lated as the semantic view prescribes. In other words, the semantic view turns
out to be adequate with respect to a particular discipline if the issues which are
internal to that discipline can be tackled, or even solved, once the theory is formu-
lated as the semantic view prescribes. Contrary to the syntactic view, the format
of a theory given by its formulation is neither canonical (i.e., to be conceived as
universally applicable), nor used to provide a demarcation criterion to figure out
whether or not a theory is scientific. Suppe means to stress exactly the contingent
nature of the formalization provided by the semantic view when he claims that:
I have not offered necessary or sufficient conditions for being a theoretical
explanation. [...] any conclusive account of what a theoretical explanation
is must be parasitic upon an account of what is to be a scientific theory.
While I believe the Semantic Conception provides a defensible account of
what it is to be a theory, I do not believe it is, or potentially can become,
and adequate account of what a scientific theory is. The issue of what
theories are scientific ultimately is based upon the domain a science deals
with and the science’s evolving standards as to what is scientific, and thus
ultimately it is not a matter for philosophical fiat or decision. However, one
can present, as I have tried to here, a philosophical account of what it is
about theories that enables them to provide scientific explanations, and to
explain how – and what sorts – of explanation they afford. I believe that
doing so can be philosophically or scientifically illuminating – but I do not
believe that either I or philosophers of science can have the last word on the
subject.16 (Suppe, 1989, pp.198-199)
Along with the criticisms of the syntactic view based on the kind of formalism
employed by the syntactic view, there is a less explicit but equally interesting line
16This point is reiterated by Suppe later in the text (see Suppe, 1989, p.420,p.432 fn.6, p.420
and p.432, fn. 6).
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of argument pursued by the advocates of the semantic view against the syntactic
view, and it concerns the origin of such formalism. This line of argument can
be summarized as follows: the programmatic goal of the syntactic view was not
to give a philosophical analysis of scientific theories tout court, rather to provide
an analysis of scientific theories which could fit well the main posits of logical
positivist. On the other hand, the semantic view only aims at being philosophi-
cally illuminating about some aspects of theories as employed in actual scientific
practice.
That the positivistic epistemology and the syntactic view are deeply intertwined
is suggested by Suppe (2000), who dubs the syntactic view the “epistemic heart”
of logical positivism. Conflating the analysis of the structure of scientific theories
with issues merely pertaining to the positivistic epistemology has been, according
to Suppe, “one of their [i.e., the positivists’] more serious philosophical errors”
(1989, p.432, fn.7).17 The same discontent about the reliability of the analysis
provided by the syntactic view is expressed by Suppes:
[P]ositivistic philosophers have written a great deal about the structure of
scientific theories [...]. [T]hey have been particularly concerned to give a
general account of empirical meaningfulness which jibes with their account
17The following is a schema which sums up the posits of logical positivism. (i) The meaning
criterion, or criterion of cognitive significance (Carnap, 1947, Hempel, 1965): The meaningful
statements are either analytic or synthetic. The condition for synthetic statements to be true is
the verifiabilty of their meaning. The demarcation criterion follows from the meaning criterion:
a theory which does not comply with the meaning criterion is not scientific. (ii) The role of logic:
Logic has two denotata. Logic as Logic of Science denotes Philosophy and, in particular, its aim:
to assure that the statements forming science are meaningful. Logic as first-order logic is the form
in which the axioms of a theory are given. With the exception of the axioms of mathematics and
logic, which are both non-empirical sciences, the axioms of an empirical theory are meaningful
only if their observational consequences are verifiable. (iii) The distinction between the context
of discovery and the context of justification of theories (Reichenbach, 1938). Through this
distinction, philosophy, as defined in (ii), is sharply separated from those inquiries which take
into account the psychological and sociological aspects pertaining to the context of discovery.
Hence, the aim of philosophy is to provide the “logical substitute” (Reichenbach, 1938) for the
occurrence of actual scientific thinking. The logical substitute of actual scientific thinking is
the analysis of the relation of theory to facts (its justification), disregarding who presents the
theory and the process of its discovery (Carnap, [1991] 1955). The relation between the theory
and the facts is defined by Carnap as denotational (ibid.). Therefore, according to the syntactic
view, the semantic relation between the theory and the world that it describes is provided by
the denotational function of language.
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of this structure. Although many precise and interesting philosophical dis-
tinctions have been made in the course of these investigations, there has
been little if any attempt by philosophers working in the positivistic tradi-
tion to give a detailed analysis of particular scientific theories. (emphasis
mine, 1954, p.242)
The controversy over the origin of the formalism chosen by the syntactic view also
sheds light on the choice of models as the relevant element for the formalization of
theories by the advocates of the semantic view. Indeed, among the reasons given
by the advocates of the view for their focus on models there is the need to “re-
gain contact” with theories as employed in actual scientific practice.18 According
to Suppe, the “dominant thrust” of contemporary philosophy of science, within
which the semantic view took shape, requires the analysis of theories not to be
jibed with any particular epistemology. In fact, the analysis should be guided
solely by the “close examination of actual scientific practice and products” (1989,
p.415). It is the “direct examination of theories” (ibid.) which reveals that the
syntactic view is a deceptive analysis of theories. In particular, the analysis pro-
vided by the syntactic view is deceptive in two senses. First, it assumes that the
explanatory role of theories pertains to the (formal) language in which theories are
formulated. Second, the analysis assumes that the language of the theory refers to
the target system of the theory directly. On the contrary, the direct examination
of scientific theories reveals that the language used for their formulation is not
itself explanatory. The formal language of theories should be rather conceived as
a ‘description’ of possible models for the theory. It is to models, not to language,
that the explanatory power pertains. Hence, if the analysis of theories wants to
regain contact with the actual scientific practice, models should be recognized as
the main tool in the formalization of theories.
Therefore, the philosophical reconceptualization of scientific theories pursued by
the semantic view relies heavily on formalization, whose models are the main de-
vice. In so doing, this philosophical analysis reflects the tension that its advocates
18A famous formulation of this point is van Fraassen’s claim that: “the scholastically logistical
distinctions that the logical positivist produced [...] had moved us mille milles de toute abitation
scientifique, isolated in our abstract dreams.” (1989, p.225).
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accept and seek for between, on the one side, the idea of philosophy as a theory
of science and, on the other side, the demand for the formalization presented by
the view to be in line with actual scientific practice.
2.2.2 Actual scientific practice
Carnap ([1991] 1955, p.393) claims that philosophy of science is essentially a ra-
tional reconstruction of scientific theories and, as such, it differs from its subject
matter. The semantic view acknowledges such a difference. However, as stressed
in the quote from Suppes in the former subsection, such a difference does not jus-
tify a full discrepancy between the philosophical reconstruction of the structure
of theories and the fundamental aspects of scientific practice.19 For this reason,
the semantic view can not be conceived as merely prescriptive, i.e., as merely pro-
viding a format for theories.20 The semantic view also aims at being descriptive
to some extent, that is, at capturing relevant elements of scientific practice. This
subsection is an attempt to sketch how the concept of model presented by the view
is affected by its twofold nature, that is, prescriptive and descriptive.
In Experience and Prediction, where the famous distinction between the content of
discovery and of justification is introduced, Reichenbach argues that epistemology
is not a description of actual scientific practice, but a logical substitute for it:
It would be, [...], a vain attempt to construct a theory of knowledge which
is at the same time logically complete and in strict correspondence with the
psychological processes of thought. [...] What epistemology intends is to
construct thinking processes in a way in which they ought to occur if they
are to be ranged in a consistent system; [...] For this logical substitute the
term rational reconstruction has been introduced; it seems an appropriate
19Evert Willem Beth who, together with von Neumann, is considered among the pioneer of the
semantic view, provided an early version of this stance, claiming that the discrepancy between
philosophy and science can not be solved unless the logical analysis of science is freed from
“philosophical speculations” (Beth, 1949).
20By “prescriptive” I do not refer to anything related to the demarcation criterion between
science and non-science. I only refer to the identification of a format which a theory formulation
should comply with.
Chapter 2. Semantic View and Scientific Representation 43
phrase to indicate the task of epistemology in its specific difference from the
task of psychology. [...]; it will, therefore, never be a permissible objection
to an epistemological construction that actual thinking does not conform to
it.21 (emphasis mine, 1938, pp.5-6)
Carnap ([1991] 1955) applies Reichenbach’s analysis of epistemology in general to
the logical analysis of theories in particular:
[W]e come to a theory of science [...] if we study not the actions of scientists
but their results, namely, science as a body of ordered knowledge. [...] We
mean by ‘results’ certain linguistic expressions, viz., the statements asserted
by scientists. The task of the theory of science in this sense will be to
analyze such statements, study their kinds and relations, and analyze terms
as components of those statements and theories as ordered systems of those
statements. [...] it is possible to abstract in an analysis of the statements of
science from the persons asserting the statements and from the psychological
and sociological conditions of such assertions. The analysis of the linguistic
expressions of science under such an abstraction is logic of science.” (ibid.,
p.393).
The analysis of scientific theories as presented within the syntactic view is then
a rational reconstruction in the following sense: (i) its aim is to provide under-
standing of theories independently of the elements that pertain to the pragmatics
of theory construction (see Carnap, 1942, p.viii), and – most importantly for what
I want to discuss here – abstraction from scientific practice guarantees such an
outcome;22 (ii) the logical image of theories thus obtained provides the canonical
form that the theory ought to mirror in order to be deemed scientific. In other
words, the clarifying task of an analysis of theories has to sacrifice scientific prac-
tice in order to reach a final image of the scientific theory. It is probably on these
21The term rational reconstruction which Reichenbach employs is the one introduced by Car-
nap in Der Logische Aufbau der Welt (1928). Carnap defines ‘rational reconstruction’ as an
explicit definition for those concepts which take shape in the psychological processes of cogni-
tion.
22This is what Reichenbach suggests when he claims that logical completeness obtains only at
the context of discovery ’s costs.
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grounds that Suppe concludes: “the less it was the positivistic influence, the more
it was the concern with ‘actual science’.” (Suppe, 1989, p.16).
The rational reconstruction obtained within the semantic view is much less de-
tached from the context of discovery than the rational reconstruction provided
by the syntactic view. The semantic view does not avoid the reference to actual
scientific theorizing, it rather seeks for it. Yet, as a rational reconstruction, it can
not open up to the subjective or psychological aspects of scientific theorizing. So
Suppe (1977) rejects Weltanshauungen analyses exactly because giving too much
emphasis to psychological and sociological factors.23 These analyses, Suppe claims,
make science too subjective, whereas “What is needed is a philosophical analysis
of the activity of scientific theorizing which does not take recourse either to psy-
chological or sociological factors or their reifications as Weltanschauungen” (1977,
p.236). On the other hand, Suppes (1960, p.66) dismisses behaviorist approaches,
which focus eminently on users and consumers of theories, insofar as lacking the
scientific clarity and definiteness to be compelling alternatives to formal accounts.
According to this picture, the semantic view turns out to be a rational recon-
struction of scientific theories which: (i) should be proved able to encode in its
formulation some elements of actual scientific theorizing, and (ii) should avoid the
possible interference of subjective or sociological factors into the analysis. But
how can an analysis of scientific theories be all such things at the same time?
An answer come from Suppe’s reflections upon the role of the “historically ori-
ented philosophy of science” (1977, p.655). The method of a historically oriented
philosopher of science is to abstract patterns of scientific reasoning from the his-
tory of science, to examine whether they are good patterns and, in case they were,
to extract the structure of the pattern and eventually formulate claims of the form
‘if elements of a good pattern of reasoning feature in the theory, then the the-
ory is likely to be successful’.24 So, actual scientific practice (past and current)
23The main claim of Weltanshauungen analyses is that the work of philosophers should overlap
with the work of historians and sociologists of science. Suppe counts among the Weltanshauungen
analyses the work by Toulmin (1953), Kuhn (1962), Hanson (1958) and Feyerabend (1970).
24The pattern identified is, of course, only a fallible conjecture but, as Suppes stresses by ap-
pealing to Lakatos’ (1971) idea of a ‘system of rules for scientific games’, without such conjecture
the scientific game is just a game devoid of epistemological relevance.
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provides an “evidential warrant” for the conjectures of the historically oriented
philosopher of science, and it may or may not confirm the reasoning pattern that
the philosopher superimposes upon actual scientific theorizing.
According to Suppe, the semantic view is an analysis carried out within a his-
torically oriented philosophy of science and its main posits have been achieved
through the following steps:
1. After having examined several uses of the term ‘theory’ in alternative sci-
entific contexts, the historically oriented philosopher notices that “one very
central use of ‘theory’ ” that could be abstracted is that of characterizing
the change of an isolated system’s behavior.
2. Examining scientific attempts to formulate and employ this particular notion
of ‘theory’, the philosopher discovers “invariant features” of its uses in actual
practice.25
3. After the invariant features have been identified, the philosopher can then
attempt a precise analysis of those theories.
Therefore, Suppe concludes:
The semantic conception of theories [...] is offered as such an analysis,
and its adequacy depends in parts on the extent to which it provides a
precise characterization of this kind of theories and the uses to which such
theories are put in science. Such adequacy does not depend on whether
its characterization is one the scientist would give or recognize – any more
than the philosopher’s reconstruction of reasoning patterns found in science
need be accounts the scientist would offer. Rather, what counts is that the
analysis be an accurate reconstruction of the devices actually employed, and
that it can explain how theories bear the epistemic burdens they are called
upon to bear in actual usage. (Suppe, 1977, p.658)
25Among these features Suppe (1977) includes the identification of several items: the system’s
class of states used to characterize the behavior of physical systems, the laws describing the
system’s change over time, the possible formulations (linguistic descriptions) of the system, etc.
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Now that we have made plain the intention of the semantic view to accommodate
actual scientific practice – within the limits imposed by rational reconstruction –
the next question in line is: does the semantic view proves to be adequate not only
in theory formalization but also with respect to theory application? According to
its advocates, it is the very issue of theory application that makes the choice of
models natural : models allow to deal with the complexity of theory application
which was obscured by the syntactic view and its appeal to correspondence rules
(Suppe, 1967, 1972, 1977, Suppes, 1967, van Fraassen, 1980b, 1989):26
When one reflect that the reliance of the theory on the results and proce-
dures of related branches of science, the design of experiments, the interpre-
tation of theories, calibration procedures, etc., are all being lumped into the
correspondence rules, there seems to be reason to suspect that, by doing so,
a number of epistemologically important and revealing aspects of scientific
theorizing are being obscured. (Suppe, 1972, p.11)
The most relevant aspect obscured by correspondence rules is “the concrete ex-
perience that scientists label as experiment” (Suppes, 1967, p.62). This aspect is
crucial – and the semantic view advocates all agree on this point (Suppe, 1977,
Suppes, 1962, van Fraassen, 1980b) – since it sheds light on how theories and phe-
nomena are ‘hooked-up’ (Suppe, 1977, p.108). On the other hand, the advocates of
the semantic view argue, correspondence rules offer a misleading picture of how we
apply theory to phenomena. This is mainly for two reasons. First, what justifies
theory application is not a bare correspondence of theories (theoretical laws) to
facts. Second, what allows to connect theory to phenomena is not to be searched
within theories, but it is external to them, and it corresponds to the atual practice
of theory construction and testing. In order to grasp this fundamental epistemo-
logical aspect, we need to look at actual practice and provide a reconstruction of
26The following is a sketch of how correspondence rules are supposed to accomplish the task
of theory application, which I borrow from Suppe (1977) and Thompson (1989). The task is
fulfilled by providing theories with empirical interpretation. Let’s take the classic example of
a correspondence rule for a disposition term such as “soluble in water” (Carnap, 1936). A
correspondence sentence would then be the formula: (x)(t)(Sxt → (Fx ↔ Bxt)) which claims
that if x is placed into water at any time t, then x is soluble in water if and only if x dissolves at
t. So S is an observation term for a test condition, F is the theoretical term to which we want
to ascribe an empirical meaning, and B is the observation term.
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how theories latch to phenomena. And it is here that we encounter the concept
of representation as entertained by the semantic view, as well as the crucial role
that models play within the semantic view – not only in theory formulation, but
also in the rational reconstruction of scientific practice.
In order to understand these claims we need to look a bit deeper into the recon-
struction of theory application according to the semantic view. A detailed sketch
of the reconstruction is provided by Suppe:
In applying a theory (or law) to phenomena, what we do is collect data about
phenomena; the process of collecting the data often involves recourse to
rather sophisticated bodies of theory. If accepted standards of experimental
design, control, instrumentation – and possibly involved reliability checks
– are carried out, a body of “hard” data is obtained from experimentation
and is taken to be relatively non problematic, sometimes generally accepted
laws of theories are also employed in obtaining these “hard” data. It is to
this body of “hard” data that the theory is applied. If the purpose of the
application of a theory is explanation, then the theory explains an event
under the description provided by this “hard” data by relating it to other
“hard” data which function as descriptions of other features which were the
cause of the event so described.27 (1989, pp.63-64)
Throughout the developments of their formulations of the semantic view, Suppe,
Suppes and van Fraassen have all deal with the issue of theory application (see
Suppe, 1974, 1977, 1989 , Suppes, 1962, 1967 van Fraassen, 1985, 2008). Among
these contributions, Suppes’ (1962) is particularly relevant. Indeed, in this paper
Suppes introduces the idea of a hierarchy of models standing between theories and
27According to Suppe (1989), the concept of “hard data” is particularly helpful to bracket
within the analysis of scientific theory the issue concerning the distinction between observables
and unobservables which, on the other hand, the syntactic view forces into its analysis of theories.
As presented in the quote above, hard data are descriptions of raw data and of (causal or of
other sort) interactions among the latter. Hard data might be theory-laden, in the sense that
the process of their collection involves sophisticated bodies of theories. If this is the case, hard
data are not given by direct observation. Hard data might obtain by direct observation as well .
Therefore, theoretical statements are not necessarily correlated to direct-observation statements,
as the final sketch of the syntactic view suggests. Theoretical statements are correlated to hard
data, which may or may not obtain by direct observation.
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their target systems. The idea of a hierarchy of models has then been borrowed
both by Suppe and van Fraassen to account for theory application. Within Suppes’
reconstruction, the hierarchy goes from the high level theory to the “hard data”
obtained through the body of theories mentioned by Suppe. In the following, I
focus mainly on Suppes’ reconstruction.28
Suppes famously claims that an “exact analysis of the relation between empirical
theories and relevant data call for a hierarchy of models of different logical type”
(1962, p.253) to bridge the gap between “the model of the basic theory and the
complete experimental experience” (ibid., p. 260).29 Models are of different logical
types in the sense that at each layer of the hierarchy there is a “theory in its own
right” (ibid.) of which the model is a realization:
Given an axiomatised theory of measurement of some empirical quantity
such as mass, distance, or force, the mathematical task is to prove a rep-
resentation theorem for models of the theory which establishes, roughly
speaking, that any empirical model is isomorphic to some numerical model
of the theory. The existence of this isomorphism between models justifies
the application of numbers to things. [...] What we can do is to show that
the structure of a set of phenomena under certain empirical operations is the
same as the structure of some set of numbers under arithmetical operations
and relations. (1967, p.57)
So the glue holding the hierarchy together is the notion of isomorphism between
two structures, which Suppes defines as the “most general and useful set-theoretical
28Van Fraassen’s reconstruction of how theories latch to phenomena will be examined in sub-
section 2.2.3. On the other hand, Suppe’s analysis, and his concept of empirical design in
particular, is openly parasitic to Suppes’ formulation (cf. Suppe, 1977, p.108 and cf Suppe, 1989,
p.135). So, the analysis that follows implicitly concerns Suppe’s formulation as well. For an
overview of Suppe’s formulation, see Appendix B.
29Behind Suppes’ attempt to reconstruct actual scientific practice within the framework of
the semantic view, there is a more ambitious program that Suppes presented at the very early
stages of his work on scientific theories (see Scott and Suppes, 1958, Suppes, 1954). Suppes holds
that in foundational studies of philosophy of science we need to distinguish between theory and
experiment, since the reconstruction of the experimental practice is more problematic than the
reconstruction of the theoretical work which can be axiomatised using set-theoretic predicates.
The final goal to be reached is then a “kind of algebra of experimentally realisable operations and
relations” (1954, p.246), that is, a systematic theory of measurement which could be axiomatised
as easily as the fundamental theory.
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[notion]” to make precise the relation holding between the different models mak-
ing up the hierarchy (Suppes, 2002, p.54). It should be noted that the notion of
isomorphism between models of a theory is defined by Suppes as “sufficiently inde-
pendent” (ibid.) of the axioms of a theory. Indeed, the definition of isomorphism
depends only on the set-theoretical properties of the models of a theory. Although
models are realization of the axioms of a theory, the latter plays no role in deter-
mining their set-theoretical properties. Therefore, isomorphism can be said to be
“axiom free”. 30
Back to the hierarchy, it ideally comprises the high level theory, the theory of
experiment, the theory of data, the theory of experimental design, and the so called
ceteris paribus conditions. At the top of the hierarchy we find the fundamental
theory, whose realization are models of the theory (theoretical models) in the set-
theoretical sense presented by Suppes (1954) (see Appendix A). In case the models
of the hierarchy are isomorphic, we can have theories whose models of different
logical types (satisfying different axioms) have the same structure.
For instance, suppose that the theory at stake is classical particle mechanics and
that the we want to predict the behavior of a metal ball on a plane with a certain
inclination γ, which is our target system. The equations of classical particle me-
chanics describe the behavior of the physically possible systems of a finite number
of point masses. However, not all of these physical systems represent the target
system. It is the theory of experiment which identifies the physical system that
represents the target system, that is, the physical system that represents the be-
havior of a metal ball on an inclined plane with inclination equal to γ. Indeed,
the theory of experiment (together with some auxiliary hypotheses) specifies which
discrete ordered sets of data (e.g., positions and momenta coordinates) correspond
to sequences of states of inclined plane systems. The theory of experiment thus
30Downes (1992), Sua´rez (2005) and Thomson-Jones (2006) extensively argue about the am-
biguity of the semantic view concerning the actual role it ascribes to models, whether that of
semantic interpretations, or of abstract mathematical structures. In particular, they argue that
only the second sort of role could let models be representational. On the contrary, as stressed
by Sua´rez, leaving room to the notion of models as semantic interpretations would be a risky
choice which would make the view fall prey of Friedman’s (1982) and Worrall’s (1984) objection
that the semantic and syntactic view are just equivalent.
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describes all the possible sets of data which can be obtained by experiments on
an inclined plane. In order for the gathered data to be compared with the out-
comes from the theory of experiment, we need a theory of data. The theory of
data specifies how the data from the theory of experimental design can be put in
a canonical form, that is, it specifies how data can be expressed in terms of the
parameters specified in the physical theory. Indeed, raw data can be collected from
planes with friction, while the theory of experiment considers frictionless planes
only. (The theory of data also employs auxiliary hypotheses and statistical theo-
ries). Finally, a theory of experimental design comprises all the rules that should
be followed to run the experiment (consistently with the theory of data and with
the theory of experiment). The theory of experimental design comprises ceteris
paribus conditions as well, which are statements describing the laboratory set-up
to design the experiment and how the latter is performed.
To have a clearer overview of the role of models within the hierarchy, we can follow
Suppes’ suggestion (1962) and imagine the hierarchy in terms of sample-spaces.
The model of the experiment, which is a realization of the theory of experiment,
identifies all the possible outcomes of the experiment that can be compared with
the theoretical model, which is a realization of the fundamental theory. The next
layer of the hierarchy comprises the model of data, which is a realization of the
theory of data. A model of data restricts to those aspects of the experiment that
have variables in the theory. Moreover, this models undergoes tests of goodness-
of-fit which establish whether the model can fit the model of experiment. The
last layer – the closest to the concrete target system – comprises the model of
experimental design, which is a realization of the theory of experimental design.
The model of experimental design provides the experimenter with the necessary
rules to be followed in order to perform the experiment in a controlled environment.
The outcome of the experiment will then be compared with the model of data and
with the model of the experiment.
As for the formalization provided, so for the analysis of theory application, the
advocates of the semantic view call for a modest interpretation. The analysis of
how theories latch to their target system has to be conceived merely as a rational
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reconstruction . As Suppes (2011) has recently emphasized, a rational reconstruc-
tion of scientific theorizing crucially depends on the selection of relevant aspects of
theorizing which characterize particular sciences (e.g. physics, biology, chemistry,
etc). In the selection process, several details actually characterizing scientific the-
orizing, and which are distinctive of the different disciplines, are missed. What we
end up with is an analysis which aims at being accurate with respect to scientific
theorizing as actually carried out, although it is not required to be universally
applicable. In fact, what Suppes claims to provide by means of the hierarchy of
models is a “conceptual grinder that in many cases is excessively coarse” through
which scientists’ experience can be put (Suppes, 2002, p.7).
In the light of the analysis of the semantic view presented in this subsection and
in subsection 2.2.1, we can draw the following conclusion on the role of models
within the semantic view. The role of models is twofold. On the one side, models
are the main tool for the formalization of theories. On the other side, models are
also part and parcel of the reconstruction of actual scientific practice. Suppes gives
exactly this twofold role to the set-theoretical structures that he employs in his
analysis of theories. Indeed, Suppes argues that set-theoretical structures provide
a framework which is “powerful enough easily to express any of the systematic
results in any branch of empirical science.” (2002, p.2). This framework also
works as s “formal machinery” which, by relating theory to data, provides a more
elaborate account of the actual practice of testing scientific theories (ibid.).31
2.2.3 Neutrality and ontological commitment
In this subsection I analyze a feature of the semantic view which, despite its rel-
evance, is seldom taken into account to draw the contrast between the syntactic
and the semantic view. The feature at stake is the semantic view’s neutrality
31In his most recent paper on the semantic view (2011), Suppes introduces a new stance on the
possible tasks of an analysis of scientific theories. Suppes argues that any rational reconstruction
of scientific theorizing, including the set-theoretical formulation of the semantic view, leads
to a level of abstraction which is “far removed from what is going on in actual experiments”
(2011, p.116). Therefore, a rational reconstruction hardly can deal with the complexity of the
experimental practice.
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with respect to other philosophical agendas not directly pertaining to the issue
of theory structure and application. In subsection 2.2.1, I have stressed that the
advocates of the semantic view dismiss the formalization of theories propounded
by the syntactic view also as an attempt to accommodate the positivistic epis-
temology within the analysis of the theory structure. In subsection 2.2.2, I have
pointed out that the inadequacy of the syntactic view to accommodate essential
aspects of actual scientific theorizing was partly due to the influence of positivist
epistemology. Drawing a contrast between the syntactic and the semantic view,
then, also implies to see whether the semantic view is tied or not to any epistemic
stance.
In this section I analyse whether the semantic view in fact manages to preserve
its neutrality with respect to epistemic attitudes – whether realist or antirealist –
and with respect to the ontological commitment that such attitudes prescribe. We
could assume that a failure in this respect might undermine the tenability of the
semantic view as an analysis of theories and representation, just as the influence
of positivism has jeopardized the tenability of the syntactic view.
Overall, one of the features of the semantic view is that it aims at neutrality.
What I mean to highlight in the following is that while Suppe’s and Suppes’
formulation of the view complies with neutrality, van Fraassen’s formulation faces
some problems in this respect. This is because, beginning with The Scientific
Image, and in subsequent works (1987, 1989, 1991), van Fraassen employs the
semantic view as a framework to develop his famous antirealist stance known as
constructive empiricism. Despite his claims to the contrary (1980a, 1987, 1989),
van Fraassen can not help but conflate his formulation of the semantic view with
the epistemic stance that he advocates, thus compromising the neutrality of the
semantic view.
Before proceeding, let me briefly introduce the concept of epistemic attitude. An
epistemic attitude is generally cashed out in terms of the belief that is implied by
the acceptance of a (successful) theory.32 According to van Fraassen (1980a), for
32For sake of argument, I am casting antirealism solely in terms of van Fraassen’s constructive
empiricism (van Fraassen, 1980a). For an overview of the different forms of antirealism in
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a realist to accept a theory implies to believe that what the theory says about the
world – whether the entities, relations, etc. at stake are observable or unobserv-
able – is literally true. The epistemic attitude of the form of antirealism known
as constructive empiricism (van Fraassen, 1980a) is substantially more modest: to
accept a theory implies only to believe that it is empirically adequate, i.e., that
the theory has “at least one model that all the actual phenomena fit inside” (van
Fraassen, 1980a, p.12) – or, using van Fraassen’s terminology, that it “saves the
phenomena”.33 In order to grasp the kind of ontological commitment involved
by these two different epistemic attitudes, we could employ Fine’s analysis of the
relation between epistemic attitudes and commitment (1986, p.130): the accep-
tance of a theory as true (or empirically adequate) implies the commitment to
the existence of the individuals, properties, relations, etc. which are referred to by
the theory. More precisely, while the realist is ontologically committed to both
the observable and the unobservable posits of successful theories, the constructive
empiricist will remain agnostic towards the unobservables and commit solely to
the observables.34
The neutrality here invoked for the semantic view depends crucially on its capacity
not to privilege any epistemic attitude, or the ontological commitment that an
epistemic attitude would imply. The negative consequences, were the semantic
view not casted neutrally, have been clearly specified by Chakravartty:
The moment the [semantic view advocate] opts for any sort of commitment,
be it instrumentalist or realist, she opens the door to the very difficulties the
development of the semantic approach was in part intended to leave behind:
philosophy of science, see Chakravartty (2014, Sect. 4). Also worth mentioning is that Psillos
(1999, p.xix) argues that scientific realism incorporates three theses: metaphysical, semantic, and
epistemic. Although I do agree with this tripartition, given that my focus is on van Fraassen’s
antirealism, I do not strictly stick to it.
33Massimi (2007) argues that the “practice of saving phenomena” as presented within van
Fraassen’s formulation of the semantic view can be read as including unobservable phenomena as
well as observable ones, since also unobservable phenomena manifest themselves in data models.
34Although not relevant for our topic, it is worth noticing that van Frassen’s empiricism differ-
entiates from traditional forms of empiricism since, although it is agnostic about unosbervables,
he does not conceive statements about unobservables as not capable of having truth value. They
can therefore be taken literally, although this does not force us to believe in the existence of
theoretical entities featuring in these statements.
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namely, issues concerning the correspondence between language and world.
As soon as we give not merely a prediction, but a description of ontological
commitments associated with that prediction – concerning which elements
of our model are meant to correspond to reality and which are not – the
traditional challenge to the realist of giving a satisfactory account of such
correspondence returns. (Chakravartty, 2001, p.330)
The quote above illustrates where the risk (or the temptation) to undertake on-
tological commitment lies for an advocate of the semantic view and, generally,
for a philosopher engaged in the analysis of the theory structure and its applica-
tion. The risk lies in justifying the application of models to their target system:
given that models are abstract entities, how can the semantic view justify the fact
that models are informative about non-abstract reality? Ontological commitment
could be a quick route to reality for the semantic view: an advocate of the seman-
tic view could first commit herself to the truth (or the empirical adequacy) of the
theory whose models are structures, and then assume that (either the observable,
or both observable and unobservable parts of) the actual world is in some map-
ping relation with one of these models. Under these assumptions the model would
represent because it just ‘mathematically resembles’ an actual state of affairs. So
the issue of neutrality becomes a matter concerning the possibility that advocates
of the semantic view employ any epistemic stance to justify the fact that models
represent their target systems.
According to van Fraassen, the semantic view does not run any risk in terms of
neutrality. Van Fraassen (1980b) makes this point clear by drawing a schema of the
arguments we can deal with within philosophy of science and claiming that those
pertaining to the semantic view are all tackled neutrally with respect to realism (or
to its alternatives). So, in his paper, van Fraassen sharply distinguishes the kind
of issues pertaining to philosophy of science into two broad categories: internal
questions and external questions.
Internal questions concern the “theory taken by itself ” (ibid., p.664). These are
issues whose analysis “does not depend on the way the world actually is, nor
on how we use or regard the theory, but only on the way the theory is” (ibid.).
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Among the internal issues van Fraassen counts the issue of the theory structure
and the theory content. We have already met the issue of the theory structure
in subsection 2.2.1: it is the issue of how to provide an adequate formalization
of theories in order to answer the question ‘what is a scientific theory’. As for
the issue of content, van Fraassen vaguely defines it. The characterization which
emerges from this and other works by van Fraassen connects the issue of content
with the renown problem of interpretation, that is, the analysis of how we equip
theories with content (see van Fraassen, 1987, 1989, 1994). I will say more on this
shortly. External questions, on the other hand, concern the elements “external
to the theory” (ibid.), such as the epistemic attitudes of the users of a theory
towards the content of that theory. Internal issues are then conceived as prior to
and independent of the choice of realism – or any of its alternatives – as well as
of any other element which is external to theories.
Within the schema, van Fraassen (1980b) places a third “topic” which is claimed
to be neither internal nor external. This is the relation of the theory with the
data, which van Fraassen considers “independent of the truth of the data” (ibid.).
The argument is – in accordance with Suppes’ idea of a hierarchy of models – that
a theory is not confronted with raw data, but with models of data (“hard data”,
in Suppe’s jargon) which are “the dress in which the debutante phenomena make
their debut” when a theory is construed or applied (ibid., p. 666). Hence, we
can infer, notions such as truth – or empirical adequacy – are not applicable to
evaluate such a relationship either.
This schema provides a tidy reconstruction of the main issues of the philosophy
of science and the domains of analysis they belong to, with a stress on the inde-
pendence of the semantic view’s domain of analysis with respect to realism or to
any of its alternatives. However, this schema also reveals a crucial difference of
perspective between van Fraassen and the other advocates of the semantic view.
This difference – as I argue below – consists in how to handle the ‘internal’ issue
of content.
There is a general agreement on the fact that the issue of content can be identified
with the problem of interpretation (see van Fraassen, 1989, p.226, and Suppe, 1989,
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p.422). Indeed, without an analysis of the relationship between models and their
target systems, the theory structure would be just an ensable of abstract symbols
devoid of cognitive significance.35 To avoid the risk envisaged by Chakravartty –
and confirmed to be avoided within the semantic view by van Fraassen’s schema
– we need to equip these abstract symbols with content in a way that does not
commit to the existence of any element of the theory.
While Suppe and Suppes stick to the schema drawn by van Fraassen and handle
the issue of content neutrally, the very van Fraassen fails in this respect. The
main reason for van Fraassen’s failure is the fact that he sharply distinguishes the
issue of content from the ‘third’ issue of theory-data relationship, while Suppe and
Suppes conflate the two. Indeed, as we have seen in subsection 2.2.2, in order
to explain how theories can be latched to phenomena – thus accomplishing their
explanatory function – we do not need to get outside the hierarchy of models
provided by Suppes. The hierarchy provides a rational reconstruction that helps
understanding how theories latch to their target systems in virtue of the very prac-
tice of theory construction and application.36 The neutrality of Suppes’ account
in the justification of such a relationship is widely acnowledged (Stegmu¨ller, 1979,
p.11,, Suppe, 1989, p.22,, Ruttkamp, 2002, p.92). Suppes himself explicitly lays it
bare: “[My view] says nothing about actual beings. [...]. The actual events I am
referring to [within his formulation of the semantic view] are also in some sense
abstract. In fact, [...], I think that much of our experience with actual objects and
processes is indescribable in its full concreteness. Any description, in informal or
formal language, is some kind of abstraction.” (Suppes, 2011, pp.115-116).
35I am borrowing the expression from Reichenbach (1965, p.36) who poses exactly the same
problem, though of course cashed in ‘syntactic’ terms. He stresses that the fundamental equations
of physics only pose a system of mathematical relations, and nothing of this system of relations
hints to the fact that it is cognitively significant: “although the equations, that is, the conceptual
side of the coordination [between a mathematical and an empirical entity] are uniquely defines,
the ‘real’ is not” (ibid.37). Reichenbach addresses the problem by the famous coordinative
definitions.
36This interpretation of the role of rational reconstruction of actual practice brings the semantic
view, and Suppe’s formulation in particular, much closer to the view held by detractors of the
semantic view, such as Morrison (1999), who stresses that it is the very practice of model
construction and applications which links models to their target system.
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In what follows I restrict the focus to Suppe’s and van Fraassen’s formulation only.
The fact that their formulations of the view are similar might help to easily grasp
their different approaches to the issue of content and neutrality. The similarity of
their formulations of the semantic view will allow to better grasp where the main
difference with respect to the issue of content and neutrality actually lies. As is well
known, Suppe and van Fraassen both develop their formulation of the semantic
view using the concept of state space (cf. Appendix B).37 On their accounts, the
interpretation of a theory is a two-step process.
The first step is to specify the theory structure by means of which to represent the
target-system. In order to do that, one needs to specify the theory’s state space.38
One then specifies the physical magnitudes (observables) considered in the theory.
Finally, one needs to specify the theory dynamics: the development in time of
states and observables. The possible dynamical evolution of the system can be
described as trajectories through the state space, i.e., as sequences of states in the
state space. The structures needed to represent the target system are provided
by the so called phase space: the state space equipped with rules describing how
the system goes from one state to another – i.e., trajectories – which are derived
according to the laws of the theory. Each trajectory in the state space corresponds
to a “possible world” according to the theory, namely to a sequence of events that
describes one possible behavior of the system.
The second step is to identify the possible worlds according to the theory and ‘to
claim’ that one of the possible worlds correctly represents the actual one. The
representational claim is then that the model is true of this world. The accounts
of Suppe and van Fraassen differ in the way they deal with this second step. More
precisely, there are important differences in both the kind of ‘truth’ involved in
the representational claim and the notion of actuality implied by the claim that
37I am not singling out here the specificities of each account. Suppe (1977, pp.227-228, fn.565)
however claims the main difference to be that, while van Fraassen (1980a) identifies theories with
configurations imposed on the phase space, he instead prefers to view configurations imposed on
phase space as canonical mathematical replicas of theories. For the sake of argument and space
I will merge the two account with, I hope, no loss of content.
38In the case the theory is classical particle mechanics and the system at stake is a particle
moving in one dimension, the state space comprises all possible ordered pairs of the form (x, p),
where x describes position and p describes momentum. See Appendix B.
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the represented target system is the ‘actual’ one. Below, I contrast Suppe’s and
van Fraassen’s accounts on these points.
Suppe (1989) holds that the possible worlds identified by the theory are “causally
possible physical systems”. Members of the set of causally possible physical sys-
tems correctly describe actual systems in situations where parameters not in-
corporated into the models exert negligible influence. Call S a model (physical
system) corresponding to a target system (phenomenal system) P and let S be
characterized in terms of various parameters abstracted from P . The values of the
parameters characterizing S (more precisely, characterizing the states in which S
is in at any given time t) are not actual parameter values characterizing P (at the
same given time t). Rather they stand in a replicating relation to the values in P
of the form:
If P were an isolated phenomenal system in which all other parameters
exerted a negligible influence, then the physical quantities characteristic of
those parameters abstracted from P would be identical with those values
characteristic of the state at t of the physical system corresponding to P .
(Suppe, 1977, p.95)
If the relation between a model and its target system is of replication, any descrip-
tion of the model S can only be “counterfactually true” of P . So the model is only
counterfactually true of the target system.
To see whether realism is at any level implied here, we need to briefly consider the
distinction by Suppe between abstraction and idealization (Suppe, 1989, pp.95-
96). If the parameters of P are ‘simply’ abstracted, then it would be possible
for P to replicate S’s behavior in reality. This is because we can recreate (e.g.,
in laboratory) a situation where the behavior of P as described by S becomes
causally possible. If the parameters of P are idealized, then the conditions set for
the phenomenon as described by S to occur are impossible to realize.
The fact that scientific theories tend to both abstract and idealize makes classical
realism (as well as empirical adequacy) untenable to unravel the theory-world rela-
tion: “there is no guarantee that any of the theory’s model [...] will be isomorphic
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to any actual phenomenal systems” (ibid.). Therefore theories as presented within
the semantic view are not literally true since they do not literally describe how
the world behaves, rather how it would behave were certain conditions met (“if
the world were ‘nice and clean’ ”, Suppe, 1977, p. 348). For this reason, Suppe
prefers to talk of quasi-realism which, he argues, does not presupposes ontologi-
cal commitment. In other words, theories are only counterfactually (non-literally)
true of phenomena, and the representational relation between the model and the
phenomenon at stake is only of replication, not of correspondence. There is then
no need to commit to the existence of idealized objects in actual phenomena to
have the relationship justified. So, Suppe concludes:
[R]ealism is descriptively false of the theories science actually uses [...] Re-
alists’ mistake is to conceive theoretical entities as particulars. [...] ideal-
izations typically are theoretical entities used nonexistentially. Thus ide-
alizations can be employed in theories without committing oneself to their
existence. When a physical system S corresponding to a phenomenal system
P is an idealized replica of P , one need not commit oneself to the idealized
values of parameters being properties possessed by particulars in causally
possible phenomenal systems. And using such idealized values does not pre-
clude the theory from being empirically true or false, for by the empirical
truth conditions [...] theories are counterfactually true or false of the phe-
nomena within their intended scope, regardless whether causally possible
physical systems are purely abstractive or idealized replicas of phenomena.
The realists are correct, then, in supposing that theories are empirically true
or false and may commit one to the existence of nonobservable particulars or
attributes, but they are wrong in identifying empirical truth or falsity with
factual truth or falsity and in supposing that to invoke theoretical entities
in a theory always is to commit oneself to their existence as particulars.
(1989, pp.100-101)39
39Another way to illustrate Suppe’s and Suppes’ stance on the impossibility to deal with actual
beings within the semantic view is to parallel their stance to a possible analogue in philosophy
of mathematics. An example in this field is Resnik (1975) who develops the idea that the notion
of object is never absolute, but always relative to a theory. More recently, Rizza (2011) has
provided a view of mathematics as non-ontologically committing. Mathematics rather offers
means to “conceptualize” empirical phenomena, that is, to provide them with a structure which
sets up the formal conditions from which the explanation of the phenomena at stake derives.
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As for van Fraassen, the possible worlds identified by the theory are empirical
substructures to be used “as candidates for the direct representation of observ-
able phenomena” (1980a, p.64). More precisely, the representational claim in van
Fraassen’s formulation of the view coincides with the theoretical hypothesis that
models are isomorphic to “concrete observable entities” (van Fraassen, 2008, p.386)
or, equivalently, that the world is isomorphic to one of these models.40 Claims con-
cerning the model are then true about the observables of the target system (that
is, they are claims of empirical adequacy of the model). Consequently, to hold
such claims entails to commit oneself to the existence of those observables which
can be embedded in the empirical substructures:
Thus we see that the empirical structures in the world are the parts which
are at once actual and observable; and empirical adequacy consists in the
embeddability of all these parts in some single model of the world allowed
by the theory. (van Fraassen, 1991, p.228)
In conclusion, van Fraassen requires the representational claim to concern actual
phenomena and, by doing so, he ends up asking to go beyond the theory-data re-
lationship to which both Suppe and Suppes restrict any representational claim.41
Hence, van Fraassen resolves the representational relationship within constructive
empiricism, rather than within the semantic view itself. Van Fraassen has recently
acknowledged this ‘misuse’ of representational claims. In his more recent contri-
butions on the topic (see van Fraassen, 2006, p.536, and van Fraassen, 2008, fn.8,
p. 386), van Fraassen makes a “mea culpa”, holding that in the former works
mentioned above the claim of empirical adequacy “uses unquestioningly the idea
that concrete observable entities [...] can be isomorphic to abstract ones”. In
other words, van Fraassen recognizes that the theoretical hypothesis above lays
Analogously, within the semantic view the objects we deal with are not particulars, but rather
objects of a theory, that is, the objects that we would obtain if the formal conditions provided
by the theory were satisfied.
40Van Fraassen borrows from Giere (1979) the idea of a ‘theoretical hypothesis’ to express the
representational relation between models and their target systems.
41An analogue analysis could be carried out taking into account van Fraassen’s development
of semi-interpreted language to give semantic interpretation of theoretical language (see van
Fraassen, 1967).
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itself open to metaphysical readings. How van Fraassen turns down such possi-
bility in his more recent contributions is part of my arguments in sections 2.3.2
and 2.4. (See also Appendix C for a thorough analysis of van Fraassen’s neutral
formulation of the semantic view before and after the ‘bewilderment’ due to the
Scientific Image).
2.3 First charge: The semantic view does not
account for representation...
There are two ways for criticizing the semantic view as an account of represen-
tation. First, we could question whether the semantic view is a good account of
representation.42 Second, we could question whether any account of representation
can be given within the semantic view.
The charge I am going to consider in this section is of the second sort. More
precisely, I will examine as illustrative examples of the second charge two recent
paper by Le Bihan (2012) and Brading and Landry (2006). These papers share
a common assumption and a common conclusion (reached by means of different
arguments): respectively, that the semantic view is eminently a program of analysis
of the structure of theories, and that within such a program representation can
not be accommodated.
What makes these contributions relevant for my analysis is that, although appeal-
ing to the same assumption (the semantic view is eminently a rational reconstruc-
tion of scientific theories), we reach opposite conclusions about the possibility for
the semantic view to account for representation. I will scrutinize the reasons that
these authors provide for such a conclusion, and I will attempt a counterproposal.
My argument takes the criticisms put forward by Le Bihan (2012) and Brading and
Landry (2006) to be based on two assumptions which, I claim, are unwarrantedly
42Philosophers criticizing the semantic view on these grounds are Bailer-Jones (1999),
Cartwright (1983, 1989, 1999a), Cartwright, Shomar and Sua´rez (1995) Frigg (2006), Morri-
son (1999, 2007), Sua´rez and Cartwright (2008).
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too strong. The first assumption (held by Le Bihan) is that a necessary condition
for the semantic view to account for representation is that it must be able to tell
us when the procedure followed by a scientist to construct a (data) model is good
or bad for a given phenomenon. The second assumption (held by Brading and
Landry) is that representation via models demands for “actual beings” – i.e., a
structure on phenomena must be imposed either by identifying phenomena with
their associated data models, or by directly assuming that phenomena come in
structures and, they argue, the semantic view can not meet such a demand.
2.3.1 Le Bihan
Le Bihan (2012) begins her analysis with the claim that there are two possible
interpretations, one strong and one modest, of the semantic view.
According to the strong interpretation of the semantic view, the view aims at pro-
viding a complete account of scientific theories and scientific practice. The account
could be complete in two senses: (i) as an account of theories, the semantic view
fully exhausts the concept of theory by identifying it with the class of its models;
(ii) with respect to actual scientific practice, it is assumed that the semantic view
can fully accommodate scientific practice.43 Hence, the semantic view aims at
being a faithful description of models as employed in actual practice and of the
scientific practice tout court.
The modest interpretation of the semantic view is rather a “methodological pre-
scription to use model theory as a tool for the rigorous analysis of the structure of
what scientists typically use to represent the world in actual practice” (ibid., 251).
In this weaker interpretation of the view, scientific models and scientific practice
can be at most partially characterized by the view. That is, the semantic view has
not among its goals to provide a complete view of scientific theories.
43As example of the strong reading, Le Bihan considers mainly Morrison (2007) and Maudlin
(2007). Suppe (2000, pp.S111-S112), on the other hand, claims that examples of strong inter-
pretation are to be found in the work of Cartwright et al. (1995) and Morrison (1999).
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Le Bihan claims that it is a matter of survival for the semantic view to drop the
strong version in favor of the modest one. In particular, she argues that only
the modest interpretation of the semantic view can survive the criticisms usually
raised against the strong version.44
This naturally leads Le Bihan to ask the following crucial question: what can
be accomplished by the semantic view as a methodological prescription? Such a
question, Le Bihan goes, pertains to the issue of the adequacy of the Semantic View
as an account of scientific models, “where scientific models are taken to be ‘what
scientists typically use’ to represent the world” (ibid., p.261). Le Bihan identifies
three criteria of adequacy for any account intended to describe an item highlighting
the use for which it has been built for. Following Le Bihan, I illustrate the criteria
by means of an example related to an ordinary object, such as a sailboat. Consider
a sailboat which has been built for the purpose of sailing. With respect to such a
sailboat an account can be:
(i) structural-adequate, in the sense that the described structure of the
sailboat (e.g., length, height, weight, etc.) is the one actually possessed
by the sailboat;
(ii) functional-adequate, in the sense that it explains how the structure
of the sailboat is employed for sailing (e.g., why that specific length,
height, weight, etc. are needed), that is, how it accomplishes its func-
tion;
(iii) pragmatics-adequate, in the sense that it explains how the struc-
ture and function of the sailboat are employed for attaining certain
purposes of the sailors (e.g., sailing comfortably, sailing fast, etc.).45
44An example of criticism to be conceived as directed against a strong interpretation of the
view is that of Morgan and Morrison, claiming that the semantic view provides only a narrow
perspective on the role of models in scientific practice and that “there is much more to be
said concerning the dynamics involved in model construction, function and use” (1999, p.10).
Analogously, Cartwright questions whether the semantic view is able to capture the “incredibly
difficult and creative activity” of model production (1999b, p,247), and Sua´rez argues that “the
semantic view lacks the resources to provide us with an understanding of how, in practice, models
mediate between theory and the world” (1999a, p. 172).
45More precisely: “a pragmatic account is expected to account for the choices made in ex-
plaining how these choices result from how the structural features of the boat, along with how
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On the grounds of the above classification of adequacy, we can consider whether
and to what extent the semantic view is an adequate account of scientific models,
casting the adequacy as in (i), (ii), and (iii) above. Accordingly, the semantic view
could be an account:
(i)’ structural-adequate: the model structure described by the semantic
view is the one possessed by the models of interest;
(ii)’ functional-adequate: the structure of models described by the se-
mantic view explains how models accomplish the representational func-
tion (assuming that the function of models is to represent their target
systems);
(iii)’ pragmatics-adequate: both the model structure described by the
semantic view and the model function explained by the semantic view
help to understand pragmatic choices made by the scientists using the
models.
Two things are worth noting at this point. First, as emphasized by Le Bihan, look-
ing at the sailboat example we can infer that: structural features can be analysed
independently of functional or pragmatic considerations; functional features can
be analysed independently of pragmatic considerations yet they crucially depend
on structural features; whereas pragmatic features depend on both structural and
functional features. In other words: “the way sailboats are used depends on the
internal make up of sailboats, and our choices regarding sailboats depend on both
the internal make up of sailboats and how this affects their possible usage” (ibid.,
p.262). Second, note that what is at stake when assessing functional-adequacy is
the issue of representation. More precisely, Le Bihan’s definition of representation
is the following: “it is a relation between a representans and a representandum. [...]
the representans is a scientific model, while the representandum is a phenomenon
in the world” (ibid., p. 266).
Le Bihan claims that within the modest interpretation of the semantic view only
structural-adequacy can be attained – while the strong interpretation would also
these features result in specific functions, relate to the specific goals and means that the sailors
have.” (ibid., 262).
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allow for the attainment of functional-adequacy.46 In other words, the semantic
view’s modesty asks for dropping the representation issue and admitting that:
“[T]he Modest Semantic View commits only to the claim that studying scientific
theories from the point of view of scientific models, and studying scientific models
from a model-theoretic point of view, is sufficient to give a structural-adequate
account of scientific models” (ibid. p, 263). The representation issue has to be
dropped since the semantic view, being merely a formal analysis, can not account
for the representational function of models as defined above, that is, it can not
account for how models are put to use in order to represent the targeted phe-
nomenon.47 Hence, Le Bihan concludes:
If the Semantic View is supposed to be a comprehensive view of science, then
it had better say something about the functional features and the pragmatics
of scientific models. [The Modest Semantic View] does not pretend to be a
complete account of scientific theories and scientific practice. (ibid., p.269)
For the reasons examined in subsection 2.2.1 and 2.2.2, I do agree with Le Bihan
that the correct interpretation of the semantic view is the modest one, and that
the modest semantic view attains structural-adequacy. However, if the analysis of
the view provided in the former sections is correct, Le Bihan’s conclusion that the
semantic view can not attain functional-adequacy is too strong. In order to argue
that the semantic view is capable to rationally reconstruct how models accomplish
their representational function, let me consider an example provided by Le Bihan.
Suppose that I want to “compare” a tile with a square given that they might share
structural features (e.g., the angular separation between the edges). In order to
do that, I need first to construct a data model for the tile (e.g., by measuring
the tile’s angles) which then I can compare with the theoretical model (viz., the
mathematical square presented as a structure). So, Le Bihan argues, while formal
46Le Bihan is not clear whether the strong interpretation would also achieve pragmatics-
adequacy. This is not an issue here, however, as I want to focus on functional-adequacy.
47Also, failing the functional-adequacy, the semantic view consequently fails the pragmatic-
adequacy as well. I will not purse this line of reasoning further as my interest here in on the
account of representation, and hence on the functional-adequacy only.
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methods, such as model theory, are a possible tool for analysing the comparison
between the two structures at stake, such methods do not provide “any way to
say whether the procedure that you used to construct your model is a good or a
bad one” (ibid., p.265). Now, there are two possible interpretations for this last
claim by Le Bihan.
The first interpretation is that the rational reconstruction provided by the semantic
view lacks the resources to assess whether the procedure to construct the (data)
model for a tile is good or not in general. In section 2.2.2, we have seen that
the rational reconstruction of the representational function of models is modest in
the sense that it provides no more than a “conceptual grinder”, sometimes even
too coarse, through which to put scientists’ experience. Nonetheless, in certain
cases, such a grinder is able to be quite specific concerning the procedure to build
models.48 So, just consider the final stages of the theory application within Suppes’
hierarchy that we saw in section 2.2.2. The data model is not just a free floating
abstract structure, but a structure built according to the theory of experimental
design. The theory of experimental design provides us with an ensemble of rules
for the test of a specific scientific theory. Such ensemble then tells us whether the
procedure we use to construct the (data) model is “a good or a bad one”. Moreover,
the semantic view provides an internal criterion of functional adequacy, that is, a
criterion which holds within the very rational reconstruction: the data model has
to be construed according to a procedure that does not rule out the possibility
to put it in a structural relationship with the theoretical model. If the procedure
does not rule out such possibility, then it is good. Otherwise, the procedure is bad.
In this regard it is worth emphasizing that what is required to be a good procedure
is just the possibility – not the necessity – that it produces a data model that is
morphic to the theory model.
The second interpretation of Le Bihan’s claim is that the rational reconstruction
provided by the semantic view lacks the resources to assess whether a procedure
to build the data model for a tile is good or not in a particular case. For this sort
48There are even cases where the reconstruction successfully captures most part of the scientific
practice involved in model construction and application, as shown in the analysis of evolutionary
biology models and confirmation by Thompson (1988) and Lloyd (1994).
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of assessment we need to appeal to pragmatic elements, such as the specific goals
and means sought for by the scientist. Evidently, this implies taking into account
elements pertaining to the pragmatic account of scientific models. Accounting
for scientists’ pragmatic considerations means, according to Le Bihan, to explain
scientists’ choices as determined by sociological or material factors (the potential
interest aroused by the tackled problem, the instrumentation available, the costs,
etc.). The possibility for the semantic view to cover these aspects is ruled out
by its very advocates (see section 2.2.2). However, as held by Le Bihan herself,
functional features can be analysed independently of pragmatic considerations.
Therefore the fact that the semantic view is intrinsically unable to account for
pragmatic considerations does not undermine its capability of being functional-
adequate.
The question as to whether a philosophical analysis of scientific theories should
cover also the pragmatic considerations influencing the particular case of model
construction is worth to be considered. Here I will limit the analysis to what could
be a possible reaction by advocates of the semantic view to this question. Lloyd
(1994, p.27), for example, holds that an analysis dealing with pragmatic considera-
tions such as how to build “the most appropriate” model to represent the behavior
of a particular phenomenon is an empirical question. One needs to fully enter the
level of actual practice, thus abandoning the perspective of the philosophical anal-
ysis in the sense of the “historically oriented philosopher of science” introduced
by Suppe in subsection 2.2.2. On the other hand, the determination of “types or
categories” of models which are used in a certain discipline, the analysis of how
they relate in order to form the structure of a theory as well as in its confirmation
are philosophical issues.
In conclusion, if we mean to show that the semantic view can not provide any
account of how models represent, there are two possible ways to go. We can hold
a ‘strong interpretation’ of the semantic view, claiming that the format that it
provides for theories and actual practice is set forth as a faithful description of
theories and of actual practice. Otherwise, we can opt for the modest interpreta-
tion of the view – the only possible according to the analysis provided in Section
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2.2. Contrary to what held by Le Bihan, the issue related to the use of models
can find room within a rational reconstruction, even if it is cashed out mainly in
formal terms. What is left out is pragmatic adequacy. However, pragmatic choices
as identified by Le Bihan are not within the province of the analysis provided by a
rational reconstruction for the reasons examined in subsection 2.2.2. This has been
clearly expressed by Suppe: “philosophical problems are not scientific problems;
thus there is no guarantee that what is adequate for doing science is adequate
for doing philosophy of science. To provide an adequate philosophical analysis of
science – to explain and provide an understanding of what science does and why
it has the epistemic or other philosophical attributes claimed for it – may require
philosophical theorizing about things that science itself need not to countenance.
[...]. To think otherwise is simply to confuse philosophy of science with science”
(1989, p.31).
2.3.2 Brading and Landry
In their 2006 paper, Brading and Landry reach a conclusion about the semantic
view that is very similar to the one held by Le Bihan: the semantic view is a
“methodological stance” (ibid., p.580), which falls short of saying anything about
representation. Also in this context, representation is intended as a model-target
relationship.
However, in order to justify their claim, Brading and Landry do not appeal to the
functional character of representation which is assumed by Le Bihan. Rather, they
call for the ontological significance of representation: the objects that empirical
theories talk about are particular objects. So the semantic view, in order to
account for representation, should have access to particular objects and, according
to the authors, it fails in this respect.
Brading and Landry claim that the conception of scientific theorizing as a hier-
archy of models which are related to each other through morphism allows us to
access only kinds of objects, that is: “objects that can be individuated only up to
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isomorphism as positions in a structure system of a given kind” (p.572). Draw-
ing on the analogy with mathematical structuralism49, Brading and Landry claim
that:
[A]ccording to the semantic view of scientific theories, theories (regardless
of how, or whether, they are formally framed) are to be characterized as a
collection of models that share the same kind of structure, and the kinds of
objects that the theory talks about can be presented as positions in such
models. (ibid., p. 573)
When we identify kinds of objects via morphisms, we are presenting objects.
The hierarchy of models put forward by the semantic view surely achieve the
presentation-level and, in so doing, it connects theoretical models to data models.
However, the semantic view is a formal analysis provided for empirical theories
and objects of empirical theories, contrary to those of mathematics as presented
within mathematical structuralism, are particular objects. In order for what we
say about kinds of objects to be true of particular objects, we need to justify not
only the applicability of high level models to data models, but also the applicability
of data models to phenomena. The problem in this regard is that the semantic
view does not provide any justification for the fact that particular objects can be
structured as in data models. That is, what we lack in the semantic view is a
theory of phenomena:
[W]ithout a theory of the phenomena one cannot formalize (again, by model-
theoretic methods) the treatment of the structure of the phenomena in terms
49Mathematical structuralism is the philosophical position according to which the subject
matter of mathematics is not the intrinsic nature of its objects, but the relations among such
objects. Hence the slogan “mathematics is the science of structure” (see Shapiro, 1983, sect.III).
So, in arithmetics the number 2 is not a particular object, it is rather a “position” in a structured
system which exemplifies the natural-number structure, such as von Neumann’s ordinals or
Zermelo’s numerals. The morphism holding between structure systems of this sort, assuring
that the number 2 has the same position in every structure, identifies 2 as a kind of object. The
properties of the objects will not be that identifying number 2 as a particular object, but those
identifying 2 with respect to other objects in the structured system. To use Shapiro’s words:
“There is no more to being the natural number 2 than being the successor of the successor of 0,
the predecessor of 3, the first prime, and so on.” (Shapiro, 1983, p.6).
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of data models alone, and so one cannot use the semantic view’s account
of shared structure between models to fully account for the applicability
of a theory to the phenomena and, thereby, to establish a theory-world
connection. (ibid., p.575)
A theory of phenomena then would allow to talk about the “structure of the
phenomena” which, in turn, allows the theory not only to talk about, but also to
be about its objects. As soon we get the “structure of phenomena” we then have
an account of representation, that is: “an account of how a physical theory, that
talks about kinds of objects, comes to be about particular objects” (ibid., 576).
Hence the conclusion:
The question of the reality of a particular physical object and/or the truth
of physical propositions cannot be settled semantically, that is, cannot be
settled merely by appeal to a Tarskian notion of a model and/or a Tarskian
notion of truth: it depends crucially on some extrasemantic process whereby
the connection between what we say and what there is is both established
and justified. This is what we mean when an account of representation is
required. (emphasis mine, ibid., p.576)
Since the semantic view relies on structures and structural relations among struc-
tures it should be understood as a methodological stance which only commits to
the claim that:
[T]he kinds of objects the theory talks about are presented through the
shared structure of its theoretical models and that the theories apply to
phenomena just in case the theoretical models and the data models share
the same kind of structure. No ontological commitment – nothing about the
nature, individuality, or modality of particular objects – is entailed. Viewed
methodologically, to establish the connection between the theoretical and
the data models, [the semantic view] considers only the appropriateness
of the kind of structure and owes us no story connecting data models to
the phenomena. In adopting a methodological stance, we forgo talk of ‘the
structure of phenomena’ and simply begins with data models. (ibid., p.
577)
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Brading and Landry then offer two alternative steps beyond this methodological
stance, claiming that one of the two must be taken to attempt to account for
scientific representation. The fundamental aim of such additional step is to account
for what the semantic view can not, i.e., how the data model latches to its target
phenomenon.
A first possible step is the one made by van Fraassen (2008) with his empiricist
structuralism, which entails the acceptance of the famous pragmatic tautology that
basically collapses the phenomenon with the data model. Indeed, this empirical
stance asserts a sort of identity between the data model and its target phenomenon
by assuming that a theory is adequate to the phenomenon if and only if the theory
“is adequate to the phenomenon as represented, i.e., as represented by us” (van
Fraassen, 2008, p.259).
The second possible step beyond the methodological stance is offered by structural
realism. French (2000) and Ladyman (1998) defend this stance by resorting to a
‘no miracles’ argument: if there was no shared structure between the data mod-
els and their target phenomena, then the success of science would be a miracle.
Although different variants of structural realism exist, all assume that the kinds
of objects presented by the successful theory adequately represent the structure
of the particular objects of which the target phenomenon consists – the various
forms of structural realism being distinguished on the basis of how they claim that
representation is obtained.
So, Brading and Landry end up claiming that unless we somehow impose a struc-
ture on phenomena – either by identifying phenomena with their associated data
models or by directly assuming that phenomena come in structures – we cannot
give an account of scientific representation, and that therefore the semantic view
cannot account for scientific representation. I contend that both these implica-
tions are unwarranted. My argument is that scientific representation need not be
framed exclusively in structural terms and, in addition, that there is more in the
semantic view than just a series of structural relationships. Let me better clarify
these two points.
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As discussed in subsection 2.2.3, both Suppe and Suppes have been quite clear
about the impossibility for the semantic view to deal with actual beings – i.e.,
with particular objects, in Brading’ and Landry’s terminology. This, however,
does not prevent the view from providing a rational reconstruction of how theories
are used to represent phenomena. More precisely, my point here is that a rational
reconstruction is an account of representation that tells us how data models latch
to their target phenomena, but it does so without dealing with any particular
object of any particular target phenomenon. To put it differently, a rational re-
construction can be an account of scientific representation in Le Bihan’s sense of
functional-adequacy (see subsection 2.3.1) without any structuralist commitment.
A data model is not a randomly chosen abstract structure. It is built according
to a precise theory of experimental design and with the specific aim of making
it potentially morphic with the theory model. The information gathered from
the target phenomenon by means of experimental procedures is always collected
having a precise theory model in mind. Can we explain this procedure of building
data models? My answer is yes. The explanation comes from the formalization of
theories provided by the semantic view given in subsection 2.2.1 and their actual
use discussed in subsection 2.2.2. A data model is an instrument for a precise aim:
to test whether the theory model successfully represents its target phenomenon.
Such an aim, which has to be supposed for all data models in general and not just
for some data models in particular, naturally gives rise to an internal criterion
for evaluating whether a given procedure followed to build a data model is bad
or not. Such internal criterion is directly implied by the structural nature of the
formalization of theories given by the semantic view: a procedure is definitely bad
when independently of the data collected it necessarily produces a data model that
can not be embedded in the theory model.
So, the semantic view can explain why data models are built as they actually are,
at least in general terms. Is this enough to account for scientific representation?
My answer here is a weak yes, which requires some specifications. If I required,
as done by Brading and Landry, an account of scientific representation to be
based only on structural relationships, then I should have agreed with them that
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the semantic view can not account for representation at all. Also, I would have
reached a similar conclusion if I had restricted the scope of the semantic view
to the formalization of theories in structural terms, as there would have been no
room in the view to say anything on the relationship between the data model
and its target phenomenon. However, according to my view, both antecedents
of these claims are false. It is true that to account for scientific representation
is to explain how (data) models latch to their target phenomena, but this need
not be done exclusively in structural terms. In fact, explaining why data models
are built how they actually are improves our knowledge of how models latch to
their target phenomena, at least in the weak sense of rationalizing the behavior of
scientists and their actual practices. Further, as discussed in subsection 2.2.2, the
semantic view does consider scientific practices, and it even uses actual practice
as a criterion to evaluate the goodness-of-fit of its own reconstruction of scientific
theorizing. In particular, the view can help to explain why scientists are forced to
extract information from the phenomenon and to put it in the structural form of
the data model.
2.4 Second charge: ...And if it does, it implies
structuralism
There is another objection that can be put forward against the semantic view
when it comes to scientific representation. The objection does not amount to an
explicit charge. It rather stems from the critical remark made by several authors
in the literature that, unless the semantic view assumes a “privileged relationship”
between the (hierarchy of) models and their tagets, the applicability of the former
to the latter is left unjustified (Frigg, 2006, Giere, 1999, Knuuttila, 2014, Sua´rez,
1999b).50 Drawing on some remarks by van Fraassen about the relationship be-
tween the semantic view and the general concept of structuralism, I argue that the
critical remark above could be interpreted as a charge against the semantic view
50Evidently, this criticism can be conceived as such only by those who, like myself, consider
ontological commitment as detrimental for an analysis of scientific representation.
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to imply a form of (ontic) structural realism about representation. Assuming that
the above observation could be so interpreted, my purpose in this section is to
examine whether the semantic view, in its original formulation, is the right target
for this charge.
Structuralism in the philosophy of science is a term with as many meanings as the
subject matter at stake. Here, I will consider the general meaning of structuralism
as nicely formulated in a recent paper by Frigg and Votsis (2011): “Generally, a
structuralist perspective is one that sees the investigation of the structural features
of a domain of interest as the primary goal of enquiry”.
The semantic view, as an analysis of theories which privileges the formulation
of theories as model-theoretic structures, can easily be interpreted as a structural
perspective on theories.51 Van Fraassen explicitly recognizes the possibility of such
an interpretation, claiming that:
By common, if often tacit, consent among [advocates of the semantic view],
the semantic approach is the current form of the general idea of structural-
ism. [...] According to the semantic approach, to present a scientific theory
is, in the first instance, to present a family of models – that is, mathemati-
cal structures offered for the representation of the theory’s subject matter.
Within mathematics, isomorphic objects are not relevantly different; so it
is especially appropriate to refer to mathematical objects as ”structures”.
Given that the models used in science are mathematical objects, therefore,
scientific theoretical descriptions are structural; they do not ”cut through”
isomorphism. So the semantic approach implies a structuralist position:
science’s description of its subject matter is solely of structure. (1997, pp.
522-523)
When the semantic view is assessed as an account of scientific representation, the
possibility of its structural reading turns out to be potentially problematic. Even
51A former case of a rational reconstruction of theory structure which has turned out to be
fruitful for structural considerations is the Ramsey-sentence approach to theories (see Worrall,
2007, Worrall and Zahar, 2001).
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assuming a deflationist attitude and avoiding a definition of representation, it is
clear that in the context of philosophy of science we interpret representation as
a way of gaining knowledge via the medium at stake (Morrison, 2008, Sua´rez,
1999a, van Fraassen, 2007). So, as long as representation is assumed to be the
relationship between (a hierarchy of) models and a target system, representation-
as-application is also loaded with an epistemic value: it is by (construing and)
applying models that we gain knowledge of the phenomenon, or kinds of phenom-
ena, of interest.52 Borrowing an example from Lloyd (1994, p.145), we can say
that when a population geneticist claims that a Mendelian model is applicable to,
conforms to, or represents a natural or a laboratory population, she is claiming
that aspects of the population system (e.g., the distribution of genes frequencies)
are explained because the system is isomorphic in certain respects to the model.
This view of representation which can be drawn from the semantic account has
undergone several criticisms, most of them focusing on the following reading of
the claim above: the model applicability requires a form of morphism which is a
relation proper of mathematical entities, such as structures. So, either we claim
that it holds among models and structured versions of targets (supposedly, models
of data), or we assume, using van Fraassen’s words: “that nature has itself a
relational structure in precisely the same way that a mathematical object has a
structure” (2006, p.539). In the first case, we are simply claiming that we can
gain knowledge of reality via morphism between mathematical structures and it is
in this context that objections such as Brading and Landry’s arise. In the second
case, we are considering whether the semantic view, in order to gain any epistemic
access to reality, needs to resort to a form of realism about structure.
This second interpretation is not fair of the semantic view in its original formula-
tion. As we have seen in Section 2.2 (and, in particular, in subsection 2.2.3), all
advocates of the view are fundamentally neutral with respect to realism. More
precisely, none of the advocates of the semantic view in its original formulation
52This is the view that representation is among the primary aim of science, see van Fraassen
(1980a, 1987), Friedman (1982, Ch.6), Kitcher (1983), Giere (1988, 1999), Morgan and Morri-
son (1999), Cartwright (1999a), and Morrison (2007, Ch.2). On the other hand, authors such
as Hacking (1983), Peschard (2011), Kennedy-Graham (2012) and Knuuttila (2011) resist the
representational interpretation of science.
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would assume a realist commitment to reality. So, the second interpretation seems
to be quite misleading.
The possibility for such a misinterpretation might be traced back to two sources.
The first is van Fraassen’s ‘bewilderment’ that we analyse in section 2.2.3 and
which led him to formulate the model-target relation in metaphysical terms. The
second is the interest shown by supporters of structural realism for the semantic
view, conceived as an hospitable environment for their stance. In particular, the
semantic view is presented by Ladyman as a “natural framework” (Ladyman, 1998,
p.411) for the ontic structural realism53, which in the mentioned paper makes its
debut:
I will argue that structural realism gains no advantage over traditional
scientific realism if it is understood as merely an epistemological refine-
ment of it, and that instead it ought to be developed as a metaphysical
position. I explain why the semantic approach to scientific theories of-
fers the natural framework for this, and what a metaphysical structural
realism must involve if it is to do justice to the intuition behind the
no-miracles argument. (Ladyman, 1998, p.411)
This viewpoint has then been further developed by French and Ladyman (1999)
and French and Saatsi (2006). Even more recently, Ladyman (2014) presents ontic
structural realism as a form of structural realism motivated by several problems,
among which, he counts scientific representation and, in particular, the role of
53As it is well known, Ladyman (1998) shapes his ontic structural realism in contrast to the
pre-existing structural realism put forward by Worrall (1989), which he dubbed epistemic. For
a thorough analysis of the relationship between these two forms of structural realism, with at-
tention whether the ontic form should be actually be preferred to the ‘traditional’ epistemic
one, see Morganti (2011). In his (1998) paper and in the entry on structural realism (2014),
Ladyman distinguishes the two forms of structural realism as follows. Epistemic structural re-
alism (ESR) states that structural properties identify our epistemic boundaries. The scientific
realists’ commitment towards theoretical entities slides into the commitment towards the rela-
tions instantiated by (observable and unobservable) entities - whilst remaining agnostic about
the nature of theoretical entities. Roughly speaking, the ESR main thesis is that we know solely
the relational structure of things and not the things themselves. Instead, a “crude statement of
[Ontic structural realism (OSR)] is the claim that there are no ‘things’ and that structure is all
there is” (Ladyman, 2014).
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models in physics. So my conjecture is that the semantic view and its “inherent
structuralism” (French and Saatsi, 2006, p.549) have been used not only as a good
framework for ontic structural realism, but as a proper tool to justify its metaphys-
ical stance. The “Poincare´ Manoeuvre” described by French makes the intention
clear: “we begin with the standard presumption that theories are committed to
objects, at least as the subjects of property instantiation; we then reconceptualise
or [...] eliminate those objects in structural terms.” (French, 2012, p.23). If the
semantic view is conceived as the tool allowing for such a manoeuvre, this would
turn the semantic view into the ‘epistemic heart of structural realism’, in the
same way as the syntactic view was for the Positivism. In other words, the step
from “being particularly appropriate for a structural realist stance” to “implying
a structural realist stance” is somehow taken by structural realists.
However, according to the analysis of the early formulations of the semantic view
provided in Section 2.2 (subsections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2), the implication above is
unwarranted: the view can account for representation – in the sense of a rational
reconstruction of it – without requiring any ontological commitment. Let me
clarify this point in further details.
The semantic view accounts for representation by providing a rational reconstruc-
tion of how scientists actually use models to represent. Such an account relies on
two crucial elements. The first element is the development of a characterization
of theories that is fundamentally structural, and which is based on the idea of a
hierarchy of models going from the most abstract to the most concrete. Admit-
tedly, the very structure of the hierarchy of models is built by means of structural
relationships among its constituent parts. But the hierarchy of models also pro-
vides the boundaries for the application of structural relationships. No structure
or structural relationship is assumed outside the hierarchy of models. And here
is where the second element crucially comes in: the semantic view is not indif-
ferent to what scientists do in practice with models and, moreover, the view tries
to explain scientists’ behavior on the basis of its own formalization of theories.
Although the view does not aim at accounting for the intentions or aims of any
single scientist, it provides good reasons why a data model exists, and why it comes
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in a structural form. It is because any scientist who attempts to relate a theory
to a phenomenon must, first of all, construct a data model of the phenomenon,
basically creating a structure that he can then put in a structural relation with
the theory model. To assume that reality is already in structural form, ready for
the scientist to be translated into the data model, would indeed mean to commit
to structural realism. But the semantic view does not assume this. It assumes
that the scientist is forced by the very way in which theories are formulated, to
extract information from the phenomenon and to put it in the structural form of
the data model. Note that this does not happen by chance: the way in which the
data model is structured crucially depends on the models that occupy a higher
level in the hierarchy.
2.5 Keeping the semantic view alive
In this chapter I have examined two charges against the semantic view of scientific
theories. Both the charges are based on the fact that the semantic view is an
analysis of theories focusing mainly on models as structure. The first criticism
questions the possibility for the analysis provided by the semantic view to account
for representation. The second criticism questions whether the semantic view could
be an account of representation without implying any form of structural realism
about representation. Drawing on an analysis of some features of the semantic
view put froward in the first part of the chapter, I have tried to give some reasons
to resist both the criticisms.
I have considered as illustrative examples of the first charge the recent papers by
Le Bihan (2012) and Brading and Landry (2006). What made their contributions
particularly relevant for my analysis is that I share with the three authors the
conviction that the semantic view is eminently a rational reconstruction and that
we use this very conviction to reach opposite conclusions. While Le Bihan, Brading
and Landry conclude that this character of the view prevents it from being able
to accommodate representation, I argue that, within the boundaries of rational
reconstruction (which I have traced out in the first part of the chapter), the view
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does provide an account of representation and of the scientific practice by means
of which it is carried out.
Le Bihan assumes that a necessary condition for the view to account for represen-
tation is that it must be able to tell us when the procedure followed by a scientist
to construct a data model is “good” or “bad” for a given phenomenon. As pointed
out in my analysis of the rational reconstruction of scientific practice as provided
by the semantic view, data models are not free floating structures, rather they are
built according to the so-called theory of experimental design. Therefore, contrary
to Le Bihan, I argue that the semantic view is capable of assessing the procedure
followed by a scientist to construct data models. This is indeed possible in two
weak senses. First, in the sense that it can be established if the followed proce-
dure is consistent with the theory of experimental design. Second, in the sense
that the procedure can yield a data model that is potentially – but not necessarily
– morphic to the theory’s model. This is enough to fulfill the necessary condition
for a (functional) adequate account set by Le Bihan.
Brading and Landry, on the other hand, assume that representation can not be
accounted for unless we impose a structure on phenomena, either by identifying
phenomena with their associated data models, or by directly assuming that phe-
nomena come in structures. Since they (correctly) argue that the semantic view is
silent on the structure of target phenomena, they conclude that the view cannot
account for scientific representation. My counter-argument runs as follows: a ra-
tional reconstruction is an account of representation that tells us how data models
latch to their target phenomena, but it does so without dealing with any specific
component of any particular target phenomenon. What we might expect from a
rational reconstruction of scientific representation is to rationalize scientist’s be-
havior in scientific practice, and this presupposes in a weak sense an explanation
of how models latch to their target systems.
The second charge is more subtle, as it allows for the semantic view to be an
account of representation, but only at the price of implying a form of structural
realism about representation. Such criticism seems to be potentially supported by
the idea that the semantic view is a hospitable framework for structural realism. I
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have argued that this conjecture is both historically misleading and unwarranted.
By appealing to the neutrality of the semantic view, which I have defended in
the first part of the chapter, I have argued that the view programmatically avoids
to ‘create an environment’ which could be hospitable for any epistemic stance
to be developed. Moreover, such charge is unwarranted. The view can account
for representation – always within the boundaries of a rational reconstruction –
without requiring any ontological commitment. Indeed, to assume that reality is
already given as structure (ready for the scientist to be translated into a data
model) would mean to commit to structural realism. But the semantic view does
not opt for this assumption. Instead, it assumes that the scientist is forced by the
very way in which theories are formulated (and, more precisely, by the hierarchy
of models), to extract information from the phenomenon and to put it in the
structural form which is typical of the data model.
Chapter 3
A Misleading Use of Structure:
An Example
3.1 Structural approaches
There is by now a long tradition of structural approaches to scientific representa-
tion, starting in da Costa and French (1990), French and Ladyman (1999), Bueno
et al. (2002), da Costa and French (2003), Bueno and French (2011) to the most
sophisticated recent accounts by Bartels (2006) and Pincock (2012). The tradi-
tion’s critics (Contessa, 2011, Frigg, 2006, Giere, 1999, Sua´rez, 2003, van Fraassen,
2008) have invoked putative counterexamples to structural notions, displaying in-
stances of scientific modeling where a model B is accepted as a representation of
some object, system or process A, while failing to hold the required structural
morphism relation to A. As a response, defenders of structural accounts have pro-
gressively weakened their constraints, from full isomorphism to embedding, partial
isomorphism and, most recently, to homomorphism. (Van Fraassen was both an
early proponent, and is nowadays a critic, at least in the terms defended here.)
It is unclear in these papers what precise claims are being made on behalf of
structural mapping or morphisms, and what exactly is the work that structures
are supposed to perform. More worryingly, perhaps, the notion of structure itself
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remains imprecise and elusive. But whatever else is claimed on behalf of structural
morphism, it is clear that the point of providing a structural account of represen-
tation is to provide some elucidation, however partial, of the central notion of
scientific representation. Hence we shall take it that any structural account of
representation is minimally committed to the claim that representation in science
is a relation that is appropriately characterized or described as a kind of structural
mapping or morphism. And indeed most authors in the tradition have invoked
structural isomorphism and its variants as part of an analysis of representation.
Thus for instance, it is claimed that:
[T]o understand how an organism performs well using a certain rep-
resentational system we have to consider the specific contents of the
representation and how they relate to its reference objects. Content
is a necessary component of representation, and homomorphisms are
necessary to explain this necessary component. (Bartels, 2006, p.17)
The evidence for these claims and their reach remains nonetheless surprisingly un-
clear. It is in particular often unclear, as we shall point out in this article, whether
isomorphism and its cousins are intended to provide an analysis of the notion of
representation itself, or whether they are merely intended to describe some of the
ways in which representation in science achieves some of its characteristic ends,
such as for instance, the aim of accuracy. In other words, it is unclear whether
structural mappings or morphisms are constitutive of representation in science, or
merely some efficient means for representation to achieve its ends. Defenders of
the structural accounts are often irritatingly imprecise in shifting from evidence
for the weaker case to claims in favor of the stronger constitutive claim. But the
inference from the former to the latter claim is invalid, since the problem of rep-
resentation and the problem of accurate representation are by now well-known to
be distinct (Callender and Cohen, 2006, Contessa, 2007, Frigg, 2006). We believe
that there is so far no good argument to the effect that the evidence for the weaker
claim (that structural morphisms are typically involved in the assessment of the
accuracy of many mathematical representations in science) is also evidence for the
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stronger claim (that structural morphisms are constitutive of the nature of sci-
entific representation, i.e., that a structural account of representation is correct).
There are powerful independent arguments against the stronger claim (see Frigg,
2006, Sua´rez, 2003) that recommend a skeptical attitude to structural accounts of
scientific representation in general.
In this paper we analyze the most sophisticated and plausible structuralist ac-
count of representation to date, namely Andreas Bartels’ (2006) homomorphism
account. The account’s main virtue is the alleged capacity of homomorphism to
account for the phenomena of misrepresentation, and indeed we believe this to
be one of the greatest stumbling blocks for structural accounts. Hence we begin
in Section 3.2 by reviewing the problem of misrepresentation in scientific mod-
elling, in both the mistargetting and inaccuracy varieties. As an illustration of
the latter, we briefly discuss the essential features of an elementary yet influen-
tial historical case of scientific modeling: the billiard ball model of gases. We
argue that there are three ways in which scientific models typically misrepresent,
and we refer to them as abstraction, pretence and simulation. We provide bare
structural characterizations for all of them in terms of simple structural renditions
of their representational sources and targets. We argue on the basis of the bil-
liard ball model that scientific models abstract, many pretend, and some simulate;
but that this does not take away any of their descriptive, predictive and explana-
tory value. Then in Section 3.3 we summarize Bartels’ homomorphism theory of
representation and review his claim that this theory accounts for misrepresenta-
tion. We point out the essential role adjudicated by Bartels to what he calls the
“representational mechanism”. Representational mechanisms have a crucial role
for representation (and misrepresentation) to occur and, being these mechanisms
independent of any structural mapping, we argue that misrepresentation is not
accounted fully in structural terms. This particularly holds for mistargetting as
presented in (Sua´rez, 2003). In Section 3.4 we dispute the claim that misrepre-
sentation as inaccuracy is accommodated within Bartels’ structural account. We
first argue that what Bartels calls homomorphism is in fact a stronger notion,
namely epimorphism. We then show that epimorphism can not account for either
abstraction, pretence or simulation. Turning to homomorphism proper, which is
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an extremely weak structural constraint, amounting to the relation technically
known as completeness, we show that it can accommodate pretence kinds of mis-
representation, but not abstraction. Since we argue that most if not all scientific
models abstract, it follows that even the weakest notion of structural morphism is
too strong for scientific representation. The formal result is summarized in Table
3.2. In Section 3.5, we admonish philosophers to take greater care with structural
accounts of representation – while structural morphisms may provide good and
valuable resources to assess the accuracy of many mathematical models in science,
they can not actually account for the very relation of representation.
3.2 Misrepresentation: Mistargetting and inac-
curacy
“Scientific representations misrepresent”: This is one of the main points of agree-
ment in the recent literature on scientific representation. Any philosophical theory
or account of scientific representation must not only accommodate but also explain
minimally how representations fail to accurately characterize or describe their en-
tire subject. Representations always simplify to some degree: this is at the heart
of why they are useful in practice.1 Thus it would be a major objection to any
philosophical account of representation that it does not account for misrepresenta-
tion. This has often been an issue for structural accounts – since on such accounts
the conditions for the accuracy of a representation (the ‘matching’ of relations and
properties at the source and target end) are also the very conditions for establish-
ing the relationship of representation in the first place. This is most evident an
objection to isomorphism accounts, and the relevant question for us is the extent
to which the objection can be answered by means of suitable weakenings of the
isomorphism relation. Yet, there is a stronger form that the objection may take,
which we would like to consider in this section.
1Jorge Luis Borges’ wonderful discussion of the one-to-one map is an exemplary parody of
how a perfectly accurate representation is also perfectly useless (Borges, 1954).
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The stronger objection begins with the observation that there are distinct forms of
misrepresentation and that these pose significantly different challenges for struc-
tural accounts. Two main kinds were already identified in Sua´rez (2003) and
referred to there as mistargetting and inaccuracy. A model may misrepresent by
being applied to the wrong target, perhaps as a result of having been mistakenly
taken to be a different model in some particular context. The model’s target is
selected as part of the normative practice of model building that gives rise to it,
but a particular agent may, perhaps out of lack of information or competence, ap-
ply it to the wrong target. The model is in that very context misrepresenting in a
rather strong sense: it is used as a representation of a system or object that it was
not intended for. We return to the issue later on in addressing whether Bartels’
account actually provides necessary and sufficient conditions for representation,
and whether these conditions can in some sense be thought to be ‘structural’. For
now, we focus only on the varieties of inaccurate misrepresentation. More specif-
ically we discuss three forms that inaccuracy can take, and which we refer to as
abstraction, pretence, and simulation.
The rough and ready definition of these terms is as follows: An abstraction es-
sentially neglects some of the features of the target system it is about; a pretence
ascribes to the target system features that this does not possess; a simulation both
abstracts and pretends: it both neglects some of the actual features of the system
and ascribes features to the system that it does not possess. We discuss these dis-
tinctions in relation to one of the best known and most widely discussed examples
of an analogical model in the history of philosophy of science, namely the so-called
‘billiard ball model’ (Hesse, 1970). Hesse presents this model as consisting of a
negative, positive and neutral analogy between macroscopic billiard balls and gas
molecules in a container. Thus in her famous dialogue between the Duhemist and
the Campbellian, the Campbellian lists the properties of billiard balls and classifies
them in three groups in relation with the analogy with gas molecules. In the neg-
ative analogy (the properties that pertain to billiard balls but not gas molecules)
there are color, hardness, brightness; in the positive analogy (the properties that
billiard balls and gas molecules share) there are motion and impact. But there is
a third group of properties that constitute what Hesse calls the neutral analogy.
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These are in Hesse’s Campbellian words, “the properties of the model about which
we do not yet know whether they are positive or negative analogies: These are
the interesting properties, because [...] they allow us to make new predictions.”
(Hesse, 1970, p.8).
Now, Hesse does not describe them, but there is a further group of properties
of interest in the analogical relationship between billiard balls and gases; these
are the properties of the gas that are most definitely not properties of billiard
balls. For instance, the billiard ball model captures microscopic features of elastic
collisions between gas molecules to some extent, but it does not say anything
informative regarding the macroscopic features of the gas, such as volume, density
and pressure. We find ways to draw inferences to those macroscopic properties
from the fully developed kinematical theory of gases, but there are no correlates
in a system of billiard balls for such properties. What’s more, the billiard ball
model is positively misleading as a guide for such properties, since there is no
relation in a system of billiard balls between average speed of the balls and the
pressure exerted outwards by the system. Obviously the missing ingredient is free
expansion, which is a thermodynamically irreversible property of any system of
gas molecules, but has no equivalent or corresponding property in any dynamical
feature of elastic collisions between classical particles or massive bodies, such as
billiard balls. We could call this the ‘inverse negative analogy’ (or negative analogy
‘by denial’): they are the properties that pertain to gas molecules but not billiard
balls. They may even be explicitly denied for billiard balls (as indeed is the case
with free expansion).
In fact, as some careful reading will reveal, the inverse negative analogy is of par-
ticular relevance in Campbell’s original discussion of the example (see Campbell,
1957). And there is some sense to this. Hesse had her own reasons to suppress the
discussion of the inverse negative analogy which could only take away from the
neutral analogy which she deemed fundamental. It is well known that her chief
aim was to defend the thesis that the neutral analogy was key to the heuristics of
research, and fully informed its logic. Campbell, however, was mainly preocuppied
with the relation between theory and measurement, and more particularly with
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the theoretical presuppositions underlying measurement procedures. In this con-
text the inverse negative analogy is relevant, for the macroscopic thermodynamic
properties in question are measurable in the laboratory, while the internal micro-
scopic properties of the gas can only by hypothesized or inferred from observation
via the model.
There are further interesting differences between Hesse’s discussion of Campbell’s
example and Campbell’s original discussion. Perhaps the most striking is that
Campbell never actually employs the term “billiard ball model”. In fact, he does
not refer to billiard balls once! His analogy is more generally with a system of
perfectly elastic macroscopic balls – and, of course, billard balls are an approxi-
mate instance of these, even though they are not in reality perfectly elastic. But
the analogy is fit for most relevant purposes, since it captures some essential as-
pects of the relationship between the laws that apply to both gas molecules and
macroscopic yet point-size elastic balls. As Campbell writes: “The propositions
of the hypothesis of the dynamical theory of gases display an analogy [...] to
the laws which would describe the motion of a large number of infinitely small
and highly elastic bodies contained in a cubical box.” (1957, p.128). There are
however some important points of difference where the model most definitely goes
astray, and they can not be understood to be part of Hesse’s negative analogy,
since they comprise properties of the gas molecules that the model fails to de-
scribe correctly altogether. These properties, which comprise what we refer to as
the inverse negative analogy, include free expansion, but also thermal conductivity,
and viscosity. As Campbell puts it: “The relation predicted [between pressure,
density, and temperature of the gas and its viscosity] does not accord with that
determined experimentally; in particular it is found that the theory predicts that
the coefficient of viscosity will be be determined by the size and shape of the con-
taining vessel, whereas experiment shows that it depends, in a given gas, only on
the density and temperature.” (ibid., p.134).
While there is no space here to discuss the details fully, the considerations above
already suggest the following distinctions with respect to the ways in which the
elastic macroscopic balls model misrepresents gases. First of all, there are all the
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properties of the model elements which are missing in the gases: they constitute
the negative analogy in Hesse’s terms. Thus billiard balls are shiny and hard, but
gas molecules are not (they are neither hard nor soft; neither shiny nor opaque).
We may then say that the model pretends with respect to its target system. It
may seem easy to discharge these properties by simply redefining the model to
include only the positive and neutral analogies. Thus, one may insist, the analogy
is not meant with billiard balls per se but with constructs that are like billiard balls
except in those respects in which billiard balls are positively unlike gas molecules.
But there are a number of problems with this strategy, some of which were already
discussed by Hesse. For a start, the move is of course circular as a definition of
the function of the analogy – since it requires us to already have a hang on those
properties that are not actually analogous. And things get even worse when we
notice that there are also properties of gases that the system of elastic balls –
whether or not billiard balls – can not possibly be said to have, including thermal
conductivity, viscosity and free expansion. This is the inverse negative analogy
we are emphasizing here and we may say that the model abstracts in this case.
The analogy as based upon the model denies that the gas has these properties.
In some cases the model even positively misleads regarding the character of such
properties in the gas. If we consider viscosity in the example above, we see that
the fact that the model fails to describe it correctly depends on the fact that
it abstracts from density and temperature on which viscosity actually depends.
Instead, according to the model, viscosity rather depends on properties the billiard
ball model pretend about, such as the size and shape of the containing vessel. In
these cases we concurrently abstract and pretend about a property of the target
system, thus lying about it. We then say that a model simulate its target whenever
it is deceptive in this sense about it. As Campbell insists, the model analogy is
not to be considered a mere heuristics in the development of a new theory, but
must be understood to be part of the theory itself: “It is often suggested that
the analogy leads to the formulation of the theory, but that once the theory is
formulated the analogy has served its purpose and may be removed and forgotten.
Such a suggestion is absolutely false and perniciously misleading” (1957, p.129).
Thus we must take seriously that models misrepresent by abstracting away, and
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thus ignoring, certain properties of the target system (escape velocity), by pre-
tending that certain properties of the target system do obtain which actually do
not (hardness and shine) and by simulating, that is, by misleadingly denying that
some properties obtain which in fact do (viscosity, thermal conductivity). What’s
more for some and the very same elements, a model will typically both abstract
with respect to some property, and pretend with respect to some other. In other
words, the representation by models will typically involve both ignoring certain
properties that do obtain and postulating other properties that do not obtain even
for the very same sets of elements in the domain of the model.
Now, let us attempt to represent these distinctions somewhat more formally, in
what we regard as a hospitable framework for structuralism, which assumes that
there are uncontroversial structural representations of both source and target. This
is a strong assumption, but without which the structuralist conception of repre-
sentation does not even get off the ground. Thus consider a model and its target
as two relational structures, B = 〈B, (RB)〉 and A = 〈A, (RA)〉, with their own do-
mains of individuals, A and B, and the sets of relations defined over the domains:
respectively (RA) and (RB). A and B are assumed to be similar structures: while
the elements of A and B may be different, the corresponding relations in RA and
in RB have the same number of arguments (Dunn and Hardegree, 2001, p.10). We
use the bar symbol for tuples of elements of A and B: a¯ = (a1, ..., an) ∈ An and
b¯ = (b1, ..., bn) ∈ Bn.
We say that a model B abstracts some property RAj ⊆ An, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, of a
target system A if and only if there exists a¯ ∈ An such that RAj (a¯) ∧ ¬RBj (f(a¯)),
with RBj ⊆ Bn being the corresponding relation of RAj in B and f being a mapping
from A to B. The abstracted properties are in the inverse negative analogy, or
negative analogy by denial. We then say that the model B pretends some property
RBk ∈ Bn, k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, of the target system A if and only if there exists b¯ ∈ Bn
such that f−1(b¯) = a¯ ∈ An and ¬RAk (a¯) ∧ RBk (f(a¯)), with RAk ⊆ An being the
corresponding relation of RBk in A. The pretended properties are typically in the
negative analogy as originally discussed by Hesse. Finally, we say that a model
B simulates a target A when it both abstracts and pretends some properties of
Chapter 3. A Misleading Use of Structure: An Example 90
the same elements of A and of their images in B; formally, for some tuple a¯ ∈ An
with b¯ = f(a¯) ∈ Bn, some RAj , RAk ⊆ An and RBj , RBk ⊆ Bn, it is true that
RAj (a¯) ∧ ¬RBj (f(a¯)) and ¬RAk (a¯) ∧RBk (f(a¯)).
We have argued in this section, by appeal to a well-known foundational example
in the literature, that models typically simulate their targets, by both abstracting
some of their properties away and misleading asserting some of the properties
they do not actually possess. We next turn to the best candidate we know for a
structuralist conception of representation, namely Bartels’ homomorphism theory,
and argue that it can not accommodate these features.
3.3 Bartels’ homomorphism theory and the ‘rep-
resentational mechanism’
The main tenets of a structural account of scientific representation can be summa-
rized as follows: (i) model sources and their targets exemplify, instantiate, possess
or at any rate may be described as relational structures in the sense of mathe-
matical logic, or set-theory; (ii) a model represents a target system only if the
relations in the target are partially or totally transferred to the model via some
sort of morphism.
We have provided a definition for relational structure in the previous section. The
transfer required by condition (ii) is accomplished by some function f : A → B.
In model theory a twofold role is ascribed to f . As a mapping, f assures that each
individual in A has one, and only one, corresponding element (an image) in B. But
in addition, as a morphism, f is a structure preserving mapping and it assures that
related objects possess related properties. The existence of a morphism between
the model and its target is what the advocates of the structural approach take to
be the condition for representation: a model B represents a target system A (if
and) only if A and B are morphic structures.
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Full isomorphism is sometimes advocated as the basic morphism between struc-
tures. For f : A → B to be an isomorphism, several conditions need to be met.
First, f : A→ B must be a bijective function, that is, for every b ∈ B there exists
an a ∈ A such that f(a) = b (also known as surjectivity) and, for every a, a′ ∈ A,
if a 6= a′ then f(a) 6= f(a′) (injectivity). Second, for all j and all elements ai of
A: RAj (a1, ..., an) if and only if R
B
j (f(a1), ..., f(an)). In other words, all relations
in A are transferred to B so that the two structures are relationally identical,
in the sense that the properties they define have identical features. (The struc-
tures themselves are obviously not identical since their domains contain different
elements).
The idea that isomorphism may constitute representation has been criticized on
several grounds. There are first of all urgent questions regarding the fundamental
assumption that model sources and targets are or may be said to possess structures.
For instance, van Fraassen (2008) suggests that isomorphism alone cannot serve
as a condition of representation because, he argues, the structure A is a “relevant
mathematical representation” (ibid, p.243) of the target system to be represented
only by construction. That is, we must first of all “choose” a domain of elements
A and a set RA of relations for it. The claim that a model B is isomorphic to A,
which allows to use B as a representation of A, thus depends on the former act of
construction of A which is essentially a conventional and pragmatic act.
Another class of objections, raised by Sua´rez (2003) and reiterated by Frigg (2006),
undermine the attempt to reduce representation to the relation of isomorphism,
irrespective of whether the fundamental assumption that model sources and tar-
gets are structures or may be described as such. Thus the logical argument shows
that isomorphism and representation do not share logical properties: while iso-
morphism is reflexive, symmetric and transitive, representation is non-reflexive,
non-symmetric and non-transitive. The non-sufficiency and non-necessity argu-
ments show that representation may fail to obtain when isomorphism holds (non-
sufficiency), and may obtain when isomorphism does not (non-necessity). Finally
the misrepresentation argument appeals to the already mentioned fact that inac-
curacy is intrinsic to all scientific representation, while isomorphism seems to leave
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no room for either incomplete or incorrect representation.
In response to these objections the advocates of the structuralist account have
proposed weakenings of the isomorphism relation. Following this direction, An-
dreas Bartels (2006) suggests that homomorphism will serve to overcome at least
the misrepresentation objection. Roughly speaking, what allegedly makes ho-
momorphism immune to the criticisms undermining isomorphism is the fact that
homomorphism allows some parts of the model not to have any counterparts in the
target, thus leaving the necessary room to account for inaccurate representation.
Bartels explicitly endorses the structural account of representation when he claims
that homomorphism is a necessary condition for representation: “something, B,
can represent something, A, only if some structure of the represented domain
A is transferred to its image B” (ibid., p.7) and that: “B represents A only if
B is a homomorphic image of A” (ibid., p.8). The homomorphism account of
representation advocated by Bartels in fact comprises two parts. One part is
purely formal, and it treats homomorphism model-theoretically. The other part
concerns the application of the concept ‘being homomorphic to’ and claims that
this concept is extensionally equivalent to ‘to represent potentially ’. Both the
formal and the extensional analyses of homomorphism provided by Bartels play a
role in his attempt to show that homomorphism accounts for misrepresentation,
so let us look at them in turn.
According to Bartels’ definitions, the following three conditions must obtain for
two similar structures A = 〈A, (RA)〉 and B = 〈B, (RB)〉 to be homomorphically
related: for all j, all (a1, ..., an) in A
n, and all (f(a1), ..., f(an)) in B
n:
Completeness: if RAj (a1, ..., an), then R
B
j (f(a1), ..., f(an)) (1)
Faithfulness: if RBj (f(a1), ..., f(an)) then R
A
j (a1, ..., an) (2)
Surjectivity: for every b ∈ B, there exist a ∈ A such that f(a) = b (3)
The condition of surjectivity on f assures that all the elements in B are images
of one or more element in A. Completeness rules out the possibility that there is
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a relation in A which has not a counterpart in B, so that the information that B
provides about A is complete. On the other hand, faithfulness rules out that there
is a relation in B which has not a counterpart in A, so that B provides a faithful
snapshot of the relational framework in A. We then say that B is homomorphic
to A.
The relation of homomorphism thus defined identifies the set or class of structures
to which any structure B is homomorphic, what we may call its homomorphism
class. According to Bartels, these structures constitute the representational con-
tent of B, that is, they are all potential representational targets of B. In order
for any of these potential targets to turn into the actual target of B, a represen-
tational mechanism must pick it out from the homomorphism class as the target
for B. A representational mechanism can be of two kinds: it may arise from an
agent’s intentions and purposes (an intentional representational mechanism), or
it may be the result of naturally occurring causal relations (a causal representa-
tional mechanism). In the first case, the selection of the actual target from the
homomorphism class is arbitrary, depending entirely on an agent’s purposes, while
in the second case the selection is driven by some causal facts that are indepen-
dent of the agent. In either case, the representational mechanism has in effect
the absolutely ineliminable role of picking out the actual representational target
of a particular model B. In spite of this, Bartels claims that his theory retains its
structural character, since homomorphism is nonetheless “the necessary condition
of correct actual representation” (ibid., p.12). Let us inspect this claim a little
closer.
Two forms of misrepresentation are generally considered in the literature: inaccu-
racy and mistargetting.2 The three kinds of misrepresentation presented in Section
3.1 all lead to inaccuracy, which is misrepresentation in the broad sense. As for
mistargetting, it is “the phenomenon of mistaking the target of a representation”
(Sua´rez, 2003, p.233).
2While misrepresentation as inaccuracy is taken into account in Cartwright (1983), Contessa
(2011), Frigg (2006), Giere (1988), Pincock (2011), Sua´rez (2003, 2004), Teller (2001, 2008b),
van Fraassen (2008), misrepresentation as mistargetting is presented in Sua´rez (2003, 2004).
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Now, homomorphism theory is claimed by Bartels to be conceptually adequate,
that is, it sharply distinguishes cases where B represents, B does not represent,
and B misrepresents. This claim is relevant insofar it is usually on the grounds
of conceptual adequacy that the literature dooms to failure structural accounts.
Indeed, it is argued, the fact that structural accounts treat morphisms as necessary
conditions for representation leaves no room for the intermediate condition ‘there
is representation and it is incorrect ’: either there exists a morphism from A to
B, hence representation, or there exist not morphism and representation does not
obtain.
According to Bartels, such a charge would be unfair to his homomorphism theory.
Indeed, the distinction between the representational content of B and its target
allows the theory to account for the following situation:
If a reference object for B [B] is chosen by a representational mechanism
out of the set of objects potentially represented by B [B], then B [B]
will correctly represent this object. If a reference object for B [B] is
chosen which does not belong to this set, then this reference object
will be misrepresented by B [B]. Thus, the case in which something
A [A] is misrepresented by B [B] and the case in which A [A] is not
represented by B [B] (i.e. A [A] is not a reference object of B [B]) are
clearly distinct. (2006, p.14)
The distinction between target and content of B plays then a crucial role in ac-
commodating those intermediate cases where representation occurs, and it is not
correct. In order to illustrate misrepresentation thus conceived, let’s consider a
universe of discourse which allows the following five structures {B,A1,A2,A3,A4}.
Among the five structures, only A1 and A2 are homomorphic to B. We call H the
set containing A1 and A2, which then constitute the representational content of
B. Now suppose that a representational mechanism picks A3 as the target of B,
thus misrepresenting A3. Consequently, structure A4 is neither a potential target
of B, nor misrepresented by B. Providing a sharp distinction between representing
(picking a target within H), non-representing (having a structure neither belonging
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to H nor picked by a representational mechanism), and misrepresenting (having a
structure not belonging to H and nonetheless picked as a target), the homomor-
phism theory has the resources to satisfy conceptual adequacy, thus explaining
misrepresentation. In particular, this notion of misrepresentation may be seen to
be addressing directly the concerns raised by Sua´rez (2003) about mistargetting:
the act of ascribing a target outside the representational content of B may be
thought to make his notion of mistargetting precise.
However, Bartels’ homomorphism is only allegedly conceptually adequate. Fact
is, we can not differentiate representation, non-representation and misrepresenta-
tion on the grounds of homomorphism alone. Indeed, Bartels claims that we have
misrepresentation if a representational mechanism picks a target for B outside the
set H of all the structures B is homomorphic to. Misrepresentation is then the act
performed by a representational mechanism to choose as a target for B a struc-
ture which B is not homomorphic to. Of course, homomorphism is necessary to
identify the set H of structures over which neither non-representation nor mis-
representation can occur. However, before a representational mechanism choses a
target for B among the structures outside H, any of these structures could be either
misrepresented or non-represented at all. Therefore, it is the choice made by a rep-
resentational mechanism to actually determine which structure is misrepresented
and, consequently, which one is not represented. In other words, homomorphism
alone can not help in sharply distinguishing representation, non-representation
and misrepresentation. Consequently, Bartels’ homomorphism theory is still in vi-
olation of conceptual adequacy. What is also noteworthy is the fact that Bartels’
attempt to accommodate the conceptual adequacy seems to resolve in a form of
deflationary, or functional, account: the crucial role is played by the choice made
by a representational mechanism.3 Bartel’s homomorphism theory falls short also
as an account of misrepresentation as mistargetting. The fact is that it does not
actually characterize misrepresentation by mistargetting in full structural terms.
For the original objection raised by Sua´rez was not reliant on the possibility of
3Deflationary (Sua´rez, 2004) or functional (Chakravartty, 2010) approaches treat representa-
tion as a function of models which allows model users to gain information about the target at
stake via the model. The ascription, or recognition, of the representational function of a model
by a user is then essential to have representation.
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ascribing a target that lies outside of the homomorphism class. To pursue the
example above, the objection does not trade on the actual representational target
A3 lying outside the homomorphism class at all. The objection can be entirely
run within the homomorphism class, and in fact it properly belongs there. For
Sua´rez’s point is that the mistaken target is assumed wrongly to be the target
precisely because it holds the required structural relation, and merely on account
of this fact. The point of misrepresentation by mistargetting is rather that no
structural characterization can distinguish structures within the homomorphism
class regardless of whether they are or not picked out as the actual target. In
other words, suppose that the representational mechanism above picked out A1
as the representational target of B and that someone mistakenly identifies A2 as
the target for B. Then there is no structural characterization available of this
mistake since both structures are on equal terms in the homomorphism class of B.
It should be clear that this point survives Bartels’ disquisition in the quote above
entirely.
Homomorphism theory seems then to fall short of what would be required for
an adequate account of scientific representation even by Bartels’ own standards.
What we need to see now is whether the homomorphism theory fares any better
in dealing with misrepresentation as inaccuracy.
3.4 Structural morphisms and representational
inaccuracy
We need to see now if the formal analysis fares any better than the extensional
analysis and enables the homomorphism account to accommodate the inaccuracy
kinds of misrepresentation. We have seen that Bartels identifies three conditions
for homomorphism (Sect.3): completeness, faithfulness and the condition that the
f : A → B be surjective. These conditions, if weakened, might “fit the cases in
which representations do not work perfectly” (Bartels, 2006, p.9). In such cases,
Bartels argues, representation may either “lead to false expectations concerning
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facts in the represented domain” or “blur some of the fine grained differences
existing in the represented domain” (ibid.). These are precisely cases of misrep-
resentation as inaccuracy. In particular, they do recall the formulation we put
forward for, respectively, pretending and abstracting. This is why in what follows
we treat Bartels’ formal analysis of homomorphism as an attempt to accommodate
misrepresentation as inaccuracy.
3.4.1 Homomorphism versus epimorphism
Before proceeding, we need to point out a technical issue about the notion of ho-
momorphism advocated by Bartels. In the literature, the only condition required
for homomorphism is completeness, i.e., the condition which assures that every
fact in A has a corresponding (atomic or relational) fact in B.4 On the other
hand, a surjective homomorphism is the condition for B to be the homomorphic
image of A.5 Therefore, the notion of homomorphism that Bartels is appealing to
does not coincide with the standard notion of homomorphism nor with homomor-
phic image. Indeed, besides completeness and surjectivity of f , Bartels requires
an additional condition, namely faithfulness:
If (i) [faithfulness] and (ii) [completeness] are fulfilled, f is a homomor-
phism from A onto B, and B, by virtue of the existence of f , can be
said to be an homomorphic image. (Bartels, 2006, p.8)
4See Chang and Keisler (1973), Dunn and Hardegree (2001), Hodges (1997), Hodges and
Scanlon (2013).
5“A relational structure B is said to be a homomorphic image of A if there exist a homo-
morphism from A to B that is onto B (in symbols, B = h∗(A)). (A function f maps A onto B
[it should be A onto B] if for every b ∈ B there is an a ∈ A such that h(a) = b).” (Dunn and
Hardegree, 2001, p.15). Read the bold character in the quote as our A and B.
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It should be noted, however, that a homomorphic image is not necessarily also a
faithful one. Indeed, the structure B can be a homomorphic image of A and yet
bear a relation RBj which has no counterpart in A.6
Our claim is that the morphism on which Bartels grounds his structural account is
not really homomorphism, but what is technically known as epimorphism. Indeed,
as demonstrated by Rothmaler (2005, Sect.2, p.474), epimorphism requires the
surjectivity of the f : A → B mapping and, in addition, both faithfulness and
completeness.
We can now consider the weakenings which, according to Bartels, allow epimor-
phism to accommodate misrepresentation as inaccuracy. The first form of weaken-
ing is on faithfulness and it leads to the notion of minimal fidelity (Bartels, 2006,
p.9). While faithfulness in its original formulation (2) requires that the implication
RBj (f(a¯)) → RAj (a¯) holds for all the counterimages of f(a¯) ∈ Bn, all j, RAj ∈ An,
and RBj ∈ Bn, minimal fidelity allows the implication to hold for some of the
counterimages only. In other words, minimal fidelity admits the following case:
Minimal Fidelity: there exists f−1(b¯) = a¯ ∈ An: RBj (f(a¯)) and ¬RAj (a¯) (4)
The fact that epimorphism is not necessarily injective is crucial here since a one–
to–one correspondence between the arguments in A and their images in B would
make the conditions of faithfulness and minimal fidelity equivalent: given that
each bi ∈ B in the range of f has only one counterimage ai = f−1(bi), it is just
6Consider two similar structures, A = 〈A, (RA1 , RA2 )〉 and A = 〈B, (RB1 , RB2 )〉, with A ∈ A =
{a1, a2, a3, a4}, B ∈ B = {b1, b2, b3}. The mapping f : A → B is surjective, and the condition
of completeness holds. Therefore, B is a homomorphic image of A. To find a case where the
conditions of completeness and the surjectivity of f (and A and B are similar structures) are
satisfied, but B is not faithful, we need a relation RBj ∈ B which has no counterpart RAj ∈ A and,
at the same time, we need to assure that all the relations in A have their counterparts in B. The
function f : A→ B is surjective (and not injective) and ascribes to each argument the following
images: f(a1) = b1, f(a2) = b2, f(a3) = b3, f(a4) = b3. Consider now the case that A has the
following family of relations: RA1 ⊆ A2 = {(a1, a2), (a1, a3)} and RA2 ⊆ A2 = {(a1, a2), (a3, a4)}.
As for B: RB1 ⊆ B2 = {(b1, b2), (b1, b3)} and RB2 ⊆ B2 = {(b2, b1), (b3, b2)}. The relation RB1 in B
thus corresponds to both the relation RA1 and R
A
2 in A, while the relation RB2 has no counterpart
in A. Therefore, B is a homomorphic image of A while faithfulness is violated.
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equivalent to claim that the conditional RBj (b¯ = f(a¯)) → RAj (a¯) holds for all the
tuples of counterimages of b¯ = f(a¯) ∈ Bn, or that it holds for at least one tuple.
The second form of weakening is on completeness, and it admits the case where
some, or even all the relations in A are not preserved in B. Weakening on com-
pleteness can take two forms: either some relations in A are not represented at
all in B, or some n−tuples in A are not represented at all in B (which is to say,
some n−tuples of images in B do not stand in any relation of 〈RB〉 although their
counterimages stand in the corresponding relations 〈RA〉).
It is worth noticing at this point the major difference between these two types of
weakenings. The weakened form of faithfulness is a proper condition, in the sense
that it does impose some restrictions on the transfer of structure: it cannot be the
case that a relation in A does not have a corresponding relation representing it
in B. The weakened form of completeness, on the other hand, is not a condition
at all, it rather consists in allowing any possible scenario, which is forecasted by
Bartels himself: “The fewer relations for which the transfer of structure holds,
and the fewer the number of elements of A to which the transfer is restricted, the
poorer the representation will be with respect to content. In an extreme case, no
content will be left” (ibid., p.11). Another, more astonishing, fact about weakened
completeness is that it is a violation of the very minimal condition required for
the transfer of structure (i.e. completeness). Thus no attempt to ground the rep-
resentational relation on weakened completeness may be interpreted as providing
a meaningful structural account of representation. The relevant weakenings must
be of a different kind. Let us see what Bartels proposes in order to accommodate
inaccurate representations.
3.4.2 Morphisms and misrepresentation (as inaccuracy)
In the previous section we have introduced the weakenings which, according to
Bartels, allow to accommodate misrepresentation as inaccuracy. In order to see
whether they actually accomplish the task, here we confront each morphism, both
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Morphism Characteristic Conditions
Homomorphism completeness
Epimorphism surjectivity of f , completeness, faithfulness
Epimorphism∗c surjectivity of f , weak completeness, faithfulness
Epimorphism∗f surjectivity of f , completeness, weak faithfulness
Isomorphism surjectivity and injectivity of f , completeness, faithfulness
Isomorphism∗c surjectivity and injectivity of f , weak completeness, faithful-
ness
Isomorphism∗f surjectivity and injectivity of f , completeness, weak faithful-
ness
Epimorphism∗c,f surjectivity of f , weak completeness, weak faithfulness
Isomorphism∗c,f surjectivity and injectivity of f , weak completeness, weak
faithfulness
Table 3.1: Morphisms
in its standard and weakened version, with the formalized versions of abstrac-
tion, pretence and simulation that we introduced in Section 3.2. For the sake
of completeness, our analysis will include also isomorphism which, as mentioned
in the previous sections, is the morphism employed in other structural accounts.
Isomorphism demands the following conditions to be satisfied: completeness, faith-
fulness, and that the mapping f : A → B be both injective and surjective.7 Our
goal is then to verify that for every morphism there exists at least one form of mis-
representation which is not accommodated, thus showing that none of the three
morphisms account for misrepresentation as inaccuracy. For the sake of clarity, we
recapitulate in Table 3.1 the conditions for each morphism, marking with a star
the weakened morphisms that we have discussed.
Two things need to be noted before proceeding. First, cases where the morphisms
are weakened on completeness are not to be considered since, for the reasons
presented in the previous section, they are not morphisms at all. Second, in Table
3.1 the following two cases are not listed: the case of a surjective homomorphism,
and the case of a faithful homomorphism (without surjectivity). The first case
7Dunn and Hardegree (2001, p.17) consider the injectivity and surjectivity of f only as a
condition for isomorphism. Chang and Keisler (1973, p.21), Hodges (1997, p.5) and Robinson
(1963, p.25) consider also faithfulness as a condition for isomorphism.
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satisfies the conditions for B to be a homomorphic image of A. The surjectivity
of f : A → B, however, is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for
homomorphism, so it can be omitted for the sake of argument without any loss of
generality. On the other hand, a faithful homomorphism f which is not surjective
is not an interesting case to consider, since faithfulness holds for the elements in B
which are in the range of f : A→ B only. And so in what follows, these quantifiers
will be omitted whenever redundant.
We consider abstraction first, which we have formalized as follows:
∃j, RAj ⊆ An, RBj ⊆ Bn,∃a¯ ∈ An : RAj (a¯) ∧ ¬RBj (f(a¯)) (3.5)
Let’s start with homomorphism. The formula (1) describing the completeness
condition is logically equivalent to the following formula: ¬RAj (a¯)∨RBj (f(a¯)) whose
logical contradiction ¬(¬RAj (a¯) ∨RBj (f(a¯))) is, in turn, equivalent to the formula
for abstractingRAj (a¯)∧¬RBj (f(a¯)). In other words, the condition of completeness is
logically incompatible with abstraction. Yet, epimorphism and isomorphism, both
in their standard version and in the version where only faithfulness is weakened,
all satisfy completeness. Therefore epimorphism, epimorphismf , isomorphism and
isomorphismf are logically unsuited to accommodate abstraction.
The second form of misrepresentation is pretence, which we have formalized as
follows:
∃j, RAj ⊆ An, RBj ⊆ Bn, ∃b¯ ∈ Bn, f−1(b¯) = a¯ ∈ An : ¬RAj (a¯) ∧RBj (f(a¯)) (3.6)
We have just seen that homomorphism and, more precisely, the condition of com-
pleteness, is logically equivalent to the formula: ¬RAj (a¯) ∨ RBj (f(a¯)). Hence,
homomorphism allows for pretence as a logical possibility. On the other hand,
pretence logically contradicts faithfulness. Indeed, the formula (2) for faithful-
ness is equivalent to RAj (a¯) ∨ ¬RBj (f(a¯)) whose logical contradiction is exactly
¬RAj (a¯) ∧ RBj (f(a¯)). Therefore, any morphism that satisfies faithfulness can not
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accommodate pretence. This evidently holds for epimorphism and isomorphism.
What about the weakened version of faithfulness ? We have seen that weakening
faithfulness admits of a tuple a¯ ∈ A which does not stand in relation RAj ⊆ An even
though its image b¯ ∈ B stands in the the corresponding relation RBj ⊆ Bn. Weak-
ened faithfulness, then, allows pretence in principle. However, for weakened faith-
fulness to actually accommodate pretence, it is crucial that the function f is not
injective, otherwise weakened faithfulness can not accommodate pretence. There-
fore, epimorphism∗f accommodates pretence, but epimorphism, isomorphism and
isomorphism∗f do not accommodate this form of misrepresentation.
The third form of misrepresentation is simulation, which we have formalized as
follows:
∃j, k, RAj , RAk ⊆ An, RBj , RBk ⊆ Bn, ∃a¯ ∈ An, b¯ ∈ Bn, a¯ = f−1(b¯) :
(RAj (a¯) ∧ ¬RBj (f(a¯)))︸ ︷︷ ︸
abstracting on a¯,b¯
∧ (¬RAk (a¯) ∧RBk (f(a¯)))︸ ︷︷ ︸
pretending on a¯,b¯
(3.7)
Simulation is what obtains from both abstracting and pretending on the same
tuple, which is a common phenomenon in modeling (as stressed by Cartwright,
1989, Frigg and Hartmann, 2012). In this case, it is much easier to verify which
form of misrepresentation is accommodated by which kind of morphism, given
that we just need to jointly consider what abstracting and pretending allow for.
It is then the case that only homomorphism∗c and epimorphism∗f,c accommodate
simulation, and neither of them are proper morphisms that can transfer structure.
In Table 3.2 we summarize the results of our analysis, which leads us to conclude
that no morphism that can be said to transfer structure from a source to a target
is actually able to accommodate all forms of inaccurate misrepresentation. The
structural mappings that merely satisfy weakened versions of completeness can
not be said to transfer structure, and the rest are unable to accommodate at
least one main form of misrepresentation as inaccuracy. Therefore we conclude
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Abstraction Pretence Simulation
Homomorphism NO YES NO
Epimorphism NO NO NO
Epimorphism∗f NO YES NO
Isomorphism NO NO NO
Isomorphism∗f YES NO NO
Table 3.2: Morphisms and Inaccuracy
that isomorphism, epimorphism and homomorphism all fail to account for the
phenomenon of misrepresentation.
It is in particular startling that most of the structural accounts proposed so far fail
to accommodate the one form of misrepresentation as abstraction that philoso-
phers of science have entertained ever since the times of Cambpell’s influential
discussion of the kinetic theory of gases. While structural mappings can be very
helpful in establishing the accuracy of certain mathematical representations in
physics, they are unable to characterize the very relation of representation in gen-
eral.
3.5 Final remarks
We have examined Bartels’ homomorphism theory of scientific representation. We
have examined it in relation to two typical kinds of misrepresentation in scientific
models, which we may refer to as ‘mistargetting’ and ‘inaccuracy’. The former
involves choosing the wrong target for a modeling source on account of perceived
similarities or structural matches, and shows representation to be an essentially
intentional notion (in a broad sense that encompasses intended use). The latter
involves at least three different kinds of distortion of model targets by model
sources, which we have distinguished as abstraction, pretence and simulation. We
have illustrated these distinctions by means of a careful study of the historical case
of the billiard ball model. This model was notoriously invoked by Mary Hesse in
her rightly influential work on analogy. Nevertheless Hesse’s treatment of the
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model is itself highly idealized. We claim that there is more to the actual case
study than just positive and negative analogies in the sense discussed by Hesse.
In particular there are inverse negative analogies, or analogies ‘by denial’, as well
as negative analogies by ‘abstraction’: there are properties of gas molecules that
billiard balls lack, as well as properties of billiard balls that gas molecules lack.
We then endeavored to provide formal characterizations for all these distinctions
in a form that is suitable to the homomorphism account of representation. The
taxonomy thus obtained proves useful to determine whether homomorphism – or
indeed any other kind of morphism – accommodates misrepresentation.
We share with Bartels the thought that the adequacy of any account of scientific
representation demands such accommodation. Any adequate account must at least
accommodate, if not explain, mistargetting and the three kinds of inaccuracy we
have discussed. Now, as for mistargetting, we have examined whether Bartels’ ac-
count successfully cope with it. A closer analysis has revealed some issues remain
regarding how much work effectively homomorphism is doing in the account. We
have argued that the representational mechanism that Bartels appeals to is cru-
cial in determining representation,misrepresentation or non-representation. Thus,
there does not seem to be much work left for homomorphism to do. Bartels
does claim that homomorphism is necessary for representation or misrepresen-
tation alike, yet his actual discussion of the role played by the representational
mechanism seems prima facie to belie this claim. As for the three forms of inaccu-
racy that we have discussed, we have provided arguments to the effect that while
homomorphism may account for pretence – although not in the form of epimor-
phism actually defended by Bartels – it can not provide for abstraction. We thus
concluded that, contrary to Bartels’ claim, the homomorphism account can not
provide for any of the two typical kinds of misrepresentation by scientific models.
A structural account may well be needed to assess the accuracy or faithfulness of
a scientific model, particularly in those cases where the model source and target
can both be given appropriate structural descriptions. Nonetheless, even in such
cases, it does not seem to be the case that the representational relation, or activity,
is constituted by any structural morphism. It is rather what Bartels refers to as
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the “representational mechanism” that does all the conceptually required work at
this stage. Once this basic mechanism is in place, it becomes appropriate to ask
questions regarding the structural match of sources and targets. Representation
does not essentially consist in transfer of structure from target system to source
object. And while the homomorphism account may describe the means whereby
some mathematical representations operate in science, it can not fully describe
representation per se.
Conclusions
To draw the discussion to a close, let me see whether I can now attempt a reply to
the question I began the dissertation with: if and to what extent the concept of
structure can be integrated into the philosophical analysis of scientific representa-
tion.
Let me first answer the if -question. My answer is ‘yes’, the concept of structure
can be integrated into the analysis. Chapters 1 and 2 are meant to give evidences
in favor of such an answer.
In Chapter 1 the concept of epistemic structure ascription has been presented
as a possible way to go in order to resist the deflationism about the problem
of representation. Turning down this form of deflationism is, trivially, a first
step to carry on the debate over scientific representation without giving ground
to any metaphysics of representation for mental states, as Callender and Cohen
(2006) suggest. So, the first – I think – significant advantage that we gain from
appealing to the concept of structure is to keep the debate on representation
alive. The concept of epistemic structure ascription is just in its embryo stage.
Surely its tenability has to be further verified and there are also possibilities for
it to be enriched by the comparison with analogue concepts presented, e.g., in the
philosophy of mathematics (Resnik, 1975, Steiner, 1978), or in more recent works
in the philosophy of science (see, e.g., Bokulich, 2011 and Debs and Redhead,
2007, ch. 1). Passed these tests and comparisons, this concept could turn out
to be a prerequisite for posing and tackling the problem of representation, as
many philosophers are keep doing, notwithstanding just few of them have picked
out the gauntlet thrown by Callender and Cohen’s deflationism. Moreover, the
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concept of epistemic structure ascription could be integrated into the inferential
account advocated by Sua´rez (2004, 2015). And this might be a non-trivial result.
Indeed, Sua´rez’s account is among the few attempts to date that does provide
an account of representation general enough to contravene the tendency, to some
extent detrimental for the issue of representation, to reduce its analysis mainly
to a description of particular instances of scientific representations, each with
their own representational formats (in Chapter 1, I have termed this trend of
inquiry “particularistic analysis”). This tendency, I think, is leading us far from
the original scope of the philosophical analysis of scientific representation, that
is, to provide a rational reconstruction which is broad and consistent enough to
successfully grasp the general features of representation.
In Chapter 2, whose first part aims at presenting the semantic view through
the analysis of its early formulations (those provided by Suppe, Suppes and van
Fraassen), I have singled out those features that make the semantic view a rational
reconstruction of scientific theories and scientific theorizing. In particular, I have
argued that the semantic view offers a contingent, modest, and neutral rational
reconstruction built on the notion of models as structures. These, I think, are
essential features that an account of scientific representation should display. The
work done within the semantic view also allows to understand the usefulness of a
rational reconstruction for an otherwise too complex enterprise, such as scientific
theorizing and experimental practice. To deal with such a complexity, we should
a priori give up the possibility of providing a faithful description of the scientific
practice. So, to mention just one formulation of the semantic view considered in
this chapter, the hierarchy of structures (models) put forward by Suppes (1962)
is a huge step forward in this direction. It is indeed presented with no demand
to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for having either representation or,
more generally, scientific explanation. The reconstruction of scientific theorizing
provided by the semantic view rather aims at setting a formal framework within
which the general features of model construction and application can be identi-
fied, thus achieving an account which is a close approximation of actual scientific
practice. The success of the semantic view in this respect might be interpreted
as a confirmation that a rational reconstruction built on the notion of structure
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could shed some light on scientific representation. In the second part of Chapter
2, I have presented a critical analyses of the charges against the semantic view as
an account of scientific representation.
In Chapter 3, I have considered a case where the integration of the concept of
structure into the philosophical analysis of scientific representation turns out to
be unsuccessful. This is Bartels’ structural account of scientific representation.
Bartels’ account is an instance of the so-called structural approaches to represen-
tation. The hallmark of these approaches is, so to speak, to let the formal concept
of structure make all the representational work – thus relying on the objectivity
of the mathematics employed to cash out the relation between a model and its
target. This way of conceiving models and their representational task has been
widely criticized in the past by renown arguments such as Newman’s problem
(1928) or Putnam’s model-theoretic argument (1976) and, more recently, further
arguments have been provided against structural approaches by Frigg (2002, 2006),
Giere (2004), Sua´rez (2002, 2003), van Fraassen (1997, 2006, 2008). The argument
presented in this chapter against Bartel’s account draws on the criticisms put for-
ward by the recent literature and it leads to the same conclusions. Conceiving the
structural properties of a model – such as ‘being morphic to’ a structure taken
to represent the target system – as (necessary and) sufficient conditions turns
out to be problematic. Indeed, structural approaches compel the philosopher to
deal either with the distinct, and equally problematic, issue of the applicability
of mathematics, or with an account based on the mind-independency of represen-
tation, which is hard to justify. The solution that the recent literature offers to
avoid the pitfalls of the structural approaches is to acknowledge the relevance of
the pragmatic aspects characterizing scientific representation (such as the role of
model-users, the practice of model-building, the epistemic goals to achieve, etc.)
and to provide accounts which consider such aspects as well. Both the accounts of
representation which I have defended in the previous chapters have the happy fea-
ture of taking into account the pragmatic aspects of representation while providing
its rational reconstruction in structural terms.
If the overall answer to the if question is ‘yes’, then the to what extent-question
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can be reformulated as follows: whither structuralism for scientific representation?
My answer is that there exists a form of structuralism which can be fruitfully used
to settle issues pertaining to scientific representation. This form of structuralism
appeals to a notion of structure as epistemic device which is employed by a compe-
tent model-user to get information about the target system. Therefore, the notion
at stake is that of structure as a representational vehicle. However, this form of
structuralism can settle only general issues about scientific representation, that is,
it may not work for particular instances of representation, which vary according
to the discipline at stake. With respect to other form of structuralism for sci-
entific representation, such as that held by the advocates of structural accounts,
the one which I advocate does not exceed its scope as a rational reconstruction of
scientific representation. This could happen if the notion of structure is employed
either to justify the representational practice independently of pragmatic aspects,
or to provide both necessary and sufficient conditions for all occurrences of scien-
tific representation, or when it is framed within wider epistemic programs – thus
compromising the neutrality of the reconstruction.
Of course, there is still much work to be done to flesh out this conception. I
would be satisfied if I managed to make this form of structuralism for scientific
representation only conceivable as an option.
Appendix A
Suppes’ Formulation of the
Semantic View
A.1 Models and set-theoretic predicates
In this appendix I illustrate Suppes’ attempt to formalize classical particle me-
chanics by employing set-theory. Suppes’ goal is to show that “even a relatively
complicated theory can be given a clear and exact formulation within set the-
ory” (Suppes, 1957, p.291). The formulation of the theory begins with its ax-
iomatic characterization, in line with what is typically done in mathematics. A
set-theoretic structure is said to be model of a theory thus formulated if and only
if it satisfies the set of axioms of the theory.
Let S = 〈P, T, s,m, f, g〉 be a system of particle mechanics, where P and T are sets,
s and g are binary functions, m is a unary function, and f is a ternary function.
The intended physical interpretation of the axioms of the theory is the following.
The elements of P are particles. The elements of T are time indices. The function
s(p, t) denotes the position of particle p ∈ P at time t ∈ T . The function m(p)
denotes the mass of particle p ∈ P . The function f(p, q, t) denotes the force that
a particle q ∈ P exerts on another particle p ∈ P at time t ∈ T . The function
g(p, t) denotes the resultant external force acting on particle p ∈ P at time t ∈ T .
110
Appendix A. Suppes’ Formulation of the Semantic View 111
A set-theoretical predicate which axiomatizes particle mechanics within set-theory
has the following form:
Definition A.1. S is a system of particle mechanics if and only if the following
axioms are satisfied:
• Kinematical axioms:
M1. P is finite and P 6= ∅;
M2. T is an interval of the real numbers R and T 6= ∅;
M3. s(p, t) ∈ R3 and is twice differentiable on T , for all p ∈ P ;
• Dynamical axioms:
M4. m(p) ∈ R and m(p) > 0, for all p ∈ P ;
M5. f(p, q, t) = −f(q, p, t) ∈ R3, for all p, q ∈ P and t ∈ T ;
M6. s(p, t)× f(p, q, t) = −s(q, t)× f(q, p, t), for all p, q ∈ P and t ∈ T ;
M7. m(p)
∂2s(p, t)
∂t2
=
∑
q∈P
f(p, q, t) + g(p, t), for all p, q ∈ P and t ∈ T .
Axiom M1 is required to have well defined mass and kinetic energy of the whole
system. Axioms M2 and M3 are considered essentially for the sake of convenience,
in particular, for tractability reasons. For instance, axiom M2 could be replaced
by the requirement that T is a subset of the rationals – empirically, this is to say
that observations take place in discrete time – but this would not allow to use
differential analysis, which makes calculation simpler. Analogue reasons can be
given for axiom M3, which requires differentiability.
Axiom M4 requires that the mass of every particle is strictly positive and inde-
pendent of time. Although an object could have a time-dependent mass, such
possibility is ruled out within classical particle mechanics. Similarly, were a par-
ticle mass null, then, according to M7, we could not determine the acceleration of
the particle by determining the forces acting on it. Together, axiom M5 and axiom
M6 require Newton’s Third Law of motion to hold. Finally, axiom M7 requires
Newton’s Second Law of motion to hold.
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P , T , s, m, f , and g are the “primitive” notions of the theory. In other words,
they are the main ‘components’ of the theory. Kinematic axioms M1, M2, and
M3 define these components set-theoretically. Furthermore, additional structure
is imposed on the primitives which should not be inconsistent with respect to the
theory. Dynamical axioms M4, M5, M6, and M7 serve this purpose. A model
M is a set-theoretical entity which satisfies the set-theoretical predicate. That
Suppes conceives models as set-theoretic structures is essential to understand in
what sense the model M can be a realization of the theory of particle mechanics
(Suppes, 1967, p.252). Sentences about the model M are valid only if they are
logical consequences of the axioms.
A model is a ‘possible realization of the theory’ if all valid sentences of the theory
are satisfied. For a model M to be a realization of the theory of particle mechanics,
it should be the case that all sentences which are valid for the theory of particle
mechanics are also satisfied inM. In this example from classical particle mechanics,
the satisfaction of the kinematical and dynamical axioms above guarantees that
this is the case.
Another hallmark of Suppes’ formulation of the semantic view, besides the set-
theoretical formalization of theories, is the idea that for a given theory we do not
have just one “logical type” of model which relates the theory to phenomena. We
rather have a ”hierarchy of models” of different logical types. Suppes illustrates
in details what of a hierarchy of models is in his paper Models of data (1962). In
the next section, I integrate Suppes’ illustration of the hierarchy view of models
with his work on both set-theoretical formalization, the theory of measurement
and linear models.
A.2 Hierarchy of models
To illustrate Suppes’ idea of the hierarchy of models, I resort to an example from
the theory of statistical learning presented in Suppes (1962). Suppes chooses the
theory of statistical learning to couch the hierarchy view of models since this
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theory is simple, mathematically non-trivial, and it involves stochastic elements.
I will not stick precisely to Suppes’ presentation of the hierarchy, partly because
now the jargon of statistical learning theory has been slightly changed and, more
importantly, because some small changes will help to shed light on those aspects
of the hierarchy view which I find particularly relevant for the purpose of this
section.
A typical realization of the theory of statistical learning is a model of learning
through experiments that describes a situation where an agent is uncertain about
the characteristics of an environment which are assumed to be persistent over time.
To learn about the environment, the agent can repeatedly run an experiment whose
outcome is stochastic but to some extent informative about the environment.
A possible specification of the statistical learning theory is the linear response
theory (see Estes and Suppes, 1959). Roughly speaking, the linear response theory
is a particular specification of how the agent interprets the evidence provided by the
experiment, that is, of how she updates her beliefs about the characteristics of the
environment. The linearity lies in the fact that, after each trial of the experiment,
the agent updates her beliefs by combining linearly her previous beliefs and the
experimental evidence.
To fix ideas, consider the following case. A researcher wants to understand the
efficacy of a drug. The experiment is a sequence (potentially infinite) of trials of the
drug on a sample of selected subjects. Each trial can provide some information in
the form of an observable response from the subjects – e.g., a particular reaction to
the drug – and a reinforcement of such a response – e.g., the intensity or the degree
of identifiability of the reaction. In order to keep things as simple as possible, let’s
assume that there are only two possible responses: yes or no, and only two possible
reinforcement: strong or weak.
Formally, the outcome of a single trial of the experiment is a pair ω = (a, e), where
a ∈ A = {a1, a2} is the observed response of the experiment, and e ∈ E = {e1, e2}
is the reinforcement. A possible experimental outcome is a sequence {ωi}∞i=0 =
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{ω0, . . . , ωn, . . .} where ωn stands for the pair of response-reinforcement observed
in the n-th trial.
A linear response theory that is particularized to the described case can be for-
malized as follows: (Ω, p, θ), where Ω = 2(A×E)
∞
is the set of all possible infinite
sequences of outcomes of single experimental trials (that is, all possible experi-
mental outcomes), p : Ω→ [0, 1] is a probability measure describing the likelihood
of each event in Ω, and θ ∈ (0, 1] is a parameter describing how much the new ev-
idence provided by the experiment affects learning – i.e., how much the researcher
weights the last observation with respect to her previous beliefs. A realization of
such a particularized linear response theory is a model of linear response which is
consistent with (Ω, p, θ) and, in addition, that satisfies the following axioms:
A1. if wn = (Ai, Ei) is observed at trial n, then at trial n+ 1 we have:
p(Ai|ω0, . . . , ωn) = (1− θ)p(Ai|ω0, . . . , ωn−1) + θ ;
A2. if wn = (Ai, Ej) is observed at trial n with i 6= j, then at trial n+ 1 we have:
p(Ai|ω0, . . . , ωn) = (1− θ)p(Ai|ω0, . . . , ωn−1) .
Axiom A1 prescribes that a response which is observed to be reinforced at trial n
leads to a higher probability of observing the same response in trial n+ 1, and the
adjustment is obtained by a linear combination of the previous expectations and
probability 1, where θ is the weight given to probability 1. Similarly, A2 prescribes
that a response that is observed not to be reinforced at trial n leads to a lower
probability of observing the same response in trial n + 1, and the adjustment is
obtained by a linear combination of the previous expectations and probability 0,
where θ is the weight given to probability 0.
From this formulation it follows that a realization of the theory can not be an
actual realization of the experiment in at least two respects. First, trials can not
be actually run an infinite number of times. Second, θ is never observed in the
experiment, as a trial provides only information on A and E.
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So, one should move down one level of the hierarchy from the abstract linear
response theory. In so doing, the observations provided by the experiment can be
related to the linear response theory.
The theory of the experiment allows for such a move. A theory of the experi-
ment which is particularized to the described experiment can be formalized by
the following pair (Ωˆ(k), q), where Ωˆ(k) = 2(A×E)
k
is the set of all possible finite
sequences of length k, where k is the number of trials fixed by the researcher, and
q : Ωˆ(k)→ [0, 1] is a probability measure describing the likelihood of each event in
Ωˆ(k) and such that it agrees with the restriction of p from Ω to Ωˆ(k). A realization
of such a particularized theory is a model of the experiment that is consistent with
(Ωˆ(k), q) and that satisfies, for instance, the following contingent reinforcement
rules:
CR1. q(wn = (A1, E1)|wn = (A1, ·)) = pi1 = 1− q(wn = (A1, E2)|wn = (A1, ·))
CR2. q(wn = (A2, E2)|wn = (A2, ·)) = pi1 = 1− q(wn = (A2, E1)|wn = (A2, ·))
Rule CR1 requires that, at any trial n of the experiment, the probability of observ-
ing E1, given the outcome A1, is independent of any previous trial. The probability
of observing E1 is the complement to one of the probability of observing E2. The
same goes for the probability in CR2.
Note that, once the researcher has chosen the number of trials k, the finite se-
quences contained in Ωˆ describe all the possible outcomes of the experiment.
However, as k is small with respect to the cardinality of Ωˆ the researcher can
still learn very little from his experiment without imposing further structure. We
then need to go down another level of the hierarchy.
The theory of data allows for this further move. The theory of data is a theory
of statistical inference applied to experimental data. With the help of auxiliary
assumptions about the distributions of relevant variables and measurement errors,
the researcher can arrange the evidences provided by the k experimental trials
into a coherent picture. A theory of data which is particularized to the described
Appendix A. Suppes’ Formulation of the Semantic View 116
experiment can be formalized by the following tuple (Ωˆ(k), τ0(α, ·), . . . , τs(α, ·)),
where τ` : [0, 1] × Ωˆ(k) → {reject, accept} is a function providing an answer
regarding the inference ` = 0, . . . , s for a selected level of statistical significance
α ∈ (0, 1) and the given observed data (ω0, . . . , ωk) ∈ Ωˆ(k). It is worth to stress
that all the additional structure that allows for statistical inference is embedded
in the functions {τ`}s`=0. A realization of such a particularized theory of data is a
model of data that is consistent with (Ωˆ(k), τ0(α, ·), . . . , τs(α, ·)) and that assumes
a particular value of α, as well as a subset of relevant inferences denoted by the
indices in I ⊂ {1, . . . , s}.
However, the model of data does not consider by default the possible confounding
factors that typically arise in experiments and that can substantially affect the
reliability of statistical inference. In other words, the “input” of models of data is
not guaranteed to be of the kind supposed by the theory of data, since the model
of data builds on codified inferences and therefore abstracts from the details of the
experimental design. So, to get to a layer which is closer to the concrete target
system at stake, we need to go down another level in the hierarchy
This final step is taken through the theory of experimental design. This is a theory
of controlled design by means of which we can read off confounding factors, that
can be eventually eliminated. In so doing, the data collected can be used within
the model of data in order to fit the model of the experiment. A realization of the
theory of experimental design is a model of experimental design that sets the rules
to be followed for running a particular experiment.
Table A.1 represents the hierarchy of models (and theories) described so far. At
the top of the hierarchy we find the theory of statistical learning which, being at
the highest layer of the hierarchy, is ideally the most far-off from the actual phe-
nomenon which is inquired. Going downward through the hierarchy, both theories
and models get more ‘concrete’ as they become particularized to fit the needs of the
researcher – namely to test the linear response theory in a controlled environment.
So, the model of statistical learning is the most abstract and theoretical, while the
model of experimental design is the most concrete and applied. In between the
highest and the lowest layers, there are the structures which allow the model of
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Theory Model Hierarchy position
of statistical learning abstract model of an agent 1st
learning by experimenting
of linear response model consistent with (Ω, p, θ) 2nd
and satisfying A1/A2
of experiments model consistent with (Ωˆ, q) 3rd
and satisfying CR1/CR2
model consistent with
of data (Ωˆ(k), τ0(α, ·), . . . , τs(α, ·)) 4th
plus a choice of significance level α
and inferences {1, . . . , s}
model producing data
of experimental to be used in the model of data 5th
design taking into account
contingent experimental conditions
Table A.1: Hierarchy of models according to Suppes
statistical learning to relate to the model of experimental design. Roughly speak-
ing, at each layer of the resulting hierarchy, the “output” of a model crucially
depends on the “input” given by the model at the former layer.
Appendix B
Suppe’s Formulation of the
Semantic View
B.1 The intended scope of a theory
Suppe (1977) bases his analysis of scientific theories on the intuitive concept of
the intended scope of a theory, i.e., the class of phenomena that a theory aims
at describing in a manner that is both sufficiently precise and abstract enough to
allow for predictions and explanations. In particular Suppe emphasizes that, in
order to deal with the complexity of a target system, theories abstract from those
features of the system which are not taken to be relevant for explanatory purposes.
As a consequence, theories never provide an accurate description of their target
system. What theories can provide is an accurate description of the system in
isolation, i.e., of a system as it would behave were it isolated from the elements
which are abstracted away. Within Suppe’s formulation of the semantic view, the
term “physical systems” refers to such systems in isolation, which are also defined
as “idealized replicas of phenomena” (Suppe, 1977, p.224). Physical systems are
then “counterfactually true” of the target system they represent (Suppe, 1989,
p.95).
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B.2 The state space
More precisely, Suppe characterizes physical systems as idealized replicas of those
phenomena that can be fully described by the set of selected parameters. A par-
ticular configuration of the systems - i.e., a particular set of values of the selected
parameters – is called a state of the system. The behavior of the system over time
is then described by a sequence of states – each of which is fully characterized
by a particular set of values of the selected parameters. A sequence of states is a
trajectory in a physical system.
The following is an example from Suppe (1977). Consider the theory of classical
particle mechanics and a phenomenon within the theory’s intended scope, such as
a free falling object in a viscous fluid. Classical particle mechanics assumes objects
to be point masses and to move in a vacuum. Motion depends on momentum and
mass. So, the only parameters that turn out to be relevant are momenta and
coordinates of point masses.
More in detail, an object in free fall through a viscous fluid is described by two
point masses, say A for the object and B for the earth, their positions, and their
momenta (both position and momenta are given by three coordinate variables).
The set of potential states of this system – i.e., the state space – is characterized
by the values of the twelve position and momentum coordinates that A and B
can have. So, the state of this system at a given time index t is described by the
numerical values of these twelve parameters, and the behavior over time t ∈ [t0, t1]
of this system is described by a sequence of such states, one for each t ∈ [t0, t1].
Note that, since each state is characterized by twelve “numbers”, i.e., the twelve
values of the relevant parameters, the state space can be described as a subset of
a twelve-dimensional coordinate space – where the coordinates are the values that
the parameters can take – and the behavior of the system can be described by a
trajectory in the coordinate space.
Now, consider a scientist who wants to predict at time t the behavior of a small rock
(A) in free fall towards the earth (B) at time t′ > t. First of all, the scientist has
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to measure both A’ and B’s positions and momenta at time t. The measurements
thus obtained should be converted into data, that is, into information about the
state of the system “would have been had the idealized conditions presupposed by
the theory been met” (Suppe, 1977, p.225). For instance, data must be corrected
for the presence of the air medium. These data provide the twelve values of the
parameters at time t that identify the state of the system at time t, as if it were
in isolation. The scientist can then apply the theory and, from the knowledge of
the state of the physical system at time t, she can derive the state of the system
at time t′ > t.
Note that, even if the theory is correctly specified, the state so predicted for time
t′ > t is not the state that the scientist will be likely to observe at t′, but it is the
state that she would observe if the system was in isolation. However, the scientist
can reverse the procedure applied to derive the twelve values of the parameters at
time t from the initial measurements relative to A and B: she can use the twelve
values of the parameters at time t′ to derive the values of the actual A’ and B’s
positions and momenta – namely, the values of the actual phenomenon which does
not take place in isolation. If the theory is correctly specified, then these actual
values will match the positions and momenta of A and B which are measured at
t′.
B.3 The phase space
According to Suppe (1977), a physical system characterized by n relevant pa-
rameters is well described by a n-dimensional phase space. Laws of coexistence
determine which subset of the phase space are physically possible. That is to say
that only the points of the phase space whose coordinates satisfy the law will be
physically possible. Laws of succession determine the possible trajectories in the
phase space. Laws of interaction describe the effect of interacting systems and
the deriving composite configurations on the phase space. A physical system is
then defined by Suppe as what obtains when “all the configurations save one are
removed from phase space” (ibid., p.227) and scientific theories are defined as
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structures, “these structures being phase spaces with configurations imposed on
them in accordance with the laws of the theory” (ibid).
According to Suppe, this formalization sheds some light on the relationship be-
tween theories and their formulations. A formulation of a theory consists in a
physical system which employs elementary statements. Elementary statements
are made of propositions expressing the value r of a certain physical magnitude
m at a certain time t. These statements can be true or false. Since, according to
Suppe, “the theory is a model of any of its possible formulations” (ibid., p.228),
the truth of an elementary statement (not to be confused with the empirical truth
of the theory) depends on the phase space which is configured.
Let H denote the phase space, E the set of all elementary statement, and e ∈ E
the generic elementary statement. The satisfaction function h : E→ 2H is defined
as the mapping that assigns to each elementary statement e ∈ E the region of H
where e is true. The triplet 〈E, H, h〉 provides the formal language for a theory.
Elementary statements can be combined together according to logical rules which
the language of the theory complies with (e.g., those of the Boolean algebra).
The truth of the compound statements will be determined by the truth of the
elementary statements. The structure of the phase space is a “major factor” in
determining how elementary statements in E can be combined together and form
statements which are true or false of the phase space. This, in turn, implies that
the theory imposes restrictions on the possible languages to be employed for its
formulation.
Appendix C
Van Fraassen’s Neutral
Formulation of the Semantic View
C.1 Before The Scientific Image: Semi-interpreted
languages
In his paper on Beth’s semantics of physical theories (1970), van Fraassen sets
the basis for his formulation of the semantic view. In this paper, van Fraassen
presents his analysis of the structure of scientific theories as an extension of Beth’s
contribution on the issue. More precisely, van Fraassen extends Beth’s analysis
by providing a framework for it which is built on the theory of semi-interpreted
language (see van Fraassen, 1967 and van Fraassen, 1969).1
Within this formulation, theories are formalized in terms of meaning relations
among predicates. This formulation can be formally presented by means of a set S
of meanings, a set P of predicates, and a function f : P → 2S which assign to each
predicate p ∈ P a set of meanings f(p) ⊂ S. A similar formulation is provided
1The reasons given by van Fraassen for focussing on Beth’s analysis are, first of all, that
Beth’s analysis is “a much more deep-going analysis of the structure of physical theories” (1970,
p.325) and, secondly, that it is more faithful to actual practice than the analysis put forward by
the syntactic view.
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for the relations of intent. By “relations of intent” van Fraassen (1967) refers
to “intensive relations” which establish whether two predicates are intensionally
equivalent. Thus, we can replace the set of meanings S with the set of intents T ,
and the function f is replaced by a function g : P → 2T which assigns to each
predicate p ∈ P a set of intents f(p) ⊂ T .
The specification of a logical space of a language, such as P , and the specification
of an interpretation function, such as f or g, jointly provide a semi-interpretation
for an uninterpreted structure. In particular, according to van Fraassen (1967), in
a semi-interpreted language four elements should be specified:
1. the syntax of the language, i.e., its vocabulary and grammar, that provides
the set of possible sentences;
2. the logical space of the language, given as a set;
3. the interpretation of the language, given as a function from the set of possible
sentences to the logical space;
More precisely, van Fraassen (1970) claims that the formalization of physical the-
ories by means of a semi-interpreted language requires the following elements (see
also van Fraassen, 1972):
• a set of (measurable) physical magnitudes M , together with a set of el-
ementary statements E about the physical magnitudes. Each elementary
statement assigns a value to a certain magnitude (the syntax );
• a state space S for the physical system under consideration that specifies all
possible states in which the physical system can be, that is, all the possible
values of the physical magnitudes according to the theory at stake (the logical
space);
• a satisfaction function σ which assigns to each elementary statement a region
of the state space (the interpretation).
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A semi-interpreted language for a physical theory is the ordered triple L = 〈E, S, σ〉.
A model for such language can be formalized as a pair M = 〈X, ξ〉, where X is
some physical system which can be represented using the magnitudes in M , and ξ
is a function which assigns to X a state in S. Therefore, an elementary statement
e ∈ E about the model M is true if and only if ξ(X) ∈ σ(e), i.e., if and only if
the system actually is in the region of the state space which is specified by the
satisfaction function. An elementary statement e ∈ E is a valid sentence in L if
and only if e is true for every model of L. Finally, a set of statements E ′ ⊆ E
semantically entails an elementary statement e ∈ E if and only if e is true in all
models of the theory in which every e′ ∈ E ′ is true.
To sum up, van Fraassen suggests that the meaning structure of a theory can be
formally reconstructed by means of a semi-interpreted language which, in turn,
becomes the language of the theory. For this reason, van Fraassen claims that a
theory defines the kinds of systems to which it applies.
C.2 After The Scientific Image: Data and sur-
face models
In Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective (2008), van Fraassen presents
an analysis of the structure of scientific theories which differs from the one illus-
trated in the previous section. The common hallmark of these two analyses is that,
contrary to the analysis presented in The Scientific Image (1980a) and strongly in-
fluenced by constructive empiricism, they are both neutral formulation of scientific
theories (see discussion in Chapter 2, subsection 2.2.3).
The analysis carried out by van Fraassen in Scientific Representation appeals to
the idea of a hierarchy of models introduced by Suppes (1962) (see Appendix A)
and, in particular, it focuses on the work done at the lowest layers of the hierarchy
by the data model and by the so-called surface model.
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The data model provides a first “policed summary” of the raw data which are
collected by means of experiments and observations. This summary is obtained
through a series of repeated measurements. More precisely, the data model sum-
marizes the relative frequencies of the measured magnitudes which are taken to
be relevant for the phenomenon at stake. For example, a graph representing the
temperature in a certain region at a certain time t is a data model. It provides
a “smoothed-out summary” of the information collected form the raw data which
have been gathered at various stations in the region of interest.
The surface model is a summary which “smoothes still further” the information
in the data model. The relative frequencies summarized by the data model are
replaced in the surface model by measures with a continuous range of values. The
main task of the surface model is to arrange information from the data model in
such a way that the empirical evidence can be put in relation with more abstract
structures at the higher layers of the hierarchy of models and, in particular, with
the theoretical model. This is a crucial step in order for a scientist to evaluate the
explanatory adequacy of the theory with respect to the phenomenon at stake. In
this regard, van Fraassen explicitly states that surface models should ideally be
considered as isomorphically embeddable into theoretical models. Otherwise, it
would not be possible to show whether theoretical models fit observed phenomena,
which is indeed the task they have been construed for.
A precise formalization of the surface models is provided in van Fraassen (2008,
p.169). A surface model mainly comprises the following elements:
• observable condition PRG: a set A of possible measurement choices;
• observable condition PRS: a set B of possible measurement outcomes;
• surface state: a probability measure pi on B which is conditional on A.
The probability given by pi(b|a) for some a ∈ A and b ∈ B is called surface
probability, and it describes the probability that, given the measurement choice a,
the outcome which will be observed is b.
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In order to see in what sense a surface model is to be embedded into a theoretical
model, it is useful to give a brief and formal description of the theoretical model
as well. In general, a theoretical model specifies:
• a set M of observables (physical magnitudes), each of which has its own
range of possible values X(m), with m ∈M ;
• a set S of states, where each s ∈ S specifies a value for each observable, i.e.,
s ∈∏m∈M X(m) for all s ∈ S;
• a stochastic response function µm which is a probability measure on X(m),
m ∈M , that is conditional on S.
The probability given by µm(x|s) for some m ∈ M , x ∈ X(m), and s ∈ S has to
be interpreted as the model’s specification of the probability that a measurement
of m gives value x when the system is in state s.
Hence, the theoretical model fits the surface model – i.e., the surface model is
successfully embedded in the theoretical model – if and only if there exists some s ∈
S such that the probability measures {µm(·|s)}m∈M all agree with the probability
pi(·|a) for every a ∈ A which allows the measurement of m. Thus, embedding
obtains if and only if one can find at least one state of the theoretical model that
can account for all measurement occurrences, as well as for their frequencies, as
they are described by the surface model.
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